No Coherent Strategy Without Core Principles in Foreign Policy

Contrary to conventional wisdom and widely embraced foreign policy dogma, strategic defense of national interests is not possible without adoption of certain core principles. Saying that “United States doesn’t have allies, it has interests” really misses the mark with regards to carrying out the tasks that secures those interests , which include the safety of  our borders, our cyber domain, our troops, and strategically important sites, such as bases and embassies, abroad. Our interests, beyond security objectives, may include regional stability, preservation and growth of important relationships and alliances, resolution of trade deficit, and various internal economic goals.  Those are interests, which are not to be confused with strategy, or a set of long-term steps in securing particular objectives with regards to those interests. If our interest, for instance, is border protection, the securing that interest would be lowering the number of known actionable threats in sensitive border areas from X to Y.

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A strategic objective towards that end would include identifying those threads, recognizing those threats as they come in, and developing standard operating procedures towards eliminating them, which may include working closely with allies on surveillance of the areas, toughening border patrol or immigration procedures, building security fences in areas known to be vulnerable in order to slow down the path of the would-be interlopers, and creating additional electronic surveillance and means of interception. The tactical steps would be the procedures towards the identification, recognition, interception, and elimination of those threats including developing of better situational awareness, purchase of more sensitive technology, and funding for the construction of fences, border patrol watch towers, and creating a successful communications and messaging system that allows for better interaction among border patrol areas.

None of these steps, however, are possible without core values that guide us in the process. For instance, we have to abide by Constitutional restraints on our side of the border, whatever those restraints happen to be and however applicable they are in any given situation. We can debate the limits of those restraints, and specific factual scenarios in which they do or do not apply, but no one will argue against the understanding that our Constitution provides a guiding set of considerations with respect to the way we can implement certain internal security procedures. The balance of individual security and freedoms from government intervention are examples of such principles. And because of our vigorous checks-and-balance systems, despite various disagreements over how the system is applied, we overall enjoy relative internal stability, and few would argue that such principles are of little value in insuring the kind of environment that is overall beneficial.

Furthermore, the aims of most domestic policy initiatives are clear, even if the execution frequently falls short of the promise. With foreign policy, however, we seem to have lost our way, despite the general sense of where it is that we wish to end up with. And that sense comes more by way of generic slogans: “Greatness, respect by other countries, security, stability, economic victories, and peace”, than through specific visions compatible with current realities, reasonable timelines, and offsetting past mistakes. There has been no shortage of recent criticism of seeming lack of strategy in the Middle East,  Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.  Our inability to develop a serious response to Russia in Syria is rivaled only by our circuitous meanderings over 16 years of failed and stagnated policies in Afghanistan.  I won’t go into the missed opportunities with regards to TPP/trade with a number of Latin American countries, which since then, joined in to make China great again or our failure of imagination with regards to the 54 vastly different African countries, an entire continent we have dismissed but with one naval base, partially controlled by the French, and a few perfunctory visits in recent years, while other countries, such as China, are engaging in aggressive neo-colonialist policies, defensive and business buildups (such as Saudis and Turkey, building all along the Gulf of Horn, and investing in Somalia), or strengthening relationships through joint ventures, green energy investments, and personal attention, such as what Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu has been doing in a series of highly successful diplomatic overtures and a barnstorming tour.

There is more to our anemic foreign policy than Obama’s legacy of failure, takeover of the agencies by career officials in strong disagreement with President Trump’s paradigm and aiming to derail his success, or even the tunnel vision obsession with eliminating ISIS at the expense of every other threat and concern by the generals in charge of our military policy. Sure, those are all important and challenging factors, but our history of poor strategic decisionmaking dates back to the Cold War, when, through the decades of perceiving the Communist threat as our main ideological adversary, we focused on its containment (mistake # 1) to the exclusion of everything else (mistake # 2) and yet once the Soviet Union fell did not finish off the remnants of these ideological proclivities at home and abroad (mistake # 3). Despite Reaganesque rhetoric of freedom, it wasn’t the freedom or long-term security of our society that was the driving force behind our action, but rather fear of a seemingly existential threat to our own way of life on a very limited immediate level. Had it been motivated by freedom, containment would not have sufficed, and all other ideologies that could be an obstacle to freedom due to their anti-individualist worldviews would have been likewise seen as threats. Our actions were entirely reactive; and though the successful Star Wars response, the first time we finally decided to act from a position of strength, finally doomed the Soviet Union’s economic paper tiger, that was merely a successful conclusion of one battle, and a defensive rather than affirmative and forward-looking one at that.

In essence, the idea that any country can subsists on interests alone, without developing strong long-term relationships based in shared values and shared visions of the future, is pure nonsense. Furthermore, any country’s basic interests – internal and external security, strong economy, its citizens’ ability to travel and do business, is heavily interdependent with the analagous interests of other states, and to some extent, every country has identical interests. Where they differ is how they interpret those interests, and what actions they are willing to take in defense of these concepts, as well as in furtherance of their vision of their own country’s prosperity, regional and global role, and cultural contributions to the outside world.  Just as Rules of Engagement drive our military approach out of concern for the lives of civilians, as well as reciprocity in the treatment of our troops, certain basic principles of civilized behavior drive (or ought to drive) foreign policy, and when some country fails to abide by such norms, conflicts and mayhem may ensue. US is no different from others in that respect. Arguing over semantics whether “friends” or “allies” are one and the same or largely different brings us no closer to understanding how it is that we have gotten ourselves into such a confusing mess in so many places simultaneously. We have had a number of very stable, largely dependable long-term relationships with the countries that share the most with us in terms of common vision, goals for regional and global roles, and dedication to pursuit of prosperity through peaceful means; our relationships with countries which have had less in common have shifted from time to time or focused on the limited number of common approaches and issues.

Nevertheless, each relationship has focused on the observation of certain norm. If our partner in that relationship violates those norms to the extent that it impedes on our own interests in a significant way, we are forced to revaluate our relationship and set appropriate boundaries. And to the extent our partners have taken care to maintain good relationship, be responsive to our needs, and show utility and interest in forging stronger bond, over time, we respond in kind, to the extent it is helpful in addressing our own needs and other interests. Seems simple and straight-forward enough, but over time we seem to have lost track of these very basic driving factors in policymaking, and rather, have reverted to reactionary approaches predicated on attempting to utilize relational variables to resolve complex geopolitical situations.  Instead, we get our further and further flummoxed by competing demands and pressures from various actors, making it difficult to decide how to react to various parties tugging us in different directions, without alienating vital partnerships or blowing up delicate sand castles of assorted relational contingencies. This confusion is driven not just by the fact that there are too many factors to be considered but by the fact that we forget  that a paradigm of basic expected behavior should be our driving force, not simple reaction to what others believe that behavior ought to be.

Let’s take a hypothetical and abstract scenario of a military operation, in the course of which we are involved in a coalition with partners from UK, and a number of countries from EU. Let’s suppose that as the operation is winding down, with the task appearing largely accomplished, several UK troops are captured by the enemy. What would we do in such a situation? Common sense would surely bring us to try to free the hostages to the extent we are able to do so. And most likely, other coalition partners would do the same, despite the acrimony between UK and EU over Brexit. Let’s take it a step further, and imagine that it is not UK, but Spain that is the coalition partner, whose soldiers are captured, and those soldiers happen to be Catalan. They have supported the recent independence move, but have remained committed to finishing off the operation. What do you suppose would happen? The prediction is not too difficult here: Spain, the US, and everybody else would do whatever is practicable to free the hostages, and deal with the political differences at some other point in time and away from the field.  The underlying principle driving this understanding is that first, you have certain obligations to your partners, both in terms of existing defense treaties, and in terms of basic ethical considerations that makes it worth everyone’s while to fight together, and second, in the future, you want to know that someone has your back if in this instance you’ve had his. That’s a basic guarantee of mutual survival and the long term survival of your societies.  And even if you happen to have some political differences at the moment, they are presumably of lesser importance that whatever task united you to fight together.

But let’s say, you are fighting with a new partner you’ve never worked with before, and an inherently untrustworthy one at that, liable to switch side on you at any given moment. You are in that situation because that partner knows local condition better than anyone else, and frankly, the risk is worth it, considering that the enemy is quite formidable and your options are limited. What do you do? You watch your back, exercise caution, keep your options open, do your due diligence in terms of keeping yourself informed about your partner’s current and potential actions, and otherwise do exactly what you would have done with a long-standing ally. If nothing goes wrong, and your task is complete, you can choose to try to build trust and additional ties with that partner, or just peacefully part your ways. And if the partner betrays you during the course of the operation, you can always start treating it as an adversary. None of that seems terribly complicated, but we have failed on several fronts:

1. Keeping ourselves sufficiently informed about the intents and nature of our friends and enemies
2. Separating various actors into enemies, friends, short-term partners, and other temporary categories that make sense according to the situation.
3. Distinguishing potential and current long-term partners who have proven trustworthy from those partners, where the relationships are not yet at that level, where the visions of the future are not shared, approach to developing interests do not coincide, and where, in fact, there is potential for friction and conflict.
4. Treating each category according to what makes sense for that level of partnership in that situation if you take propaganda, social pressures, and past habits out of the equation.

How could we have made such basic errors in judgments? Because we have confused terms – we have mixed goals, strategic objectives, strategy in pursuit of those objectives, tactics, and underlying principles of engagement into an incoherent mishmash of incoherent concepts that merely obfuscate the situation. Somehow, using the terms “morality” and “foreign policy” in the same sentence has become taboo, even laughable. And yet it is morality that has allowed humans to survive, because at the end of the day, morality is based in pragmatic evolutionary considerations, that has kept everyone from eliminating everyone else to the point of extinction at the very outset of our sentience. I would posit that contemporary theories of international relations – idealism and realism – have failed where policies based in some underlying and focused principles likely would have helped us remain focus and develop coherent paradigms appropriate for the long-time pursuit of strategies in defense of our interests. Realism has been based in short-term reactionism, which of course, caused us to ignore long-term implications of unwise decisions. Idealism forces us to ignore realities on the ground and to try to force facts to feet our vision of what should be. It’s bound to fail, and it has failed us, again and again. We have exercised various combinations of these competing extremes to some degree for many decades, resulting in further problems, repetition of the same approach, and a self-perpetuating cycle of overlooking threats and underutilizing valuable tools and relationships.

We are doing so yet again, in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia. Leaving aside emotionally loaded terms such as “friends” and “allies” to describe our joint actions in some of these places, we have clearly forgotten that we need to do what makes sense for us, rather than what makes sense to assorted other parties pushing their demands on us. The largely theoretical construction that if we let Baghdad do what they will in Kurdistan, along with our clearly designated adversary, Iran, they will eventually go along with our vision of stability in the Middle East, is ludicrous. No country will place US interests above its own vision; it’s up to US to enforce what it has in mind through effective negotiations and utilizing partnerships to achieve specific results in the mutually beneficial directions. US is not benefiting from the instant scenario; on the contrary, we are losing respect, losing money, losing other potential partners, losing resources, wasting time, and seeing undesirable strategies of our adversaries successfully unfold before eyes.

There is no practical reason why we should not be treating our Peshmerga partners captured by adversarial Iran-backed militias the same way we would have treated our British or French or German partners under similar circumstances – if possible in the field, conducting operations to release them. Theoretical constructs about what Baghdad would possibly do if we did that are irrelevant if we abide by basic principles – we want our goals to be respected, and therefore we cannot allow the partners that have proven trustworthy be captured with no response. If our other partners are unwilling to assist in the matter, we have to act on our own, and if they interfere – well, that makes it clear where their loyalties are, doens’t it? Our partners should be able to settle political differences among themselves, but if we want our own interests to meet with success, we need to ensure that the principles that make our strategies successful prevail. If we lose one partner to another, we have actually lost both.  And then we are on our own against an enemy. And we have lost one partner to the enemy, and our partner is siding with that enemy, we have two enemies instead of one, and it makes sense to strengthen our relationship with our one existing partner for our own sake. It’s in our self-interest to be in a position of strength in any given conflict to the extent possible. That’s a basic principle, just as it’s a basic principle to protect those partners that are helpful in a particular scenario and that can be just as helpful in the future.

We cannot have a strategy if we do not have basic guides by which we operate.

The reason why the world seems messy and confusing is because we ourselves choose to view it as such and because we act in a haphazard way, instead of utilizing a specific lens that would help us guide us to where we actually want to be – in a position when we can make a positive impact towards clearly identified desirable results, and in a relationship with partners, who, by nature of sharing similar objectives, are bound to stick with the same principles and strategies, rather than switch back and forth among various sides depending on which way the wind blows. No, we want to have a system. The system works like a compass and guides us safely through whatever storms come our way, because if you know the direction you’re going in, even if you have to adjust for various obstacles along the way, you are bound to get where you need to be sooner or later. And conversely, if you are wondering from place to place with no direction and no plan to find direction and no tools to help with finding direction, you are very likely to spend your time perpetually lost. The only way to have a successful journey is to have a system for determining your location and adjusting accordingly until you get back on track to where you need to be.

The only way to have a successful foreign policy is to have a principled one, firmly based in foundations that will give you a system for formulating coherent responses, no matter what the circumstances or changes in circumstances appear to be, flexible in adjusting to reality, but strong enough to move you past all obstacle in the direction where you, and not the wind, or the sunset, or other people who likely have no idea where they are going, are trying to get you to go.

Trump, Don't Be Obama

My article was published in Israel HaYom, and republished on Instapundit.org

http://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/trump-dont-be-obama/

Irina Tsukerman

Trump, don't be Obama
Eight months into the Trump administration, it is time to stop making excuses. The Obama administration holdovers are not exclusively responsible for everything going wrong with U.S. foreign policy. Multiple agencies doubling down on foreign policy are a clear indication that the policy in question comes from the top, not from some rogue employee in one agency.

These actions by the U.S. are doing nothing but damaging its credibility and relationships.

First, the United States contributes free weapons to the Lebanese Air Force, which are then shared with Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization. Hezbollah is a fearsome Iranian proxy that has now grown to the size of a standing army and plays a distinctive and influential role in Lebanese politics. It has also attacked Americans, Israelis, and other targets over the course of the last several decades in a number of locations, and has played a destructive role in Syria. That has not worked out so well with the branch of the Afghani mujahedeen that has grown into the Taliban, and arming Hezbollah is likewise not likely to contribute to peace and stability in the world.

Second, U.S. policy in Syria, which has focused only on ISIS, has essentially allowed Iran to step in uninhibited.

Admittedly, this policy started under former U.S. President Barack Obama; however, no clear explanation has ever been provided as to why the Trump administration should go along with the terrible policies of its predecessor. The White House let Iran build a land corridor to Lebanon, which will facilitate arms and drug trafficking and offer passage for terrorists. All the while, Iran is looking to build bases in Syria and gaining control of the Strait of Hormuz, which has essentially sidelined the U.S.

Third, Trump's capitulation to Iraqi and Turkish demands on opposing Kurdistan independence emboldened Iran in its interventionism policy in Kurdistan. And it's no excuse to say that the U.S. clarified well in advance that it won't support Kurdish aspirations. The Republican-led Congress has failed to repeal the law against directly arming Kurds. As a direct result of the heavy-handed U.S. pressure on the Kurds to postpone their referendum, Iraq's government openly invited the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps to plan the takeover of Kirkuk, which, by use of some force, displaced over 170,000 people, murdered over 400 civilians and injured hundreds more. And it did not stop at Kirkuk. Faced with the administration's "neutrality" policy, Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Ghasem Soleimani entered Kirkuk freely on numerous occasions, and opened headquarters and military bases, solidifying Iran's presence in the area.

Iranians and Iraqis continue their punitive march past Kirkuk, placing minorities, such as the Yazidis, in harm's way. The Iraqi army refuses to take control or responsibility for these militias, which are wreaking havoc, and, coupled with Baghdad's harsh, isolationist policies, are ruining the region's economy. Further, Iraq, armed with U.S. weapons, ignored U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's gentle admonition that Iranian militias should go home. Iraq has now found a new, stronger ally, and the U.S. is being pushed out.

Fourth, Tillerson and Trump both said that there was no plan to try to stop America's European partners from doing business in Iran. And despite the positive indication that Trump will not allow a major Boeing deal with Iran to go through, such statements send, at best, a mixed signal. It was the complete isolation of Iran that forced it to seek relief from sanctions by way of the nuclear deal in the first place. Now, not only is Iran flush with money and investments, but continued business with other countries will make U.S. sanctions a mere drop in the bucket. U.S. sanctions alone will not affect Iran's economy, it won't diminish the strength of the Revolutionary Guards, nor will it hamper Iran's geopolitical ambition. Instead, the U.S. will be at a distinct business and economic disadvantage vis-à-vis European states. Disunity among allies is sure to be exploited by the Iranian regime, which thrives on the divide-and-conquer approach to dealing with its adversaries.

Fifth, the U.S. is allowing Hamas to do business with Iran, even as it is facilitating Palestinian unity between Fatah and Hamas and trying to work out a peace deal with Israel. Iran is encouraging the worst possible behavior in Hamas and praises the return to the destructive rhetoric that makes any sort of coexistence with Israel, much less normalization, impossible. Funding from Iran will also serve to nullify any effect from the Taylor Force Act, which would curb U.S. taxpayer funding of the Palestinian Authority in response to its continuous incitement to terrorism.

Separately, each of these policies, continuing under Trump, not Obama, is destructive enough. Together, they create a pattern of paying lip service to decertification and opposing Iran's military expansion across the Middle East and beyond, while tacitly allowing Iran and its proxies to profit from the U.S. defense industry and sacrificing American allies – a familiar pattern from the preceding administration. It is time for the Trump administration to stop finger-wagging while de facto perpetuating Obama's outdated and failed policies and refocus its energy on finding solutions.

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security lawyer based in New York.

How US Emboldens Iran Through Inept Foreign Policy

Hamas pays Tehran a visit. Again.

Could it have ANYTHING to do with the fact that IRGC is traveling everywhere unrestricted and the president just gave Europe permission to do business in Iran?

Nah, couldn't possibly be.

Article Published on JerusalemOnline

http://www.jerusalemonline.com/blogs/irina-tsukerman/op-ed-when-allies-fight-america-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-31888

Op-Ed: When allies fight - America between a rock and a hard place
Irina Tsukerman explains how the Iraqi incursion into the Kirkuk province has sparked a problematic situation for the US. However, she argues that the Iranian aid that Baghdad is receiving should have triggered the Trump administration to end its “hands-off approach” to the issue.

Iraqi forces in Kirkuk Photo Credit: EPA-EFE
The current standoff between Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's national sovereignty claims in taking over the Kirkuk province and gaining control of the oil-rich fields has placed the US in a difficult position of having to mediate between allies in an attempt to preserve a semblance of stability in a region already plagued by diverse and persistent conflicts. Another NATO ally, Turkey, is likewise placing pressure in an already complicated situation. The US is bound by the terms of a defense treaty to defend other NATO members from all attacks, but Turkey sees even countries outside its own borders as its spheres of influence and has been increasingly aggressive in intervening in the course of events in areas it claims as its territory or potential for future conflicts.

Whether such an expansive interpretation of national interests merits support from other NATO members certainly merits reexamination, but in the instant case, the predicament is directly contributing to further complications and forces the US to have to juggle competing claims of legitimacy in a way that is inching closer to being unresolvable. However, Baghdad's incursion into Kirkuk has crossed the lines of discussion and created a situation where discussing the conflicting interests of various parties in a diplomatic setting is becoming increasingly moot.

Reports of Kurds being forcibly displaced, coupled with actions that caused the Kirkuk's Kurdish governor to flee the area altogether, defy Baghdad's claim that the operation is in place merely to prevent the dissolution of the country. Likewise, Vice President Al-Maliki's comments placing the blame for the creation of ISIS on Erbil in order to break up the country add disturbing and disingenuous undertones to this course of events.

Through it all, the US continues to issue statements claiming that it's "closely monitoring the situation" and trying to mediate among all sides. Without a question, it's in the US' interests to avoid any action that would lead to deterioration of any possibility of returning to a diplomatic track or further destabilizing the region. However, the current hands-off approach not only plays into the hands of its enemies but emboldens action that goes far beyond the securing of Baghdad's perceived interest in preserving its territorial integrity.

How should, then, the US act in situations where its allies - one, a state armed directly with US weaponry, and another, a courageous nation that has been an important asset in the war against ISIS - are in a state of conflict? I would posit that the resolution of the instant scenario should be guided by the same norms the US utilizes in evaluating any situation where its allies come to a head.

First, how does the situation affect US national interests, in particular, any security considerations?

Second, does the US have binding defense treaties with either of the allies and what are the terms of those treaties? In the event that there is no such agreement, or where the agreement amounts to little more than arms trade or promises of assistance in the event of an invasion by outside forces, what is the nature of the relationship between the US and that ally?

Third, has either party involved in the conflict been the aggressor or violated any international laws, norms, or committed any acts deemed unconscionable during the course of the conflict?

Fourth, what role can the US constructively play in order to preserve good relations with both sides, and to mitigate possible damages, including minimizing the number of any casualties, property damage, population displacement and political and economic complications?

Fifth, are there any other factors to be taken into consideration, such as involvement of third parties, such as state and non-state actors, and their role in this conflict, and goals with respect to the US’ own interests and agendas?

Sixth, how are this situation and the US action or inaction affect US relations with other allies, who are likely to be affected by the conflict?

In the past, the US has tried to keep its involvement to a minimum or even stay completely neutral during wars between Pakistan and India, even when those wars took place during the Cold War and Pakistan was largely US-oriented while India had a far stronger relationship with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the nature of the US outlook on the matter was affected by the fact that the US-Pakistani relationship at the time was largely governed by the view that Pakistan played a role as part of buffer states and that US interests included backing any state that could either potentially fall under Soviet influence or could be helpful in preventing Soviet expansionism.

At the moment, however, the situation in the Middle East is in flux, and our stated goals and unarticulated considerations are far from black and white. Our limited goal of defeating ISIS in the area has been largely met with the help of both Baghdad and the Kurds. The next issue looming large on the minds of the administration and policy experts alike has been the containment of Iran's aggression. Whether containment is the best way to characterize the current stand on Iran, whether it's feasible, or the best possible course of action in the current climate are all questions deserving of independent evaluation. However, there is no doubt that Iran's aggressive actions in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and elsewhere have given cause to concern in the White House, so much so that just a week ago, Trump placed the IRGC on the list of global terrorists.

Balancing respect for the right to peaceful self-determination with the national sovereignty and territorial integrity rights of others would be a complicated matter under the best of circumstances, but there is one factor that shifts the tenor of the discussion altogether - the role of Iran and the IRGC in Baghdad's forcible takeover of the Kirkuk province.

Baghdad had invited Iran's tanks to its borders days prior to the invasion, so Iran's involvement in the matter should come as no surprise. Those who have been following the events closely should be well aware that Iran's interest in the matter is preventing similar secessionism from taking root among its own minorities, including the Kurds, who have grown restless and have had long-standing conflicts with the Iranian regime.

A joint operation between Iran and Iraq in this matter would be concerning enough, but the fact that Iran sent the IRGC, rather than its military or police forces, to participate in this operation should have been the red line for the US, changing the calculus of conflict. Baghdad's invitation of the IRGC and continued involvement with Qasem Soleimani after the US had designated the IRGC a terrorist organization is an act of betrayal of whatever defense interests we have with Baghdad. It is indisputably a strike to our national security interests - because the US President has deemed that it is so and because the executive branch has taken decisive action in making clear that IRGC is a security threat. Admittedly, the administration sent some mixed signals with respect to the level of seriousness as to the enforcement of the new policy.

For instance, the administration seems to disregard the fact that the IRGC, as all other entities in Iran, get their marching orders directly from the Supreme Leader-guided regime. The IRGC is not an independent entity. It's not a non-state terrorist organization. It is a central part of the Islamic Republic. So when Secretary of State Tillerson makes comments that the US will not interfere in the European trade with Iran, he is, in essence, saying that despite the fact that the US finds that Iran directly sponsors terrorism, it is okay for its allies to trade with Iran and that somehow it's possible to separate trade and investment, from Iran's other activities. The argument that has not worked in the designation of all of Hezbollah (interestingly, an Iranian proxy) as a terrorist entity is somehow still being applied to the Islamic Republic. It's not helpful.

Nevertheless, the new policy is what it is, and as such, requires some level of intervention if the IRGC directly and opens threatens US national security interests, which is exactly what it is doing at the moment. That becomes an overarching consideration. If other allies, including Turkey and Baghdad, refuse to recognize why the IRGC involvement is such a central concern to the United States and ignore this issue, their status as allies comes into question. Any actor that openly cooperates with the US enemies and aids and abets activity by US-designated terrorist organizations in a way that will likely directly impact US interests and security is not acting as a friend.

All other questions, under such circumstances, fade into the background. The first and foremost concern should be: how does this affect the US? The answer is simple: it is harmful to the US, the presence of its troops in the region, its relationship with other allies, and it's most certainly detrimental to its new policy and the goals of countering Iranian aggression. The news that the IRGC, led by Qasem Soleimani, whose forces pressured PUK into giving up control of Kirkuk behind KRG leader Barzani's back, has now established five military bases and headquarters in Kirkuk is both a disaster and an embarrassment. Continuing to deny Iran's involvement will not make it so. Rather, by taking no action to deter the IRGC from spreading its influence in the area, we are openly contradicting our own policy, violating our own laws, betraying our own constituents who are relying on the US government for protection against enemies, and emboldening the openly adversarial Iranian regime. And that is all before we even get to our practical and moral obligations to the Kurds, our other important relationships in the region, or any other considerations.

We are showing ourselves to have no principles, to be a lawless nation, that is incapable of consistently enforcing its own national security strategies, and by failing to stop the incursion of the IRGC into the Kirkuk province, we are opening ourselves to future attacks

JOL Blogger | Irina Tsukerman

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York. Her focus of interests ranges from assisting liberal dissidents and persecuted minorities to international geopolitics to relationship-and coalition building between Jewish and non-Jewish communities in New York and internationally. In addition to Jerusalem Online, her articles have appeared in a range of publications including PJ Media, Jerusalem Post, Times of Israel and Morocco World News. She has also appeared on Moroccan media and Fox Business.

Click Here for more reports by Irina Tsukerman

Cuba Bans Dissidents and Independent Journalists from Travel

So Cuba is engaged in the Soviet-era tactics of preventing dissidents and independent journalists from traveling abroad.

Possible reasons may include fear of defections, as well as possible truthtelling about the evils of the Castro regimes.

Just a guess, but if Cuba were the idyllic place of wonderful free healthcare, top notch medicine, and free education unparalleled in quality, the regime would have had nothing to worry about.

And for those of you who still think that normalization with Cuba have somehow improved the conditions inside the country or will lead to liberalization, get your heads out of the sand.

The only people who have benefited are the people directly connected to the regime.

Everyone else continues to suffer deprivation and a worse human rights crackdown than before the normalization.

My article on the Iran decertification published in JPost

http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Trumps-Iran-policy-shift-should-be-the-first-step-of-a-more-aggressive-approach-507777

Jerusalem Post Opinion
TRUMP’S IRAN POLICY SHIFT SHOULD BE THE FIRST STEP OF A MORE AGGRESSIVE APPROACH

> 'Decertifying' Iran deal, Trump to propose new, unilateral terms
BY IRINA TSUKERMAN  OCTOBER 18, 2017 20:56
Trump's recent 'decertification' of the nuclear deal signals the possibility of a new era of American foreign policy.

Trump’s Iran policy shift should be the first step of a more aggressive approach
US PRESIDENT Donald Trump speaks about Iran and the nuclear accord at the White House on Friday. (photo credit:REUTERS)

US President Donald Trump’s speech on the shift in Iran policy last Friday was a welcome relief from the Obama administration’s apologetic and self-serving rhetoric, as well as its series of foreign policy steps leading up to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which allowed for chaos in Syria, ignored as long as possible the fate of American prisoners in Iran and left the world, and the United States, more vulnerable to terrorism and ballistic missile attacks than ever before.

Trump condemned the extensive Iranian malfeasance in strong, unequivocal terms and vowed to move away from the policy of appeasement that only played into the hands of the ruthless regime that demands respect for its national sovereignty while contributing to violent uprisings and civil wars in a number of nations in the neighborhood.

It is a good first step, and psychologically important for both the US and its allies alike. Moral leadership is of the essence in a world increasingly plagued by a lack of clarity and courage. That said, and as Senator Ted Cruz has put it, all economic, diplomatic and if necessary, military options must be explored with regard to Iran.

The current shift in policy, while a promising beginning, is neither entirely new nor sufficient, and we should not be misled into believing that it will solve all problems. In reality, the White House’s designation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organization, crackdown on human rights abuses, and other steps delineated in the speech were all parts of the policy shift outlined in this summer’s sanctions package passed by Congress and signed into law by President Trump.

What is left unstated in the numerous analyses of the speech provided by the full spectrum of pundits and journalists is that the “new” policy is merely a commitment to reinforcing existing law. The lawmakers who came out with positive statements with regard to the new speech are quite familiar with the legal provisions. No doubt they want to be supportive of the executive decision to finally do the right thing, but the question as to why it has taken so long to utilize the authority provided by Congress and enforce the mandatory provisions outlined in the law signed in July remains open. For that reason, it is hard to view this shift as anything particularly radical.

Furthermore, the enforcement of the anti-IRGC provisions, while a necessary step for security is by no means sufficient. It would allow the killing or arrest of such figures as Qasem Soleimani, and perhaps a greater focus on cracking down on entities that fund IRGC companies.

However, the US acting in isolation against Iran, where many Western countries are already heavily invested, would be an economic drop in the ocean.

And some of the worst violators of human rights may not be affiliated with IRGC. The prison wardens, guards, judges, doctors, and other non-military enablers of the regime remain beyond the reach of the law. And the non-IRGC intelligence agencies and military apparatus will continue to benefit from the sanctions relief and unfrozen assets provided by the terms of the JCPOA.

What’s worse, President Trump has asked Congress not to impose the new sanctions, which, as a public statement, will have unfavorable consequences for his own plan of actions. His comments signal that the administration has not yet recognized the full extent of the regime’s duplicity, providing it yet another opportunity to realign priorities and shift whatever illicit materials it may possess during an unspecified time period, while the US is cracking down on the IRGC, a step that Iran was already fully prepared for given the months of discussion and public statements in that regard. What’s missing from the new policy is an element of surprise vital to keeping the adversary off-balance. Congress recognizes the limitations of just focusing on terrorism, while ignoring other central concerns of the JCPOA.

Rep. Peter Roskam (R-Illinois) is already set to craft a new bill which would address this missing piece.

The bill would reimpose the original sanctions if Iran does not comply with the terms within six months: give access to inspects its military sites, stop all work on ballistic missiles. It would kill the rightfully maligned “sunset clauses.”

The trouble is, six months (providing the bill even passes, and passes quickly) is more than enough time for Iran to take further deceptive action. Time is the regime’s greatest friend and our worst enemy.

And for all we know, the military sites we have in mind are not even the sites where the bulk of illegal nuclear activity is taking place. The exiled Iranian People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran recently came out with a bold claim that this entire time, IRGC has been operating four new military sites where this work has been taking place. Whether or not this is “fake news,” the fact that the claim was made should be publicly acknowledged and discussed, and at the very least, investigation of such statements should be demanded. Yet, there was no mention of the likelihood of continuous nuclear proliferation in the new policy, with the brunt of the focus on the IRGC.

While we continue trying to placate the staunch supporters of the JCPOA, Iran is likely continuing to acquire the very capabilities JCPOA sought to prevent.

While we continue to focus our efforts on lists of terrorists, which will likely take many months to compile, and which will shift again and again as the clever IRGC members will suddenly leave the organization and to everyone’s surprise join up with other intelligence agencies or newly created organizations, the many non-IRGC terrorists, military personnel and civilian enforcers will continue to get away with murder. What we should be doing instead:

1. Reimpose sanctions immediately and lift them only after full inspection of all available military sites and investigation of suspected secret sites.

2. Create a set of sanctions that would focus less on particular organizational membership and more on the harmful/aggressive activity.

3. Engage in a much more efficient listing and enforcement of existing sanctions.

4. Penalize individuals and entities responsible for specific violations against US nationals, such as arbitrary detentions and imprisonment.

5. Reengage with our allies in bilateral and multilateral trade deals that would make their financial withdrawal from the risky and unsavory investments in Iran worth their while.

Unless we focus on Iran’s activity as a mutlifaceted problem that requires a holistic approach, the Islamic Republic will continue playing games, reaping the benefits of time extensions and breaks, while also growing increasingly stronger as a threat to our national security interests, and the well-being of our allies and the entire region.

The author is a human rights and national security lawyer based in New York.

How US Can Prevent Future Unjust Imprisonments and Arbitrary Detentions of Americans by Cuba and Others

In early October, a US citizen and her husband, a former Cuban diplomat, were sentenced to 13 and 17 years respectively on charges of espionage by a  military court in Havana. This sentencing follows the expulsion of 15 Cuban diplomats from the United States by the State Department, after Cuba failed to protect US diplomatic personnel from repeated sonic attacks on its territory. This news went largely unnoticed by U.S. media and thus elicited no outrage or condemnation by the international community, nor public expressions of concern by the State Department.

Cuba has a long and sordid history of arresting critics, dissidents, and foreigners on trumped up national security charges.  Alan Gross is but the most famous of foreigners who spent years in Cuban prison for humanitarian work and assistance in civil engagement. Cuban government had engaged in a campaign of extortion, and finally released Mr. Gross, after US paid over $3 million in settlement.  It seems that the Castro regime was less concerned about the assault on its law than about getting a hefty renumeration for its own pockets. President Trump acted to restrict tourist travel to Cuba for American citizens in June, but that still leaves 12 categories of travel legal and does not address the issue of American citizens who are already in Cuba.  In other words, US nationals continue to travel to Cuba for various, entirely valid reasons, and yet are subject to arbitrary detentions, imprisonment on trumped up charges, denial of medical treatment in Cuban jails, and abuse of all kinds.

The Alan Gross case had worked in Cuba's favor and set a precedent of successful use of Americans as hostage, whose release can be negotiated for financial and political boons.  President Obama's shift in policy, normalizing the diplomatic relations between the two countries did little to address the Castro regime's illegitimate use of the justice system to secure payments for prisoners, that under normal circumstances would be considered a form of racketeering under US RICO statutes. Two years after normalization, this shift in policy has failed to empower and enrich millions of Cubans unaffiliated with the Castro regime, has not only not fixed the deplorable human rights situation but actually led to a crackdown on human rights activists, caused medical concerns for US diplomats in Cuba, and in general, and with respect to anyone and anything excepting the wealthiest crony investors, has misfired "big league".

The worst of it for the US is that Cuba continues to play it both ways - demands legitimacy accorded to it by the normalized relations, while also continuing to use Americans as pawns against the US government. This latest conviction is not only a perverse tit-for-tat in retaliation for the expulsion of the Cuban diplomats from the United States, but a reminder that Cuba, despite being smaller, weaker, and known for its support of terrorists and rogue regimes from all over the world, still has the upper hand in its relations with the United States. Cuba can detain, convict, and abuse Americans and the US will play right into its hands, because the US values human life and the Castro regime does not. US is willing to go to extreme lengths to secure the release of its unjustly held citizens and permanent residents, whereas for Cuba, a person is only worth as much as the regime can get in payment for his release. And until recently, short of banning all travel to Cuba, we were powerless to do anything about it, because we have no leverage short of going along with the demands of the extortionist regime and exchanging prisoners or paying money. We are not willing to engage in the same terrorist behavior and hold Cuban diplomats or citizens hostages here just to secure the release of American nationals.

But what recourse do we have under such circumstances? It appearance that we do have a path forward that does not include negotiations with an illegitimate revolutionary regime that thinks nothing of extortionist abductions to further its goals. After examining existing human rights laws on the books,  I discovered that:

* Currently, there are no laws, nor pending bills that would penalize states or individuals or entities responsible for arbitrary detentions, arrests, denial of medical treatment, or torture against US citizens and permanent residents.

* The only legislative requirements associated with US prisoners in other countries are regular reporting requirements by the President to Congress, which obviously do not do much to assist those in need.

* Currently, there are at least 10 US citizens & permanent residents held captive in Iran, at least 4 in North Korea, at least one in Turkey, and just this weekend, there has been news of conviction of a US citizen on Cuba on espionage charges, resulting in a 13 year sentence.

*  In the past, US citizens have been held or convicted on trumped up charges, denied medical treatment, and brutally tortured in a number of countries. Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Turkey have all used the imprisonment of these individuals to extort political and financial concessions from the United States.

* One solution to this legislative gap would be a law incorporating Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act  type language, that would would assert visa cancelations and asset freezes for any individuals and entities associated with unjust treatment of US nationals.  That would include judges, prison guards, wardens, torturers, and doctors involved in denial of life-saving medical treatment in prisons.

* Such legislation  would essentially ostracize anyone involved in such activity on the basis of their unconscionable actions, and not simply for the fact of membership in an organization such as IRGC. Organizations can dissolve or be renamed; many of the people involved in the lawless arrests and imprisonment of Americans are not members of any political organizations, and yet contribute to this gross injustice.

* In addition to making such people unwelcome in the international arena, and denying them the possibility of utilizing the US banking system, as well as providing a bit of justice for the survivors and for the families of people who have gone missing or died as a result of actions by these state enablers (such as Bob Levinson and Otto Warmbier), this legislation would likely positively affect the outcome of hostage negotiations by giving the executive branch additional leverage in conducting these talks. Currently, we have no leverage and as a result have been forced to either admit defeat and retreat or to grant concessions which only encourage what ultimately amounts to terrorist behavior.

* Another positive aspect of this legislation is making these countries safe for travel. Executive actions are currently preventing US citizens from traveling to countries such as North Korea, and strong travel warnings and restrictions have been placed on Cuba and other places. Visas have are not being issues for travel to Turkey. Such actions ultimately only hurt the idea of freedom of travel, which is central to a functioning democracy, and are only necessary because currently there is no other way of providing for the basic security of those traveling to these countries. Such measures are inimical to health people-to-people relations and any possibility of business, cultivating individual relationships, or frankly, even liberalizing such countries through their exposure to Western ideas and private initiatives.  A much better way of ensuring security for Westerners is attacking the cause of all problems - extortionist state action, which endangers travelers. Legislation that penalizes those who benefit from such extortion would disincentivize these states from further engaging in such actions, deter abductions, and make US travels restrictions less necessary.

And while the audience considers the upsides of taking legislative action that would empower our negotiators and reduce the power of racketeering regimes over the United States, I hope the White House considers highlighting this case of a gross miscarriage of justice, publicly denounces the Castro regime's extortion, shuts down the US embassy in Cuba until further notice, and expels the remaining diplomats from the United States. There is no reason why the enablers and servants of the Castro regime should continue to be treated as legitimate actors by the international community while continuing to engage in illegitimate actions and unjust convictions of foreigners. Civilians are not, and should never be, fair game during diplomatic tensions, and this instant conviction for "spying" that has come so shortly after the expulsion of Cuban diplomats from the US, should be no exception.

Terrorists of the World, Unite!

Now that Hamas and Fatah formed a unity government, how will the US government in good conscience continue justifying paying money to terrorists?

And how will the political hacks in Israeli intelligence circles continue making the claim that having these terrorists on the dole somehow promotes peace? 

Bibi is not Putin, and Hamas isn't Chechnya. You cannot buy them off, as we have seen time and time again.

Are US and Turkey on the Path to Cold War?

While Trump and Corker are excoriating each other on Twitter, while progressives and conservatives are arguing about the value of Pence's walkout on the kneeling football players during a game, while the world is pretending be shocked, SHOCKED about the allegations of Harvey Weinstein's sexual harrasment against a number of women...

US and Turkey just froze non-immigrant visas to each other in reciprocal moves, shortly after Erdogan demanded the return of Gulen movement members from the US in exchange for Western prisoners in Turkey. As I said earlier, policy is what happens when no one is looking. And what we have here is a rapid cooling in our relationship with Turkey, which somehow remains a member of NATO and technically, our ally.

Nevertheless, Turkey will not stop its extortion from the West until it feels severe pain from its actions, which should include blacklisting of anyone connected to the unlawful imprisonment of the American evangelical pastor, sanctions related to its funding of terrorist organizations and vast human rights violations, the freeze of Erdogan's off-shore accounst, and the flow of corrupt money into the US, the outing and PNGing of the many unregistered lobbyists, the uncovering of the Turkish intelligence involved in active measures on US soil, and much more.

How US Can Do the Right Thing By the Kurds, While Avoiding Crisis

The US at this juncture has significant leverage over Baghdad.

President Trump can exercise that leverage effectively by having the airport ban lifted, not with loud proclamations that can only create indignation with the Iraqi government, but with nuanced behind the scenes diplomacy.

The ban is not going to change anyone's mind about independence, only gets people more intent to move forward as soon as possible unilaterally and with no negotiations.

At the same time, it's causing damage to Kurdish economy, creates undue suffering for civilians, and causing problems for US investors working on oil projects in the region.

The US has invested untold amount of money into Iraqi government - just so they could repay us by creating a de facto blockade against our allies, and preventing us from getting in and out?

It serves no legitimate purpose and actually causes the US to look weak - weaker than the Iraqi government, and unable to defend our own interests.

Weighing in on this issue will allow the US to retain credibility with the Kurds while also pushing both sides towards a negotiated solution to the current face-off.

Second, the US should play a role in negotiations over Kirkuk and oil, which are central to any successful bilateral discussion.

Kurds, Iraq, and even Turkey are all making a play for that crucial territory. While many can argue about what legitimacy any one of these sides has towards a territory that has at one point been woefully allocated to the fictional country of Iraq by the British,  from US perspective, there is a simple, straightforward answer to the dilemma. It's not in the US interests to have the Iran-backed Baghdad have complete access to the oil, and there are few things more alarming than seeing the increasingly unfriendly Turkey with an independent revenue inside what is essentially Kurdish territory. While Turkey is making plans to invade the Kurdish region of Iraq, even if that means having to overcome peshmerga guarding all current routes, and dealing with PKK, which finally found a bit of a safe harbor with the KRG,  the US is interested in avoiding additional protracted regional conflicts, and keeping oil out of the hands of the increasingly dictatorial Erdogan.

US has credibility, because ultimately it doesn't need Kirkuk oil. US is growing independent of foreign oil through increased development of its own resources and research into alternative sources of energy. Some businesses still benefit from investment into oil extraction in that area, but ultimately, US has other sources of revenue, and for that reason would make for a fair and acceptable arbiter. US, for instance, can reasonably ask Kurds to compensate Iraq for the perceived loss of oil-related revenue, or to negotiate a rental or sharing agreement of some sort, as a precondition for a peaceful parting of ways.  US involvement is infinitely preferable to Russia's, which may be looking to gain leverage over Iran and Turkey, via its backing of KRG, but is also a largely self-interested actor, whose involvement in Syria has been anything but stabilizing and peaceful, and the expansion of whose role throughout the region is not something the US or anyone else ultimately would want to see.

The alternative to US involvement is either a very high likelihood of an international conflict between several allies and an adversary thrown in, or a significant empowerment of Russia in the role of an international broker. These are the scenarios best avoided.

Finally, US can ensure a peaceful transition by continuing being perceived as a strong, well-meaning ally, whose perspective deserves consideration - both by the Kurds and by Iraq. To do so with the Kurds, US should immediately renew the payment of stipends to peshmerga, initiated last year by the Obama administration. The Trump administration ceased payment as soon as the year-long agreement expired, and so far, has not renegotiated the continuation of the agreement, due to perceived uncertainty over the referendum.

Now, however, is not the time for Swiss neutrality, but rather for an active role in supporting one ally and reassuring the other one, while showing strength and resolution in the face of enemies and frienemies, who are all too ready to exploit the vacuum.  We are much more likely to resolve tensions and avoid conflict by keeping to our alliances and showing our worth as a dependable and respectable friend, than by fleeing at the first sign of trouble, and leaving those who have served our purposes by bravely fighting ISIS out to dry.

Staying out of the issue and refusing to back Kurds in times of need will not win us friends or allies in the Middle East, a region that values strength, loyalty, and strategic consistence over quibbling, appeasement, and insecurity. And US has much to be secure about. It has strength, moral clarity, and a set of values that have made it a desirable harbor for aspiring immigrants and refugees from around the world. It can play an important in diplomatic role in preventing conflicts before they begin, not just having to resolve them once the die is cast. I suggest we do so, before the chaos and disputes plaguing the region engulf even the places that are currently enjoying relative stability and can serve as exemplars for peace and prosperity if we play our cards right.

Reinventing the State Department.

Once upon a time, diplomacy was a powerful political tool for assisting and complementing military solutions towards complex problems.

Now it has become a joke of endless dialogues and peacemongering at the cost of all other steps that need to be taken to resolve the problem.

The issue here is not destroying or eliminating the State Department, but reorienting its mission, optimizing existing tools towards the foreign policy goals of the administration, getting rid of the people who are disruptive to those goals, and hiring people who will be helpful towards the implementation.

But the status quo cannot continue. The military can only advice as to the military objectives and strategies towards achieving those. They are not a substitute for political decisions.

State Department Finally Listens to Reason, Follows Senator Cruz's Advice, Expels 15 Cuban Diplomats from the US

The State Department finally used common sense, took Senator Ted Cruz's advice, and expelled 15 Cuban diplomats from the US in retaliation for the failure to protect US diplomats stationed in Cuba from unprovoked sonic attacks, resulting in various injuries.

This is an important point, because Cuba, though claiming both innocence and ignorance, is clearly responsible for protecting US diplomatic personnel from harm, and the State Department's first duty is to ensure that our people around the world receive the best possible treatment in the event of work-related injuries, and are kept out of harm's way to the degree possible. It's also important to note that even if Cuba is not the perpetrator of the attacks, it mostly likely is aware of the actors behind it, and is giving them cover. These incidents have been taking place over the course of two years, and it's astounding to consider that during this entire time period the host country hasn't got a clue as to who or what has targeted and harmed so many people in different locations.

Evacuation of those directly in harm's way was the common sense protective measure, but taking a punitive measure that underscores that attacks on our people and protection of perpetrators will not be tolerated was equally important. Whether this expulsion will prove to be a sufficient signal remains to be seen. However, I side with those, such as SEnator Cotton and Senator Rubio, who think that our embassy in Cuba should be shut down, not only for the protection of the remaining 40% of our diplomatic force, but to send a strong signal that we are not playing games and there cannot be a relationship until this unacceptable situation is resolved and the culprits are brought to justice.

The Trouble With Afghanistan

I hate to admit it, but Elizabeth Warren actually has a point on her critique of our strategy in Afghanistan:

* there is no timeline
* the drug trade is back up
* there is no support for the government

What she did not mention but I will: there is a group of rogue states operating in Afghanistan in contrast to our own goals. In addition to being in conflict with our own State Department over how to handle Taliban, we also have to contend with growing ISIS presence, with Al Qaeda, with the ISI freelancing, and with these other states (China, Russia, Iran, Pakistani government), all contending for human and natural resources, dominance in the area, and a way to stand up to the United States.

I did not hear a clear strategy or an answer from Secretary Mattis that would have allayed any of these concerns.

Breaking Up Egypt and North Korea: Why Sissi's Illicit Trade with North Korea Makes Sense

Earlier, I expressed bewilderment when the State Department sanctioned Egypt by withholding aid due to the alleged broken promise regarding an NGO law that Egypt had reassured the US government it would not implement, but did.  The pragmatic Tillerson's willingness to intervene in an ally's internal issues when other similarly situated allies, such as Turkey do much worse, with no reprimand from the White House, seemed a little excessive and unfair. I thought there had to be more to the story and that the stated reason was probably not the real one. A bit later, an update regarding Egypt and North Korea's ongoing and illegal arms trade caught my attention, and I wondered whether that's what really was going on. However, at the time, there was no comment from the White House that would link the two events, nor did the analysts so much as suggest that could be the real reason for the tensions between Sissi and Tillerson.

Now, it seems, my suspicions were unequivocally confirmed by an explicit statement from the administration acknowledging that the sanctioning of the aid was at least in part due to the incident of a ship flying under Cambodian flag, found caught delivering North Korean arms to Egypt. According to the article, Egypt claimed innocence and cooperation with the UN in destroying the weapons; however, the Egyptian intelligence only reacted when there was no other choice and did not volunteer information; furthermore, despite profuse denials, it appeared that the rogue ship was destined for Egyptian companies rather than some third parties. Reason for dealing with North Korea? North Korea is both cheaper than most other suppliers, and has been modernizing where Russia, and others have stuck to distributing old Communist arsenals.

Several questions naturally arise at this juncture:

1. Why is Egypt so desperate for cheap weapons?
2. Why does it value those cheap weapons more than it values its alliance with the United States? (Sissi had to be fully aware of the operation, as well as the priority this administration has placed on not dealing with North Korea)
3. The incident happened last year during Obama's administration. Has anything changed since then? Has the new administration made its priorities sufficiently clear at the outset?  Was it wise for the new administration to punish Egypt for the sins committed under Obama?
4. What impact have the new sanctions had a) on Egypt-North Korea relations and b) on Egypt-US relations?
5. What is the next step for the administration if Egypt is found to continue trading with North Korea in violation of both old and new sanctions against the latter?
6.  What should US do if it legitimately wants to woo Egypt away from bad actors? (This is a separate question from what I think the administration will actually do).

I will start off with a tentative and entirely unscientific guess that Egypt was as angered by Trump's reaction to last year's incident as Trump was by perceived deception, and will continue to do whatever it feels like doing just because it can. Does it seem rational in terms of the fact that this incident already cost Egypt badly needed aid from the US and Trump's much desired goodwill? If we were discussing a Western democracy, it would sound completely irrational, even crazy, indeed. But we are talking about a Middle Eastern dictator, and therefore, all of this makes complete sense.  First of all, Sissi did not view Obama as an ally and felt no obligation to constrain his own decisionmaking by US concerns, especially since Obama himself did not seem all that particularly concerned about North Korea, and certainly not concerned enough to go after all the other countries that we now know have been involved in illegal arms trade with the Junche regime. Sissi needed weapons to fight ISIS and internal enemies, and he sure wasn't going to get all those weapons from the US, and North Korea was simply cheaper than everybody else providing such services.  Trump's reaction must have been somewhat surprising to Sissi who probably thought of Trump as a more pragmatic-minded leader than Obama and was hopeful that the relations between the two countries would start off well.  Trump, however, made North Korea a top foreign policy priority, and Sissi's unwillingness to see eye to eye on that matter was a red line.  Allegedly, Obama was likewise angry at Sissi for alleged other North Korean weapons deals over the years, but if that is the case, none of that made it to the level of public knowledge and one may wonder why that was the case.

However, based on the available evidence, it appears that this administration's response has been reactionary. The rocket deal from last year impacted Trump's decision to delay or freeze aid to Egypt, which is understandable... but unwise. First, it just does not make sense for a new administration to build relations with an ally based off solely an incident that took place under a previous administration. Now, if it turns out that there is evidence of continued trade that has gone into this year, and that after many behind the scenes discussions about the importance of cutting it out, Egypt failed to comply, I would say Trump would be wholly justified in making that decision.  If that is not the case, though, the administration is making a mistake that may take well with the president's base here in the United States, but will not move Sissi to improvements, certainly not in the immediate future, not even if Sissi needs Trump a lot more than Trump needs Sissi (which isn't the case, either). To bend to Trump's terms under such circumstances - if this freeze is indeed a reaction to one past incident rather than a result of an ongoing and failed dialogue - would mean to lose face, and as I've argued before, that's just not something Sissi can afford to do and certainly not something he would ever consider.

What should President Trump have done? Exactly what I just suggested: engaged in a quiet behind the scenes conversation with Sissi, explained that North Korea is providing dangerous assistance to Iran, and  thus presents a danger to everyone, promised to cut a good deal on necessary weapons, and to increase cooperation related to fighting ISIS, and told Sissi in no uncertain terms that while the administration is willing to let Obama era bygones be bygones and start out on a fresh page, no further infringements of sanctions on North Korea would be tolerated, and that a relationship with the US would have to be predicated on a basic degree of honesty and respect.  No matter how tempting and unnerving it may be, you just don't start out a new relationship with an apparent and eager ally with threats and punishments, especially when you are simultaneously letting other countries off the hook for various human rights violations and security infringements (and I'm talking Turkey - Sissi has a less than cordial relationship with Erdogan, who is housing Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and is alleged to have supported ISIS). Acting in an apparently hypocritical manner was likely seen as a stab in the back by Sissi and did not make him warm up to any concessions. SO the issue here is not that Sissi doesn't want or need a relationship with the US, but that he perceives the decisionmaking as being done by Trump (which is not inaccurate), and predicates a strong relationship with the US on a strong relationship with Trump. If the US is not providing Sissi with what he needs to retain power, some level of support, and ability to control the security situation, then what kind of an ally is it, and why does Sissi need it, when he can have Russia, which makes no such preconditions? That is how Sissi thinking at the moment. He would prefer US to Russia, but he will prefer a loyal ally who understands what he needs over one that just makes constant demands. That's not to say that Trump was incorrect in having these expectations either, and from Trump's perspective, Sissi's actions were also most disappointing, and perhaps even seen as an act of betrayal. But we are adults here, which means, we realize that national self-interest here should trump whatever personal issues either leader has with each other at this point.

While I cannot say for certain what happened in meetings between the administration and Sissi's people before the sanctions were announced, I can tell you what's happening right now: Egypt may be more careful in trying not to get caught, because it's aware that it's under greater scrutiny now than ever before, but it will continue to try to cut deals with North Korea whenever it can until and unless something major changes: either it suffers an emergency and desperately needs US help, the international situation changes such that it becomes simply too costly and damaging to do business with North Korea, or there is a change in US leadership, and Sissi feels he can try again with a new president. He would certainly be willing to reconsider if Trump himself makes a move to put this messy business behind him, but I doubt that's going to happen in the near future.  As for the US, given that it has been some time since the freeze on aid has been announced, and there have not been further developments, I think the administration is planning to maintain its stand for the time being, and unless there is a new adviser who informs Trump that the current course of action will not lead to a breakthrough, I likewise see no warming of relations with Egypt in the immediate foreseeable future for largely the same reasons. If the US catches Egypt continuing to engage in North Korea, it may try to slap on more sanctions, or engage in tough talk behind the scenes, but at this point, without a serious investment into the repair of the damaged relationship, I doubt that additional tough steps, particularly if they are public, will change Sissi's mind. He will simply look for other partners. As for Trump, if he ever wants to get back on track with Sissi and move that conversation in a much more constructive direction for both countries, all he needs to do is pick up the phone - and make an offer (or a deal, if you will) that Sissi can't refuse.

Turkey's Extortionism Pays Off

Turkey is holding an evangelical US pastor hostage. Erdogan is trying to extort the US into giving up his political enemy, Fetullah Gullen, in exchange for the American. Yet President Trump continues to do business as usual with this terrorist regime, that is holding a US citizen on trumped-up charges, and recently cut an airplane deal with the Erdogan regime. That's called negotiating from a position of weakness. Where's that in the "Art of the Deal", Mr. President? How can you consider a country that is detaining your citizens for no reason an ally or a business partner? Are there no other non-terrorist states that would be willing to buy our planes? Are we so desperate for Erdogan's "friendship"? In addition to attacking peaceful protesters on US soil, detaining US citizens on trumped-up charges should be considered an act of aggression, punishable by sanctions against everyone involved.

State Department follows Iran and Turkey right into the Swamp

Our pathetic State Department, as voiced not by some Arabist career diplomat, nor by an insidious Obama holdover, but by Trump's very own Rex Tillerson, just proclaimed that it does not recognize the results of Kurdish independence referendum. Yet, this administration, continuous onwards in its quest to fund corrupt Palestinian leadership and work towards establishing a Palestinian state. Mind you, in an interesting and completely unexpected coincidence, Hamas, part of the future unity government, is openly funded by Iran, same country bluntly opposed to the establishment of a Kurdish state. In the same coincidence, Hamas is also supported by Turkey, another country that expressed its opposition to the Kurdish state in the strongest possible terms short of an invasion. Instead of providing moral strength and leadership and using its status as a world power to shush the naysayers once and for all, the United States is once again, jumping off the moral bridge following the bad example of instigating bullies no one ever actually wants to be friends with, right into the morass of nincompoopery and relativism. Well done, Secretary Tillerson, we are not only NOT draining the swamp, we are actually making it a lot worse.

The Cuba Non-Response Response

The US has taken certain security precautions in response to the ongoing trouble for diplomats in Cuba, namely
1) cutting staff by 60% to leave only "emergency" personnel (what, they are not people?)
2) warning Americans not to travel to Cuba
3) moving visa applications for Cuban visitors to nearby countries
and
4) stopping official delegations to Cuba, though receiving diplomatic visits in the US.

You know what US hasn't done? Assigned any sort of responsibility to the Castro regime for allowing Americans to be repeatedly and continuously attacked on Cuban soil

Kurdistan's Geopolitical Implications

Over 90% of Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan voted "yes" in the independence referendum.

Now what?

Well, there are actually several things going on with the Kurds.

First, the Iraqi Kurds decided to form an independent state.

Syrian Kurds are building an autonomy, and Damascus appears open to that possibility.

Iranian Kurds are increasingly antagonizing the state.

Turkish Kurds are increasingly under pressure by Erdogan, with heads of pro-Kurdish party HDP in prison, many Kurdish politicians under detention or threat of arrests,  and frequent raids and attacks against young Kurds suspected of being connected to the PKK or simply accused of it without any evidence whatsoever.

The consequences of the independence referendum have been manifold. The United States notoriously and repeatedly had asked the Kurds to postpone it in order to avoid tensions; Israel openly supported the vote; Canada and France stated that they would be ok with the results either way; and Russia was a big financial backer.

Most of the Western world, however, spoke out against the independence referendum. As Seth Frantzman points out.,  perhaps supporting Middle Eastern monarchies, once created by colonialists, but refusing self-determination to an indigenous nation with its own culture and democratic structure, is a way for perpetuating colonialist legacy for many European states. Meanwhile, the neighbors of the aspiring states took the vote even worse. Iraq refused to recognize the vote, and is threatening to expropriate Kurdish oil fields by force and to shut down flights to and from Erbil. Turkey is threatening to sanction the region into starvation. Iran is looking to military intervention as an option. And Iraq sent a military delegation to Iran to coordinate a potential military response.

Much like in 1948, when another indigenous nation became independent and formed a state, only to be immediately attacked by its neighbors, all hell appears to be about to break loose.

Iran, Iraq, and Turkey see Kurds as a threat, and for a good reason. Not only does Kurdistan have a potential to become a bulwark against the regional aggression of both Iran and Turkey, but it may inspire the Kurdish populations of both countries to rebellion, and may set a bad example for other minorities in Iran. Moreover, a democratic and relatively liberal Kurdistan in an unstable, illiberal, and deeply undemocratic Middle East is a dangerous entity, similar to Israel. The usual suspects, in fact, have been accusing Kurds of conspiring with Israel.  And both Iran and Turkey threatened not only Kurds, but Israelis over the support for the referendum and the idea of a Kurdish state.

As for Arab States, they have long had issues with Kurds, emanating from competition over oil, territory, tribal differences (particularly in Syria), cultural issues, and even religious tensions. Shi'a Iraqis took issue with Sunni Kurds, and Kurdish practice of Sunni Islam appears to be more liberal in comparison to their Sunni Arab neighbors. Complicating the situation is the fact that many of the Syrian and Turkish Kurds are secular/socialist, some Iraqi Kurds have reconverted to Zoroastrianism, some are Christian, and then there are Yazidis, who are of Kurdish descent but consider themselves the carriers of the true Kurdish religion and see Islam among Kurds as a remnant of Arab Muslim colonialism in the region. Most Kurds of Jewish descent have moved to Israel, but some have been living secretly in the Kurdish area, and Jewish Kurds in Israel are overall open and supportive.

Strategically, up until recently, Kurds in Syria presented a problem for Arab States, both because they were in conflict with many of the Sunni tribes, and because they were seen as a bulwark against the spread of Wahhabism through various insurgent and terrorist groups, which were backed by Saudi Arabia and embraced by Turkey. Kurdish ambitions for autonomy in Syria became a serious thorn in Turkey's side, since Turkey perceived a potential for contiguous Kurdish territory as a potential to destabilize Eastern Kurdistan in Turkey, which could lead to a separate independence movement and requisition of Turkish territory. For that reason, Turkey was willing to embrace and support ISIS, so long as ISIS focused its efforts on destroying the Kurds and prevented them from consolidating territory. Of course, eventually, ISIS got out of hand and became uncontrollable even inside Turkey. But even still, Turkey was willing to sacrifice its own forces to invade Syria, anger Western allies, and weaken itself internally, just to attack Kurds rather focus all of its efforts on ISIS. We see this attitude continue to this day.

Arab Gulf States, however, may sooner or later be forced to shift their positions, as long as Sunni Syrians and Kurds come to some sort of agreement. Iran's rapid expansionism and the increasing and seemingly inevitable possibility of land corridor from Syria to Lebanon presents a much greater and immediate problem that Kurdish limited ambitions for autonomous federalism in Syria. Kurds do not threaten the existence of the monarchies, whereas Iran backed Shi'a minorities inside the predominantly Sunni Gulf States do. Kurds are not looking to destabilize other states, whereas Iran has exactly that goal in mind. Kurds are still stateless and therefore by definition weaker than Iran, now pumped with unfrozen money delivered in cash by the Obama administration, and through all the investment deals by large Western countries. Kurds have significant internal differences,  and through disunity failed to achieve the same level of cohesion and prosperity as they could have otherwise (and still may as a state), and certainly somewhat more fragile than the Islamic Republic even at its most divided. So Kurds are not an immediate threat, and furthermore, increasingly, just like Israel, Kurds are a potential ally, though admitting that may take the Gulf monarchies even longer than finally putting their decades-old enmity with the State of Israel on ice.  Kurds are opposed to Iran and likewise proved to be a cogent and effective force against ISIS. Moreover, while the Arab states, with shocking levels of social inequality, are increasingly falling behind economically, Kurds are investing not just in oil but in education, and are likely to lead in the regional development with help from Israel, and eventually, other Western investors.  They are a viable regional trading partner... or competitor, depending on how these monarchies choose to play it. So far, they have been quiet comparatively to Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

However, right now they have an opportunity to make an important choice about their own future. Do they embrace progress, putting aside age-old tribal feuds, and invest into building up a relationship with a strong ally, who can help, at least temporarily, to fight back the increasingly aggressive and ever-nearing mutual enemy? Will they embrace modernity and progress, recognize Kurdistan's potential, and work together on joint ventures, on growing past oil, on modernizing and taking the region in a different direction? Or will they fall prey to internal divisions, corruption, clerical intransigence,  and petty rivalries, and fall behind the vanguard that is Kurdistan, perhaps forever? That remains to be seen, however, the positive influence of more liberal Arab states such as Morocco and Tunisia, and the seeming commitment to modernization that such younger regional leaders as KSA's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are promising in word as well as some action, are some of the signs that point to the fact that these Gulf States are at least considering a wiser, and more thoughtful approach to geopolitical strategy than the pessimists would have us believe. I hope they choose to embrace promise and vision instead of the past delusions and ghosts of outdated colonialism. These partnerships and their potential are worth the trouble.

As for Kurds? They are committed to fighting for their future, and just as Israel once with a little help from a few good friends, managed to break through all the obstacles and to come out stronger, smarter, and better in every way,  so will this nation that has been waiting its turn for far too long. And everyone else, sooner or later, will have no choice but to get used to it. The only question is, will they reap the rewards of early loyalty and friendship, or will they close the ranks of the belated  sour grapes consumers, grumbling over remaining scraps.