This Is How You Lose Big League on Foreign Policy

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/11/03/this-is-how-you-lose/

Imagine a small country with an insecure government that the past administrations have been supporting, and which has issues that you don't particularly like.

Imagine that this country is a possible ally against a much bigger threat in the region.

What do you do when the bigger threat is courting this country and is promising all sorts of boons with no strings attached?

What's your leverage? Do you engage? Do you give up? Do you continue to stand on principle?

Well, whatever the choices are in this situation, the one thing that is guaranteed not to be helpful is doing absolutely nothing and leaving it up to others to decide how things are going to work.

And that's, of course, precisely what the Trump administration did with Cambodia.

A few months ago, in the wake of the new administration's early forays into foreign policy, regional experts warned about Cambodia moving away from the West towards China, in the run up to the upcoming elections.

Cambodia was worried about losing the elections, and China was offering condition-free loan and political support. Donald Trump, not as interested in pressing for human rights and democracy as some of his predecessors, was, at that point, still an unknown quantity, and could have utilized this opportunity to woo away Cambodia from China by gauging it on other issues. 

For the new administration, it would have been a mistake to rely on the passive continuation of existing foreign relations with even relatively small countries when other countries are actively moving towards engagement in whatever manner.

In bipolar or multipolar circumstances, the smaller countries will engage in maneuvering and play off the superpowers against one another to get the most benefit and influence for themselves. It's a classic Cold War tactic. The mistake the United States was making during the Cold War proxy tensions (and perhaps there were few options at the time) was to be reactive in its approach and merely throw resources as a response. But of course, the Soviet Union would then provide more goodies without any preconditions or expectations of democratization, and so forth.

The better position would have been to a better approach would be to reevaluate various pressure points of Cambodia's foreign policy and to use those pressure points as a more nuanced engagement approach to steer them towards the United States but also make clear that increased engagement with China will not come without a cost. In other words, reverse the position and cause the weak country in question to have to do the cost-benefit analysis of having to choose its allies - or else making the wiser choice, of not being played by China and engaging with both.

That approach very well may have failed. China has no scruples about backing the governments that are loyal and helpful.  And interfering directly in another country's elections is also problematic. But non-interference has not helped us one bit.

Incumbent PM Hun Sen distanced himself from the US, and disregarding all international norms, threw his political opponent in prison.  Earlier engagement may not have stopped this development, but perhaps it could have prevented a complete deterioration of the relationship, and would have allowed us to figure out the leverage for promoting human rights and fair elections. At the very least, we could have taken a more principled stand on this issue before Hun Sen had gone so far in the direction of authoritarianism.

And even after the fact, it is not the President of the United States who has taken an active role in countering this violation of human rights and international norms, but Senator Ted Cruz, who essentially stated that he would work on utilizing the Global Magnitsky Act to deny Cambodian human rights violators entry to the United States. That would, of course, require Congressional pressure on the administration, which has yet to designate human rights violators under that law. At this point, the White House has been put on very public notice, and has no excuse not to take decisive action, including, potentially, sanctions - which is arguably as embarrassing for us, after all the investments we have made into Cambodia, as it is for the Cambodian Prime Minister, who is impolitic reaction to Sen. Cruz's letter was very telling.

However, if US is to be taken seriously, it has no choice but to play an active role in its own relationship, particularly with countries which have been significant recipients of the US taxpayers' money. The US should not have to support corrupt regimes, which have no regard for democracy or freedom, and who are also empowering other dictatorships in order to protect their leadership - but  not their people. And the US should certainly position itself in such a way that other countries should want to do business with it, because an honest relationship with a strong, fair-minded, country respectful of its partners and obligations, and expecting the same should be seen far more reliable and a far better investment than an utterly corrupt and morally bankrupt party leaders, which have been known to renege on its financial promises and will just as easily throw you to the wolves when they no longer have use for you as they back you in time of need.  China has a history of dubious financial investments, which have done little for Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and other countries. It has left projects in Latin America left unmanaged, and has become infamous for the corrupt quality of its project and "investment support"/development, amounting to little more than colonial practices, all over Africa.

Choosing to work with the US should be a no-brainer.  But not if we let China do all the leadership and all the talking, and not if we show we have no interest in strong relationship with clear and coherent rules. I hope this situation wakes President Trump and the State Department to the fact that putting America first means putting in the work needed to forge relationships with our allies, partners, and beneficiaries of our investment that are based on the pursuit of mutual interests and respect. Signalling that we just don't care enough to bother with diplomacy will position us in a very weak place down the road, and one day, we may find that those who do care have taken all initiative and all leverage out of our hand. And that day, who we partner with and on what grounds will no longer be up to us.

How US Unequivocal Support for Iraqi Nationalism Will Lead to Radicalization and Extremism

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/how-us-unequivocal-support-for-iraqi-nationalism-will-lead-to-radicalization-and-extremism/

Seth Frantzman, in a recent article, analyzes US position of neutrality on Baghdad takeover of Kirkuk, and further silence on the alleged human rights violations, and punitive actions such as the shut down of Kurdish press, Kurdistan24 and Rudaw. In sum, the thinking is that encouraging Iraqi nationalism, which is based in substantial part in anti-Kurdish sentiment, US will turn Iraq away from Iranian influence, and unify the country under the Saudi Arabia aegis against the spread of Iranian influence. The idea there is that if the Shi'a Iraqi government aligns with the Sunni KSA, together they can counter Iran. And indeed, Iraq has signed a corresponding defense treaty with KSA. However, that is not a meaningful agreement for two reasons: first, Iraq will do just about anything to play all sides, including the US, which has been arming its army. Second, KSA is far away, and Iran is close. Abadi and the Islamic Republic has been getting along quite nicely, and Abadi invited Iran to participate in takeover of Kirkuk. It clearly does not see Iran as a threat, though KSA does. And when forced to choose between its Shi'a neighbor, which has helped Iraq with the Kurdish issue and the Sunni Saudi Arabia, which is known to sympathize with Iraq's Sunni population, tribal and religious considerations will prevail over piece of paper.

The fact that the United States does not realize that shows the extent of ignorance of our foreign policy leaders of the cultures, which they are now trying to bring together through fictitious borders and imaginary alliances. The British, when they did the same, at least cynically imposed divisions to perpetuate their own power. The US leaders actually believe that this policy is going to work and that it's in the best interests of the Middle East and the United States. It is quite amazing.  This vision of a Baghdad-Riyadh alliance puts aside the dream of a free and democratic Kurdistan. The reason for this groupthink at top levels may be deeply rooted in the underlying psychological need to stay consistent. In other words, the US has already invested so heavily into Baghdad, that having realign its policy now would be equivalent to conceding defeat. In other words, the excuse that this is all about American interests is rational, but the reasoning behind is not. Otherwise, the weight that the US would be giving to other considerations would be at least equal to its own wishful thinking to see this implausible alliance of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to work for more than five minutes, until Iran decides that it should be otherwise.

Much has already been said and written about the potential boons of an independent Kurdistan for the United States - a trading partner with a vibrant economy, a buffer state against Iran's and Turkey's expansionist ambitions, a new model of indigenous evolutionary liberalization, a friendly state, open to Western values and partnership with Israel. All of these potential benefits, in the eyes of the generals, who are spearheading US foreign policy in the Fertile Crescent, is of less interest than having Iraq not be quite-so-pro-Iran.  There is no official analysis on how such calculations are figured, but there is also a darker side of this conversation that likewise does not appear to figure into the equation: the potential for the radicalization of the Kurdish region. Neither friends nor critics are particularly interested in touching on this sensitive topics. Those, who favor independent Kurdistan focus the bulk of their attention on the perceived betrayal by the US - in other words, a valid, but largely emotional talking point, whereas the critics cite the dubious benefits of yet another tribal Muslim state at the cost of weakening another ally - Iraq. The underlying working assumption, however, is that the US decisionmakers are correct in one way: Kurdish independence will bring greater instability than Kurdish "remain", at least in the short term.

Such position relies on the erroneous assumption that Iraq is open to various potential positions, and will pivot in the desirable direction if only the United States will do what Baghdad claims needs to be done to earn its favor - return the oil fields to Abadi's forces without a question, stay moot on the Kurds, encourage peace talks through gentle rhetoric, and ignore the Iran-backed militias and IRGC presence in the vicinity. If only the US does all these things, at some point, all will be well. IRGC will not do much damage beyond security the territory for Iraq and ensuring that the rebellious Kurds will not tempt its own Kurdish population; Turkey is all talk; ISIS has been taken care of, and US can reap the boons of its cynical wisdom. Such wishful thinking is no more practical than believing that Kurdish independence will come without a bloody fight against a variety of regional forces. That's not a commentary on the morality or benefits or likelihood of such a move; that's just a statement of logical observation based in the Middle Eastern dynamics. You get what you are willing to fight for, and only if you win with overwhelming force. In the meantime, US is so focused on its own line of reasoning that it ignores major red flags that undermine its position.

First, Iraq has already and openly pivoted to Iran. The actions of the last few weeks demonstrate it amply. US reasoning that by sacrificing Kurdistan it can stop Iraq from growing closer to Iran is not only mistaken; it is nothing short of appeasement.  Iran's interest is regional dominance. Abadi, if he wants to stay in power in the region, needs to abide by Iran's decisionmaking. It will, therefore, cooperate to whatever extent necessary that it is seen as a fully ally, reliable in supporting Iran's ambitions.  Iran will not stop at building IRGC military basis and headquarters in Kirkuk, nor does it make it any sense to stop when there is no resistance from anyone.

Second, Iran's presence in the Kurdistan area far exceeds what can be gauged from the coverage, especially after Kurdistan24 and Rudaw were shut down. According to one source, Iran has as many as 700 secret houses in Suleimanya alone. If that's accurate, it's quite plausible that Iran has extensive presence, both overt and clandestine, in every corner of Kurdistan. And it is there to stay, long-term.  From disputed territory between Baghdad and Erbil, Kirkuk province are becoming occupied territories, essentially colonized by Iran. If Iran continues to grow its military presence in the area, and there's every reason to believe that without a war, Iran is not going anywhere, the next step is indoctrination of the local population - ranging from forced conversions to political brainwashing.

It may already be building schools, whereas Western educational opportunities in the region are woefully missing. Furthermore, with Baghdad banning all commercial flights in and out of  Erbil, and potentially cutting off access to Syrian and Turkish overpasses, Kurds are not only economically isolated, but become wholly dependent on Baghdad and Tehran for humanitarian aid, educational maintenance, and even the news.And Iran is likely to radicalize the local Shi'a population through joint educational programming.  The religious element may prevail over tribal concerns, if Iran is seen as an economic benefactor, rather than an oppressor to the Iraqi majority. Meanwhile, it is taking every step to show who's the boss. Iran is opening up its border with Kurdistan - that is a sign that the regime has achieved a decisive military and psychological victory. It has nothing to fear from the Kurds.

At the same time, however, the support of nationalist sentiments among Iraqis is taking a turn less towards unity and more into anti-Kurdish xenophobia. Already, a Kurdish journalist was stabbed to death in Kirkuk. Iranian militias, not Iraqi forces, arrested dozens of young Kurds in a cafe in Kirkuk. Their fate is unenviable, as anyone, familiar with the brutality of the regime and its treatment of rebellious ethnic minorities will testify. And religious minorities all over the Kurdish region are threatened by the IRGC and the Iran=backed militias. Jewish and Christian sites near Al Qosh are in danger. Multiple Christian and Yazidi groups have expressed concern.  Militias are on full alert protecting civilians, yet they are outnumbered and outgunned by the well-equipped Iraqi forces, and the Iran=backed militias that are not answerable to Abadi's command.  This destabilization is precisely what US support for national unity was supposed to prevent. Instead, it is turning into the scapegoating and vendetta against the Kurds.

Third, these divisions are likely to be exploited by Sunni extremist groups, like Al Qaeda and remnants of ISIS and their ilk. Seemingly defeated, these groups await opportunity for strife in order to make a triumphant comeback, sow discord, and take advantage of other violent situations.  And ideological extremists will surely take the opportunity to appeal to the disenfranchised groups, proselytize among embittered and marginalized Kurdish peripheral regions, and go after every resentful person or group left hopeless after the takeover of Kirkuk.

Worse still, if Iraq continues to try to destroy Kurdish nationalism and sense of identity, as it's doing now, the resistance that will arise will become increasingly radical and violent, and the potential for militant action, all the way to terrorism against civilians is not to be ruled out. We have seen the way the Soviet Union had sown chaos among Turkish Kurds, eliminating all nationalist groups except for the PKK, and turning PKK into a Soviet terrorist group (which after several decades finally reformed, but not before costing many lives of innocent civilians in the process). Interestingly, Russia is moving back into Kurdistan, and is seeking a closer relationship with the Kurds. It's also looking to utilize them more in Syria.  That Russia will use this opportunity to play on the anti-American backlash through what is widely perceived as betrayal is quite obvious.

To make a long story short, the downside to the chimeric US strategy involving the one-sided coddling of Baghdad to the exclusion of all other interested parties, is that instead of building bulwarks against extremists, including Iran, which is the whole goal of this exercise, the US is actually making active enemies out of absolutely everyone in the region, strengthening the potential for extremism, and allowing radical actors to assume the vacuum of leadership, all in the name of unity and the US interests. But the region united by extremism is not in the US interests at all, and neither is giving up opportunities for economic investments and partnerships fall into the hands of Russia and Iran, which have not done anything positive with any place they have ever been involved in.

The administration should snap out of this dangerous delusion quickly, and start drawing and enforcing boundaries for its "ally" Baghdad, which include, first and foremost, getting Iran and out of the picture completely, and only then creating positive bilateral and equanimeous conditions for further negotiations. It should send a clear signal to Kurds that their identity is recognized and respected, and to all other actors, that US has a central role to play in the region, and that chaos and extremism of any sort is not an option and will not be tolerated - not after all the lives the US has sacrificed to get to where we are today. Most importantly, the US should remember that alliances among former enemies are temporary, and for that reason Iraqi-Saudi alliance cannot be relied upon to last.

But strong long-term relationship among groups of people who have a baseline of common interests, values, and a history of fighting together for common goals can endure and move in the most positive direction. We should not continue following the same failed policy of putting all our eggs in one basket (in this case, Abadi), only to be bitterly disappointed and face new crisis yet again.  We have the luxury of hindsight to make better, more informed decisions, and the richness of our experience to build a better, more secure future for ourselves, and the world that we want to live in.