No Coherent Strategy Without Core Principles in Foreign Policy

Contrary to conventional wisdom and widely embraced foreign policy dogma, strategic defense of national interests is not possible without adoption of certain core principles. Saying that “United States doesn’t have allies, it has interests” really misses the mark with regards to carrying out the tasks that secures those interests , which include the safety of  our borders, our cyber domain, our troops, and strategically important sites, such as bases and embassies, abroad. Our interests, beyond security objectives, may include regional stability, preservation and growth of important relationships and alliances, resolution of trade deficit, and various internal economic goals.  Those are interests, which are not to be confused with strategy, or a set of long-term steps in securing particular objectives with regards to those interests. If our interest, for instance, is border protection, the securing that interest would be lowering the number of known actionable threats in sensitive border areas from X to Y.

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A strategic objective towards that end would include identifying those threads, recognizing those threats as they come in, and developing standard operating procedures towards eliminating them, which may include working closely with allies on surveillance of the areas, toughening border patrol or immigration procedures, building security fences in areas known to be vulnerable in order to slow down the path of the would-be interlopers, and creating additional electronic surveillance and means of interception. The tactical steps would be the procedures towards the identification, recognition, interception, and elimination of those threats including developing of better situational awareness, purchase of more sensitive technology, and funding for the construction of fences, border patrol watch towers, and creating a successful communications and messaging system that allows for better interaction among border patrol areas.

None of these steps, however, are possible without core values that guide us in the process. For instance, we have to abide by Constitutional restraints on our side of the border, whatever those restraints happen to be and however applicable they are in any given situation. We can debate the limits of those restraints, and specific factual scenarios in which they do or do not apply, but no one will argue against the understanding that our Constitution provides a guiding set of considerations with respect to the way we can implement certain internal security procedures. The balance of individual security and freedoms from government intervention are examples of such principles. And because of our vigorous checks-and-balance systems, despite various disagreements over how the system is applied, we overall enjoy relative internal stability, and few would argue that such principles are of little value in insuring the kind of environment that is overall beneficial.

Furthermore, the aims of most domestic policy initiatives are clear, even if the execution frequently falls short of the promise. With foreign policy, however, we seem to have lost our way, despite the general sense of where it is that we wish to end up with. And that sense comes more by way of generic slogans: “Greatness, respect by other countries, security, stability, economic victories, and peace”, than through specific visions compatible with current realities, reasonable timelines, and offsetting past mistakes. There has been no shortage of recent criticism of seeming lack of strategy in the Middle East,  Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.  Our inability to develop a serious response to Russia in Syria is rivaled only by our circuitous meanderings over 16 years of failed and stagnated policies in Afghanistan.  I won’t go into the missed opportunities with regards to TPP/trade with a number of Latin American countries, which since then, joined in to make China great again or our failure of imagination with regards to the 54 vastly different African countries, an entire continent we have dismissed but with one naval base, partially controlled by the French, and a few perfunctory visits in recent years, while other countries, such as China, are engaging in aggressive neo-colonialist policies, defensive and business buildups (such as Saudis and Turkey, building all along the Gulf of Horn, and investing in Somalia), or strengthening relationships through joint ventures, green energy investments, and personal attention, such as what Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu has been doing in a series of highly successful diplomatic overtures and a barnstorming tour.

There is more to our anemic foreign policy than Obama’s legacy of failure, takeover of the agencies by career officials in strong disagreement with President Trump’s paradigm and aiming to derail his success, or even the tunnel vision obsession with eliminating ISIS at the expense of every other threat and concern by the generals in charge of our military policy. Sure, those are all important and challenging factors, but our history of poor strategic decisionmaking dates back to the Cold War, when, through the decades of perceiving the Communist threat as our main ideological adversary, we focused on its containment (mistake # 1) to the exclusion of everything else (mistake # 2) and yet once the Soviet Union fell did not finish off the remnants of these ideological proclivities at home and abroad (mistake # 3). Despite Reaganesque rhetoric of freedom, it wasn’t the freedom or long-term security of our society that was the driving force behind our action, but rather fear of a seemingly existential threat to our own way of life on a very limited immediate level. Had it been motivated by freedom, containment would not have sufficed, and all other ideologies that could be an obstacle to freedom due to their anti-individualist worldviews would have been likewise seen as threats. Our actions were entirely reactive; and though the successful Star Wars response, the first time we finally decided to act from a position of strength, finally doomed the Soviet Union’s economic paper tiger, that was merely a successful conclusion of one battle, and a defensive rather than affirmative and forward-looking one at that.

In essence, the idea that any country can subsists on interests alone, without developing strong long-term relationships based in shared values and shared visions of the future, is pure nonsense. Furthermore, any country’s basic interests – internal and external security, strong economy, its citizens’ ability to travel and do business, is heavily interdependent with the analagous interests of other states, and to some extent, every country has identical interests. Where they differ is how they interpret those interests, and what actions they are willing to take in defense of these concepts, as well as in furtherance of their vision of their own country’s prosperity, regional and global role, and cultural contributions to the outside world.  Just as Rules of Engagement drive our military approach out of concern for the lives of civilians, as well as reciprocity in the treatment of our troops, certain basic principles of civilized behavior drive (or ought to drive) foreign policy, and when some country fails to abide by such norms, conflicts and mayhem may ensue. US is no different from others in that respect. Arguing over semantics whether “friends” or “allies” are one and the same or largely different brings us no closer to understanding how it is that we have gotten ourselves into such a confusing mess in so many places simultaneously. We have had a number of very stable, largely dependable long-term relationships with the countries that share the most with us in terms of common vision, goals for regional and global roles, and dedication to pursuit of prosperity through peaceful means; our relationships with countries which have had less in common have shifted from time to time or focused on the limited number of common approaches and issues.

Nevertheless, each relationship has focused on the observation of certain norm. If our partner in that relationship violates those norms to the extent that it impedes on our own interests in a significant way, we are forced to revaluate our relationship and set appropriate boundaries. And to the extent our partners have taken care to maintain good relationship, be responsive to our needs, and show utility and interest in forging stronger bond, over time, we respond in kind, to the extent it is helpful in addressing our own needs and other interests. Seems simple and straight-forward enough, but over time we seem to have lost track of these very basic driving factors in policymaking, and rather, have reverted to reactionary approaches predicated on attempting to utilize relational variables to resolve complex geopolitical situations.  Instead, we get our further and further flummoxed by competing demands and pressures from various actors, making it difficult to decide how to react to various parties tugging us in different directions, without alienating vital partnerships or blowing up delicate sand castles of assorted relational contingencies. This confusion is driven not just by the fact that there are too many factors to be considered but by the fact that we forget  that a paradigm of basic expected behavior should be our driving force, not simple reaction to what others believe that behavior ought to be.

Let’s take a hypothetical and abstract scenario of a military operation, in the course of which we are involved in a coalition with partners from UK, and a number of countries from EU. Let’s suppose that as the operation is winding down, with the task appearing largely accomplished, several UK troops are captured by the enemy. What would we do in such a situation? Common sense would surely bring us to try to free the hostages to the extent we are able to do so. And most likely, other coalition partners would do the same, despite the acrimony between UK and EU over Brexit. Let’s take it a step further, and imagine that it is not UK, but Spain that is the coalition partner, whose soldiers are captured, and those soldiers happen to be Catalan. They have supported the recent independence move, but have remained committed to finishing off the operation. What do you suppose would happen? The prediction is not too difficult here: Spain, the US, and everybody else would do whatever is practicable to free the hostages, and deal with the political differences at some other point in time and away from the field.  The underlying principle driving this understanding is that first, you have certain obligations to your partners, both in terms of existing defense treaties, and in terms of basic ethical considerations that makes it worth everyone’s while to fight together, and second, in the future, you want to know that someone has your back if in this instance you’ve had his. That’s a basic guarantee of mutual survival and the long term survival of your societies.  And even if you happen to have some political differences at the moment, they are presumably of lesser importance that whatever task united you to fight together.

But let’s say, you are fighting with a new partner you’ve never worked with before, and an inherently untrustworthy one at that, liable to switch side on you at any given moment. You are in that situation because that partner knows local condition better than anyone else, and frankly, the risk is worth it, considering that the enemy is quite formidable and your options are limited. What do you do? You watch your back, exercise caution, keep your options open, do your due diligence in terms of keeping yourself informed about your partner’s current and potential actions, and otherwise do exactly what you would have done with a long-standing ally. If nothing goes wrong, and your task is complete, you can choose to try to build trust and additional ties with that partner, or just peacefully part your ways. And if the partner betrays you during the course of the operation, you can always start treating it as an adversary. None of that seems terribly complicated, but we have failed on several fronts:

1. Keeping ourselves sufficiently informed about the intents and nature of our friends and enemies
2. Separating various actors into enemies, friends, short-term partners, and other temporary categories that make sense according to the situation.
3. Distinguishing potential and current long-term partners who have proven trustworthy from those partners, where the relationships are not yet at that level, where the visions of the future are not shared, approach to developing interests do not coincide, and where, in fact, there is potential for friction and conflict.
4. Treating each category according to what makes sense for that level of partnership in that situation if you take propaganda, social pressures, and past habits out of the equation.

How could we have made such basic errors in judgments? Because we have confused terms – we have mixed goals, strategic objectives, strategy in pursuit of those objectives, tactics, and underlying principles of engagement into an incoherent mishmash of incoherent concepts that merely obfuscate the situation. Somehow, using the terms “morality” and “foreign policy” in the same sentence has become taboo, even laughable. And yet it is morality that has allowed humans to survive, because at the end of the day, morality is based in pragmatic evolutionary considerations, that has kept everyone from eliminating everyone else to the point of extinction at the very outset of our sentience. I would posit that contemporary theories of international relations – idealism and realism – have failed where policies based in some underlying and focused principles likely would have helped us remain focus and develop coherent paradigms appropriate for the long-time pursuit of strategies in defense of our interests. Realism has been based in short-term reactionism, which of course, caused us to ignore long-term implications of unwise decisions. Idealism forces us to ignore realities on the ground and to try to force facts to feet our vision of what should be. It’s bound to fail, and it has failed us, again and again. We have exercised various combinations of these competing extremes to some degree for many decades, resulting in further problems, repetition of the same approach, and a self-perpetuating cycle of overlooking threats and underutilizing valuable tools and relationships.

We are doing so yet again, in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia. Leaving aside emotionally loaded terms such as “friends” and “allies” to describe our joint actions in some of these places, we have clearly forgotten that we need to do what makes sense for us, rather than what makes sense to assorted other parties pushing their demands on us. The largely theoretical construction that if we let Baghdad do what they will in Kurdistan, along with our clearly designated adversary, Iran, they will eventually go along with our vision of stability in the Middle East, is ludicrous. No country will place US interests above its own vision; it’s up to US to enforce what it has in mind through effective negotiations and utilizing partnerships to achieve specific results in the mutually beneficial directions. US is not benefiting from the instant scenario; on the contrary, we are losing respect, losing money, losing other potential partners, losing resources, wasting time, and seeing undesirable strategies of our adversaries successfully unfold before eyes.

There is no practical reason why we should not be treating our Peshmerga partners captured by adversarial Iran-backed militias the same way we would have treated our British or French or German partners under similar circumstances – if possible in the field, conducting operations to release them. Theoretical constructs about what Baghdad would possibly do if we did that are irrelevant if we abide by basic principles – we want our goals to be respected, and therefore we cannot allow the partners that have proven trustworthy be captured with no response. If our other partners are unwilling to assist in the matter, we have to act on our own, and if they interfere – well, that makes it clear where their loyalties are, doens’t it? Our partners should be able to settle political differences among themselves, but if we want our own interests to meet with success, we need to ensure that the principles that make our strategies successful prevail. If we lose one partner to another, we have actually lost both.  And then we are on our own against an enemy. And we have lost one partner to the enemy, and our partner is siding with that enemy, we have two enemies instead of one, and it makes sense to strengthen our relationship with our one existing partner for our own sake. It’s in our self-interest to be in a position of strength in any given conflict to the extent possible. That’s a basic principle, just as it’s a basic principle to protect those partners that are helpful in a particular scenario and that can be just as helpful in the future.

We cannot have a strategy if we do not have basic guides by which we operate.

The reason why the world seems messy and confusing is because we ourselves choose to view it as such and because we act in a haphazard way, instead of utilizing a specific lens that would help us guide us to where we actually want to be – in a position when we can make a positive impact towards clearly identified desirable results, and in a relationship with partners, who, by nature of sharing similar objectives, are bound to stick with the same principles and strategies, rather than switch back and forth among various sides depending on which way the wind blows. No, we want to have a system. The system works like a compass and guides us safely through whatever storms come our way, because if you know the direction you’re going in, even if you have to adjust for various obstacles along the way, you are bound to get where you need to be sooner or later. And conversely, if you are wondering from place to place with no direction and no plan to find direction and no tools to help with finding direction, you are very likely to spend your time perpetually lost. The only way to have a successful journey is to have a system for determining your location and adjusting accordingly until you get back on track to where you need to be.

The only way to have a successful foreign policy is to have a principled one, firmly based in foundations that will give you a system for formulating coherent responses, no matter what the circumstances or changes in circumstances appear to be, flexible in adjusting to reality, but strong enough to move you past all obstacle in the direction where you, and not the wind, or the sunset, or other people who likely have no idea where they are going, are trying to get you to go.

Why Baghdad's Move on Kirkuk Is Not About the Independence Referendum

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/11/22/why-baghdads-move-on-kirkuk-is-not-about-the-independence-referendum/

By now, it should be abundantly obvious that  Baghdad's move to take over Kirkuk has been pre-planned and would have advanced with or without the independence referendum. Iraqi forces and Peshmerga were allied against ISIS in the liberation of the territories, yet Iraq's ultimate priority has always been in retaining the control over the oil fields and revenue from the Kurdish-held territories.  And with Barzani's resignation as KRG President, we now know that whatever criticisms could be made about the latter's hold on power well beyond the constitutional provisions, his concerns about Kurdish security and move for independence were a great deal more than just power play. Further proof of Baghdad's disingenuous bluster about territorial integrity and "unity" (carved out by the British under the Sykes-Picot agreement, that would intentionally keep different nations with disparate identities cobbled together, foster divisions, and allow the British Empire to maintain control) are Abadi's actions with respect to the Kurdish citizens the moment the Baghdad-Iran alliance assumed control of much of the disputed territories and the oil fields, which were, in fact the central concern.

The legitimacy of Baghdad's concern for its national sovereignty is undermined by the unnecessary assault on the Kurdish autonomy, which can only make the Kurds yearn for independence more, not less. Though Middle East is all about overpowering and crushing your enemy to make him respect you, the excessively vindictive actions by Baghdad, and its welcoming of a foreign regime (IRGC) into this punitive takeover is likely to have the opposite effect. Baghdad's reimposition of power began with a crackown on Kurdish media - the banning of Kurdistan24 and Rudaw, two of the major local outlets, which have been providing detailed information about both the military action of the past few weeks and internal Kurdish matters of interest to their families in Syria, Turkey, and Europe, and enhancing the understanding of world leaders who would otherwise be uninformed about the alphabet soup of Kurdish parties and factions in the region.

This move signals illegitimacy of having a separate Kurdish identity, a bitter point for a nation of approximately 30 million people with distinct languages, culture, and indigenous roots in the region, but to this day without an independent state.  Second, it is an insurance policy that the international community will have no access to real-time information on the ground, and certainly not the English-language Kurdish take on it. There is a small coterie of Western journalists presence, but as the Israeli journalist Seth Frantzman has pointed out, they tend to rely on other Western journalists for information, and thus likely miss a great deal of internal dynamics and the full spectrum of regional narratives.  Lack of alternative information will go a long way towards creating an appearance of only one perspective: Baghdad's position, made public through official channels and formal meetings.  Whatever public support the Kurds are currently getting is largely fueled by the unrestricted access to their voices. The legitimacy of Baghdad's own actions are severely undermined by its move to squash down criticism from the significant portion of its population, and its ally in the war against ISIS.

Second, Baghdad has moved to pay salaries directly to the Kurdish civil servants, bypassing the KRG. This undermines the authority of the Kurdish leadership, and makes the Kurdish infrastructure heavily depended on, and thus potentially loyal to, Baghdad. For sure, even if the bulk of the Kurdish civilian forces grow resentful of this deprivation of a sense of autonomy, others will cling to security for their immediate situation, and Baghdad thus far successfully divides-and-conquers the already splintered Kurdish groups.  For the same reason, Abadi's forces are seeking to cut off Peshmerga access to the pipeline that delivers oil to Turkey, and to provide all oil to Turkey, bypassing the KRG. It's just another way of undermining Kurdistan, weakening its economy, undermining its business relationship with Turkey, and ensuring that Iraq is viewed as the central authority, whereas Kurdistan is merely a province with no independent power to make deals or provide anything of value to the region.

Third, Baghdad is seeking to undermine the use of Kurdish languages in the region, in order to weaken the sense of a national identity and common destiny among the Kurds in Iraq, as well as a sense of unity with the Kurds in other countries. The first sign of this cultural crackdown is the attack against a Kurdish official, who used his own language rather than Arabic, in a formal media setting. While Baghdad has not yet made this move an official policy, this disturbing incident is a sign of what it could do, and what it will likely do, following the example of Turkey, if Kurds continue to resist. Suppression of national culture is the best way to weaken a potentially rebellious or troublesome population. The Soviet Union has done that systematically to the Jews; Iran has persisted in its tactics against a whole host of national minorities; and Turkey before and during Erdogan has imposed fascist policies to ensure cultural conformity.

Fourth, Baghdad is looking to divide the minorities living in Kurdish area, and has already done so, in that various groups have associated themselves with Peshmerga, PMU (connected to Iran), or with Iraqi forces, that have been trained and armed by Americans.  At the same time, Iraqi forces claimed to have no control over the Iran-backed militias, that are retaking the territories, and have opened up civilians and minorities to potential exploitation and destruction by the militias.  Having gone as far as Al Qosh, these groups have threatened a Jewish historical site, and the Christian sites in the area.  And Christian groups have reached out to the international community to complain of threats directed at them by Hashd. Yet the forces have not stopped at the borders of areas that are of strategic and geopolitical importance to the Iraqi government. They have pushed out outwards, and have been repelled by Peshmerga in multiple places, and have made way in others. Although strictly speaking there has been a ceasefire, between Iraqis and Peshmerga, that has not affected non=Peshmerga Kurdish forces protecting civilians and minorities, and who are still under threat of Iran-backed militias and IRGC. At the same time, these moves are a clear indication that Baghdad is not seeking a truce. It is seeking domination and full control of the Kurdish population, a repressive and punitive one at that.

Thus far, the response from the international community, particularly from the United States, has consisted of calls for peace and agreement, support for Iraq's unity, and proposals of mediation to the tune of "why can't we just all get along". None of that was aimed at curbing Iraq's abusive behavior or at seriously reassuring our Kurdish allies as to the commitment of the US to their security, cultural preservation, and autonomy, even under our official position of preserving Iraq as a cohesive state - quite ironic, given that there is nothing indigenous about the Sykes-Picot treaty imposed on Iraq by the British. Furthermore, there is radio silence from the US administration as to the article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, assembled with the help of US State Department and top American lawyers, which provides for Kurdish independence. Certainly, such a provision would at the very least provide a level of recognition and provision for Kurdish rights.

And ironically, it is this potential suppression of Kurdish autonomy that provides the greatest justification to independence under international law. (The Katanga case). At the end of the day, however, any nation that feels oppressed or that is otherwise dedicated to independence and pursuit of its own destiny must come to terms of having to organize its forces into strong cohesive units, making at least temporary alliances with its factions abroad, procuring whatever is needed for strong offensive and defensive fronts, through subterfuge, if necessary, and being prepared for a military triumph and complete capitulation of its opponents. In other words, if Kurds want their own state, they are going to have to fight for it, and international support will emerge only once it becomes clear that they can actually win, and have the wherewithal to support their own state without anyone's help. It's not pretty, but this is how it worked out for Israel, which likewise was surrounded by overwhelming enemy forces, had very limited access to inferior weapons, and no international recognition - yet there she is, nearly 70 years later, small but independent.  I hope that the US administration will see that the Baghdad government is losing its own legitimacy with each oppressive step that it takes, that its direction comes from the Iranian ayatollahs and will do the only right and practical thing under the circumstances - change its policy to fully backing the Kurds and keeping the worst of Baghdad's actions at bay. But I wouldn't hold my breath or rely on that.  I would also not remain passive, waiting for miracles to happen or for these problems to resolve themselves. Time may very well be ripe for a Kurdish state - but are the Kurds themselves ready?

Why Baghdad's Move on Kirkuk Is Not about The Independence Referendum

Cross-posted at:

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/11/22/why-baghdads-move-on-kirkuk-is-not-about-the-independence-referendum/

By now, it should be abundantly obvious that  Baghdad’s move to take over Kirkuk has been pre-planned and would have advanced with or without the independence referendum.

Iraqi forces and Peshmerga were allied against ISIS in the liberation of the territories, yet Iraq’s ultimate priority has always been in retaining the control over the oil fields and revenue from the Kurdish-held territories. And with Barzani’s resignation as KRG President, we now know that whatever criticisms could be made about the latter’s hold on power well beyond the constitutional provisions, his concerns about Kurdish security and move for independence were a great deal more than just power play. Further proof of Baghdad’s disingenuous bluster about territorial integrity and “unity” (carved out by the British under the Sykes-Picot agreement, that would intentionally keep different nations with disparate identities cobbled together, foster divisions, and allow the British Empire to maintain control) are Abadi’s actions with respect to the Kurdish citizens the moment the Baghdad-Iran alliance assumed control of much of the disputed territories and the oil fields, which were, in fact the central concern.

The legitimacy of Baghdad’s concern for its national sovereignty is undermined by the unnecessary assault on the Kurdish autonomy, which can only make the Kurds yearn for independence more, not less. Though Middle East is all about overpowering and crushing your enemy to make him respect you, the excessively vindictive actions by Baghdad, and its welcoming of a foreign regime (IRGC) into this punitive takeover is likely to have the opposite effect. Baghdad’s reimposition of power began with a crackown on Kurdish media – the banning of Kurdistan24 and Rudaw, two of the major local outlets, which have been providing detailed information about both the military action of the past few weeks and internal Kurdish matters of interest to their families in Syria, Turkey, and Europe, and enhancing the understanding of world leaders who would otherwise be uninformed about the alphabet soup of Kurdish parties and factions in the region.

This move signals illegitimacy of having a separate Kurdish identity, a bitter point for a nation of approximately 30 million people with distinct languages, culture, and indigenous roots in the region, but to this day without an independent state.  Second, it is an insurance policy that the international community will have no access to real-time information on the ground, and certainly not the English-language Kurdish take on it. There is a small coterie of Western journalists presence, but as the Israeli journalist Seth Frantzman has pointed out, they tend to rely on other Western journalists for information, and thus likely miss a great deal of internal dynamics and the full spectrum of regional narratives.  Lack of alternative information will go a long way towards creating an appearance of only one perspective: Baghdad’s position, made public through official channels and formal meetings.  Whatever public support the Kurds are currently getting is largely fueled by the unrestricted access to their voices. The legitimacy of Baghdad’s own actions are severely undermined by its move to squash down criticism from the significant portion of its population, and its ally in the war against ISIS.

Second, Baghdad has moved to pay salaries directly to the Kurdish civil servants, bypassing the KRG. This undermines the authority of the Kurdish leadership, and makes the Kurdish infrastructure heavily depended on, and thus potentially loyal to, Baghdad. For sure, even if the bulk of the Kurdish civilian forces grow resentful of this deprivation of a sense of autonomy, others will cling to security for their immediate situation, and Baghdad thus far successfully divides-and-conquers the already splintered Kurdish groups.  For the same reason, Abadi’s forces are seeking to cut off Peshmerga access to the pipeline that delivers oil to Turkey, and to provide all oil to Turkey, bypassing the KRG. It’s just another way of undermining Kurdistan, weakening its economy, undermining its business relationship with Turkey, and ensuring that Iraq is viewed as the central authority, whereas Kurdistan is merely a province with no independent power to make deals or provide anything of value to the region.

Third, Baghdad is seeking to undermine the use of Kurdish languages in the region, in order to weaken the sense of a national identity and common destiny among the Kurds in Iraq, as well as a sense of unity with the Kurds in other countries. The first sign of this cultural crackdown is the attack against a Kurdish official, who used his own language rather than Arabic, in a formal media setting. While Baghdad has not yet made this move an official policy, this disturbing incident is a sign of what it could do, and what it will likely do, following the example of Turkey, if Kurds continue to resist. Suppression of national culture is the best way to weaken a potentially rebellious or troublesome population. The Soviet Union has done that systematically to the Jews; Iran has persisted in its tactics against a whole host of national minorities; and Turkey before and during Erdogan has imposed fascist policies to ensure cultural conformity.

Fourth, Baghdad is looking to divide the minorities living in Kurdish area, and has already done so, in that various groups have associated themselves with Peshmerga, PMU (connected to Iran), or with Iraqi forces, that have been trained and armed by Americans.  At the same time, Iraqi forces claimed to have no control over the Iran-backed militias, that are retaking the territories, and have opened up civilians and minorities to potential exploitation and destruction by the militias.  Having gone as far as Al Qosh, these groups have threatened a Jewish historical site, and the Christian sites in the area.  And Christian groups have reached out to the international community to complain of threats directed at them by Hashd. Yet the forces have not stopped at the borders of areas that are of strategic and geopolitical importance to the Iraqi government. They have pushed out outwards, and have been repelled by Peshmerga in multiple places, and have made way in others. Although strictly speaking there has been a ceasefire, between Iraqis and Peshmerga, that has not affected non=Peshmerga Kurdish forces protecting civilians and minorities, and who are still under threat of Iran-backed militias and IRGC. At the same time, these moves are a clear indication that Baghdad is not seeking a truce. It is seeking domination and full control of the Kurdish population, a repressive and punitive one at that.

Thus far, the response from the international community, particularly from the United States, has consisted of calls for peace and agreement, support for Iraq’s unity, and proposals of mediation to the tune of “why can’t we just all get along”. None of that was aimed at curbing Iraq’s abusive behavior or at seriously reassuring our Kurdish allies as to the commitment of the US to their security, cultural preservation, and autonomy, even under our official position of preserving Iraq as a cohesive state – quite ironic, given that there is nothing indigenous about the Sykes-Picot treaty imposed on Iraq by the British. Furthermore, there is radio silence from the US administration as to the article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, assembled with the help of US State Department and top American lawyers, which provides for Kurdish independence. Certainly, such a provision would at the very least provide a level of recognition and provision for Kurdish rights.

And ironically, it is this potential suppression of Kurdish autonomy that provides the greatest justification to independence under international law. (The Katanga case). At the end of the day, however, any nation that feels oppressed or that is otherwise dedicated to independence and pursuit of its own destiny must come to terms of having to organize its forces into strong cohesive units, making at least temporary alliances with its factions abroad, procuring whatever is needed for strong offensive and defensive fronts, through subterfuge, if necessary, and being prepared for a military triumph and complete capitulation of its opponents. In other words, if Kurds want their own state, they are going to have to fight for it, and international support will emerge only once it becomes clear that they can actually win, and have the wherewithal to support their own state without anyone’s help. It’s not pretty, but this is how it worked out for Israel, which likewise was surrounded by overwhelming enemy forces, had very limited access to inferior weapons, and no international recognition – yet there she is, nearly 70 years later, small but independent.  I hope that the US administration will see that the Baghdad government is losing its own legitimacy with each oppressive step that it takes, that its direction comes from the Iranian ayatollahs and will do the only right and practical thing under the circumstances – change its policy to fully backing the Kurds and keeping the worst of Baghdad’s actions at bay. But I wouldn’t hold my breath or rely on that.  I would also not remain passive, waiting for miracles to happen or for these problems to resolve themselves. Time may very well be ripe for a Kurdish state – but are the Kurds themselves ready?

Irina Tsukerman, human rights and national security lawyer based in New York.

Giving Credit Where It's Due - Pres. Trump's Speech to South Korean Assembly Was Excellent

The speech to the South Korean Assembly was not only the best speech Pres. Trump has delivered in his entire life, but an objectively excellent speech.

It gets everything right. Every single point. It has vision, and balance, and direct messaging to the peoples of both countries, and to the leadership and the regime in North Korea.

I have nothing to criticize, and furthermore, I wish with all my heart that the vision outlined in this speech comes through exactly as written. (Do I think it will actually happen? Unfortunately not. But was this exactly the right thing to say? Absolutely).

One of the These Things is Not like the Others

Serious question:

Why were the breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia legit, but when Catalonia wants to secede, suddenly everyone cares about Spain's territorial integrity?

Congress All Talk, No Action On Iran's Growing Strength In the Middle East

Sen. Cotton correctly highlighted the dangers of Iran's growing presence in the Shi'a Crescent.

You know what would have been even better?

Calling on the President to take action in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. I'm not entirely sure why Congress is sitting pretty and watching calmly while the enemy forces are spreading everywhere.

US is grasping defeat from the jaws of victory in Iraq

Two disturbing developments: Hashd, an Iran-backed militia, basically told US forces in Iraq to get lost. So if the US has been supporting Abadi vis-a-vis Kurds in hopes that Abadi is going to be better than someone more pro-Iranian leader, they are in for a disappointment. Iraq now has much more powerful buddies - Iran and Russia, which is seeking to widen its business operations in Iraq, and particularly, Iraqi Kurdistan, and increasingly doesn't need the US. US is losing out not only with Kurds but with Iraq as well entirely due to its show of weakness. That's an important cultural point that the administration simply doesn't get, because it thinks only in terms of short-term military tactics, without understanding the tribal nature of the societies it's dealing with. Furthermore, US is endangering the local minorities. Iraqi military has made it clear that it doesn't have control over Iranian militias and what they choose to do to Yazidis, Christians, and others. Second, Iraq is seeking to not only control 100% of oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, but to block important passages to Syria and Turkey. That will prevent freedom of movements for Kurds who have passed back and forth unrestricted since the beginning of life in that area. It's actually very, very dangerous and will enable Turkey to potentially enter the area in the future. It will also prevent Peshmerga from assisting with fight against ISIS or other terrorists in Syria.

We're Living An Old Joke About the Nazis

Rex Tillerson: It's time for Iranian militias to go home.

IRGC + Iranian militias immediately picked up their marbles and went home.

Or not. No, they actually didn't even blink.

Article Published on JerusalemOnline

http://www.jerusalemonline.com/blogs/irina-tsukerman/op-ed-when-allies-fight-america-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-31888

Op-Ed: When allies fight - America between a rock and a hard place
Irina Tsukerman explains how the Iraqi incursion into the Kirkuk province has sparked a problematic situation for the US. However, she argues that the Iranian aid that Baghdad is receiving should have triggered the Trump administration to end its “hands-off approach” to the issue.

Iraqi forces in Kirkuk Photo Credit: EPA-EFE
The current standoff between Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's national sovereignty claims in taking over the Kirkuk province and gaining control of the oil-rich fields has placed the US in a difficult position of having to mediate between allies in an attempt to preserve a semblance of stability in a region already plagued by diverse and persistent conflicts. Another NATO ally, Turkey, is likewise placing pressure in an already complicated situation. The US is bound by the terms of a defense treaty to defend other NATO members from all attacks, but Turkey sees even countries outside its own borders as its spheres of influence and has been increasingly aggressive in intervening in the course of events in areas it claims as its territory or potential for future conflicts.

Whether such an expansive interpretation of national interests merits support from other NATO members certainly merits reexamination, but in the instant case, the predicament is directly contributing to further complications and forces the US to have to juggle competing claims of legitimacy in a way that is inching closer to being unresolvable. However, Baghdad's incursion into Kirkuk has crossed the lines of discussion and created a situation where discussing the conflicting interests of various parties in a diplomatic setting is becoming increasingly moot.

Reports of Kurds being forcibly displaced, coupled with actions that caused the Kirkuk's Kurdish governor to flee the area altogether, defy Baghdad's claim that the operation is in place merely to prevent the dissolution of the country. Likewise, Vice President Al-Maliki's comments placing the blame for the creation of ISIS on Erbil in order to break up the country add disturbing and disingenuous undertones to this course of events.

Through it all, the US continues to issue statements claiming that it's "closely monitoring the situation" and trying to mediate among all sides. Without a question, it's in the US' interests to avoid any action that would lead to deterioration of any possibility of returning to a diplomatic track or further destabilizing the region. However, the current hands-off approach not only plays into the hands of its enemies but emboldens action that goes far beyond the securing of Baghdad's perceived interest in preserving its territorial integrity.

How should, then, the US act in situations where its allies - one, a state armed directly with US weaponry, and another, a courageous nation that has been an important asset in the war against ISIS - are in a state of conflict? I would posit that the resolution of the instant scenario should be guided by the same norms the US utilizes in evaluating any situation where its allies come to a head.

First, how does the situation affect US national interests, in particular, any security considerations?

Second, does the US have binding defense treaties with either of the allies and what are the terms of those treaties? In the event that there is no such agreement, or where the agreement amounts to little more than arms trade or promises of assistance in the event of an invasion by outside forces, what is the nature of the relationship between the US and that ally?

Third, has either party involved in the conflict been the aggressor or violated any international laws, norms, or committed any acts deemed unconscionable during the course of the conflict?

Fourth, what role can the US constructively play in order to preserve good relations with both sides, and to mitigate possible damages, including minimizing the number of any casualties, property damage, population displacement and political and economic complications?

Fifth, are there any other factors to be taken into consideration, such as involvement of third parties, such as state and non-state actors, and their role in this conflict, and goals with respect to the US’ own interests and agendas?

Sixth, how are this situation and the US action or inaction affect US relations with other allies, who are likely to be affected by the conflict?

In the past, the US has tried to keep its involvement to a minimum or even stay completely neutral during wars between Pakistan and India, even when those wars took place during the Cold War and Pakistan was largely US-oriented while India had a far stronger relationship with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the nature of the US outlook on the matter was affected by the fact that the US-Pakistani relationship at the time was largely governed by the view that Pakistan played a role as part of buffer states and that US interests included backing any state that could either potentially fall under Soviet influence or could be helpful in preventing Soviet expansionism.

At the moment, however, the situation in the Middle East is in flux, and our stated goals and unarticulated considerations are far from black and white. Our limited goal of defeating ISIS in the area has been largely met with the help of both Baghdad and the Kurds. The next issue looming large on the minds of the administration and policy experts alike has been the containment of Iran's aggression. Whether containment is the best way to characterize the current stand on Iran, whether it's feasible, or the best possible course of action in the current climate are all questions deserving of independent evaluation. However, there is no doubt that Iran's aggressive actions in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and elsewhere have given cause to concern in the White House, so much so that just a week ago, Trump placed the IRGC on the list of global terrorists.

Balancing respect for the right to peaceful self-determination with the national sovereignty and territorial integrity rights of others would be a complicated matter under the best of circumstances, but there is one factor that shifts the tenor of the discussion altogether - the role of Iran and the IRGC in Baghdad's forcible takeover of the Kirkuk province.

Baghdad had invited Iran's tanks to its borders days prior to the invasion, so Iran's involvement in the matter should come as no surprise. Those who have been following the events closely should be well aware that Iran's interest in the matter is preventing similar secessionism from taking root among its own minorities, including the Kurds, who have grown restless and have had long-standing conflicts with the Iranian regime.

A joint operation between Iran and Iraq in this matter would be concerning enough, but the fact that Iran sent the IRGC, rather than its military or police forces, to participate in this operation should have been the red line for the US, changing the calculus of conflict. Baghdad's invitation of the IRGC and continued involvement with Qasem Soleimani after the US had designated the IRGC a terrorist organization is an act of betrayal of whatever defense interests we have with Baghdad. It is indisputably a strike to our national security interests - because the US President has deemed that it is so and because the executive branch has taken decisive action in making clear that IRGC is a security threat. Admittedly, the administration sent some mixed signals with respect to the level of seriousness as to the enforcement of the new policy.

For instance, the administration seems to disregard the fact that the IRGC, as all other entities in Iran, get their marching orders directly from the Supreme Leader-guided regime. The IRGC is not an independent entity. It's not a non-state terrorist organization. It is a central part of the Islamic Republic. So when Secretary of State Tillerson makes comments that the US will not interfere in the European trade with Iran, he is, in essence, saying that despite the fact that the US finds that Iran directly sponsors terrorism, it is okay for its allies to trade with Iran and that somehow it's possible to separate trade and investment, from Iran's other activities. The argument that has not worked in the designation of all of Hezbollah (interestingly, an Iranian proxy) as a terrorist entity is somehow still being applied to the Islamic Republic. It's not helpful.

Nevertheless, the new policy is what it is, and as such, requires some level of intervention if the IRGC directly and opens threatens US national security interests, which is exactly what it is doing at the moment. That becomes an overarching consideration. If other allies, including Turkey and Baghdad, refuse to recognize why the IRGC involvement is such a central concern to the United States and ignore this issue, their status as allies comes into question. Any actor that openly cooperates with the US enemies and aids and abets activity by US-designated terrorist organizations in a way that will likely directly impact US interests and security is not acting as a friend.

All other questions, under such circumstances, fade into the background. The first and foremost concern should be: how does this affect the US? The answer is simple: it is harmful to the US, the presence of its troops in the region, its relationship with other allies, and it's most certainly detrimental to its new policy and the goals of countering Iranian aggression. The news that the IRGC, led by Qasem Soleimani, whose forces pressured PUK into giving up control of Kirkuk behind KRG leader Barzani's back, has now established five military bases and headquarters in Kirkuk is both a disaster and an embarrassment. Continuing to deny Iran's involvement will not make it so. Rather, by taking no action to deter the IRGC from spreading its influence in the area, we are openly contradicting our own policy, violating our own laws, betraying our own constituents who are relying on the US government for protection against enemies, and emboldening the openly adversarial Iranian regime. And that is all before we even get to our practical and moral obligations to the Kurds, our other important relationships in the region, or any other considerations.

We are showing ourselves to have no principles, to be a lawless nation, that is incapable of consistently enforcing its own national security strategies, and by failing to stop the incursion of the IRGC into the Kirkuk province, we are opening ourselves to future attacks

JOL Blogger | Irina Tsukerman

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York. Her focus of interests ranges from assisting liberal dissidents and persecuted minorities to international geopolitics to relationship-and coalition building between Jewish and non-Jewish communities in New York and internationally. In addition to Jerusalem Online, her articles have appeared in a range of publications including PJ Media, Jerusalem Post, Times of Israel and Morocco World News. She has also appeared on Moroccan media and Fox Business.

Click Here for more reports by Irina Tsukerman

No Friends But the Mountains

Couldn't agree more with this statement on Kurdistan by Bernard-Henry Levy:
"As for the others, it is an unmitigated disaster. For the United States, in particular, it is one more step in the discrediting of an administration that has become incapable of the elementary political act of distinguishing friends from enemies".

New Strategy in Afghanistan Already a Bust

With Taliban continuing to gain ground in Afghanistan, not without assistance from Russia, and taking over 3 districts in the past 2 days, our "new" strategy in Afghanistan seems to be flawed.

First of all, we cannot really achieve victory without cutting off the source of fuel and other resources (i.e. Russia) from the enemy. However, that does not appear to be the goal. Our "surge" of several thousand people is aimed at providing additional training and counsel to the local police. However, this tactic seems little to do with the stated goal, which is to back the Taliban into a corner and force them to the negotiating table. Without a significant realignment of strategy, human resources, and capabilities, actions by the Afghan forces are not likely to change, and all of that will take significant time, during which period, the Taliban will continue gaining ground, making the consequent push back that much harder.

So basically, Taliban right now has the momentum. We added more troops for counseling, but did not otherwise significantly shift the situation on the ground. And we have no specific stated measurement of success, but without any military education whatsoever, I can tell you want one such measurement logically should be: How much ground our allies have regained from the enemy. I sure hope that there is some secret plan that will emerge like deus ex machina at the last minute, and we will see an immediate reversal of fortunes for everyone involved. Right now, however, we are off to an inauspicious start.

Dangerous Words Lead to Dangerous Actions

In an earlier post, I surmised that dehumanization of Kurds and other minorities in Turkey can eventually lead to the justification of mass atrocities against them, just as in 1915, the Ottomans used political enmity to justify the massacre of over a million Armenian men, women, and children.

However, the US ally Erdogan is not the only one capable of riling up the masses into an extreme nationalistic (and also religious) fervor. Our other ally, supported, supplied, and strengthened by the United States, Iraqi VP Nouri Al-Maliki, recently stated that ISIS was created in Erbil in order to lead to the partition of Iraq.  This level of political propaganda, and there is no doubt that's what this is, is aimed to manipulate tribal, deeply divided, and in many cases, largely uninformed public to shift the blame for lack of unity inside the country from the people who drew the maps with the purpose of creating internal divisions and thus minimizing the possibility of rebellion against the British Empire to the Kurds, who are seeking a peaceful separation.

There is no question that in an unstable region fraught with tensions, such comments are inherently incendiary and can be interpreted as an incitement to hatred, if not to outright violence. The people of Iraq who have suffered greatly in the hands of ISIS are now being pointed in the directions of the Kurdish region, which played a significant part in the fight against the common enemy, as a perpetrator. The idea that Kurds created ISIS is as preposterous as comparing right-wing Jews to Nazis, and yet, this comment was made by the Vice President of the country.  This is the government the United States supports and considers a legitimate democratic representation of all of the people of Iraq. Despite President Trump's comments that the United States is not taking sides in any tensions between Baghdad and Erbil, the State Department stated otherwise, specifically calling for joint administration of all regions, and claiming that separation might be exploited by ISIS, and likewise referring to all parties involved as Iraqi partners, despite the fact that the recent independence referendum established that at the very least, the Kurds no longer think of themselves as such, nor wish to stay in this dubious union.

However, even such commitment to the chimeric idea of Iraqi national unity does not justify excusing and ignoring blatantly provocative comments from top level officials, who are maliciously and deliberately encouraging strife and violence against a particular group of people. US should pressure Al-Maliki into disavowing his comments, issuing an official apology to the Kurds, and explaining that Kurds were equal partners in the fight against ISIS and can in no way be blamed for its creation. What makes these comments particularly dangerous is that they complemented by action. Specifically, despite earlier claims from the Pentagon that the invasion of Kirkuk was due to a misunderstanding of the official instructions, the Iraqi forces, backed by IRGC and Iran-supported militias, are on the march for the second day and have now entered Sinjar.

Sinjar is an area that is home to a large  number of Yazidis, who have also formed their own forces. IRGC is not known for being particularly welcoming to minorities, and Iran and Shi'a militias have threatened Yazidis in the past. Despite tensions with the Barzani government, Yazidis are better off under Kurdish control of the area than should the likes of Soleimani and Al-Maliki be left in charge.  Barzani, meanwhile, issued a non-commital statement expressing an unspecified hope for the creation of an independent Kurdistan one day in the future. With PUK reportedly having abandoned Barzani's coalition due to an agreement with or perhaps pressure from the IRGC forces, Kurdish unity is likewise in question. As they quarrel and point fingers, Baghdad's agents continue to gain control of essential oil fields, leaving the Kurds with not much to go on at this juncture. The visuals of the Iraqi forces on the march with their Iranian partners while the Vice President is making comments blaming the Kurds for the creation of ISIS are striking and horrific. Kirkuk was largely empty and for now the troops are under control, focusing on their military targets, but it takes but a match to light the fires of enmity, fear, and nationalist fervor that could lead to bloody attacks against the locals. Such reprisals may indeed be planned by the Iraqi government in order to ensure complete control and kill off the Kurdish dream altogether. The Pentagon threatened the cessation of armament and supply of the Iraqi troops in the event they attack and cause harm to the Kurds, but it's unclear that this will either actually happen or, even if it does, will in any way undermine the Iraqi determination to subdue the Kurds, in thought as well as in deed.

What should Barzani do now?  Regrouping... and planning a more strategic response that will not, in the future, rely on untrustworthy groups. Including leaders of other tribes and factions into the decisionmaking process regarding further plans may ensure the groups remaining on the same page and being less likely to be divided by IRGC or anyone else. Kurdish democracy is imperfect, and an adversary can easily pick off different parties one by one by promising them future leadership, threatening that particular group, or bad-mouthing Barzani's leadership. There's nothing new to exploitation of internal divisions. In fact, to provide a historical comparison, Israel went through much the same in the early stages of the formation of the state. However, at the end of the day, the leadership managed to summon just enough unity and agreement to do what was needed to be done to achieve independence (and then happily continued to fight and backstab each other from the day Israel was created until now).

Disunity is not an impediment to creation of the state, just so long as there is enough commitment among the core group to make a strategic victory possible. Barzani should take lesson from this experience, and not leave major cities or other sites in the hands of small groups of people. Additionally, this is the time to come to an agreement with Kurds in Syria and Turkey, and start forming and organizing a real army, strong, numerous, and committed enough to stand up to Iraq and its militias, with or without support from the United States, Israel, or anyone else. There will be help, but in the beginning it will be clandestine, limited, and highly dependent on circumstances. Once the Kurds show their commitment to victory through strengths, even the United States will start coming around. But for now, hard times lie ahead, and the Kurds should look inwards for solution, while receiving consultation and limited supported from a few early enthusiasts until such time as they start showing signs of clear success and military superiority.

What US Neutrality on Iraq's Invasion of Kirkuk Means for Our Interests in the Region

Cross-Posted:

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/what-us-neutrality-on-iraqs-invasion-of-kirkuk-means-for-our-interests-in-the-region/

President Trump responded to the entrance of the Iraqi forces and Iran-based militias into Kirkuk this morning by stating that US is not taking sides between Kurds and the Iraqi government and is engaged in encouraging all sides to avoid clashes and continue dialogue.

However, in the context of the current tensions, US neutrality and commitment to non-intervention is taken as betrayal by the Kurds and as tacit approval by Iraq, Iran, and even Turkey. Qassem Soleimani's role in the fall of Kirkuk was the first test of the White House's  new policy on Iran, which includes designating IRGC as a terrorist organization and opposing Iranian expansionism in the Middle east.  Nevertheless, thus far, the administration has failed to show commitment to upholding US law and going after the terrorist leader, despite an opportunity to do so in the course of this operation.

From the perspective of tribal Middle Eastern societies, no matter what President Trump's actual intentions are, he has chosen sides by failing to stop the Iraqi forces from entering Kirkuk, raising the Iraqi flag, lowering the Kurdish flag, seizing the oil field in the area, and in every respect asserting dominion and control over the area. That is a sign of not only a political betrayal, but of a strategic choice that will have long-term repercussion for the region.  Despite the lofty rhetoric about stopping Iran, the United States cannot overlook the alliance about the Abadi forces, trained and supplied by the United States, and Iran-backed Shi'a militias, that in the past, have pressured the Kurds, threatened religious minorities in the area, including Yazidis and Christians, and despite some limited cooperation with the United States on the issues of fighting ISIS (mainly out of self-interest), have otherwise acted as agents of the ayatollah-led Iranian regime.  Both indecisiveness and conscious choice to allow Baghdad and Iranian agents to do as they wish with the Kurdish areas, send the same signals to all involve, and make the United States both unwelcome with the allies, and irrelevant with the adversaries in the region.

Strategic withdrawal from an active role in the region may have its place, but only if it's done on our terms, to our advantage, and in a way that signals a well-thought out foreign policy and defense of interests, rather than weakness, inability to make decisive move, or a choice of undemocratic regimes and bad allies over dependable allies whose help will be needed many times over in the future. Indeed, however, many are not convinced that the position of the administration on this issue is sincere. For instance, Turkey's position on the matter of Kurdish independence may have been the lodestar in this decisionmaking process. Turkey has recently come to an agreement with Iran on a variety of matters, which included increased military cooperation and the issue of Kurdistan's independence referendum. After the fall of Kirkuk, Ankara issued its approval of the invasion.

The administration has been careful in maintaining good relations with Turkey. It had previously pressured Barzani to postpone the referendum, after both Abadi and Erdogan expressed strong opposition. President Trump, despite major policy differences, recently called Erdogan a friend, and Turkey and the US recently concluded a deal over Boeing airplanes. Turkish lobby has been strong in the US. Michael Flynn, President Trump's former national security adviser, had worked for Turkish interests. In fact, shortly before being removed from his position, Flynn had reportedly blocked a military move in Syria that Turkey had opposed. Moreover, as we now know, Turkey had paid off a number of major think tanks that had advised President Trump shortly prior to Erdogan's visit to the White House in May of this year.  President Trump is likely getting very bad advise from the Secretary of State, who views the independence referendum as illegitimate, and from an assortment of sources, who are taken in by the extensive Turkish lobby in the United States.

None of it changes matters. The current calculus throws the Kurds into the arms of Russia, which has already ascended to power along with Iran in Syria, pushing the United States out of a position of significant influence altogether due to our short-sighted focus on only dealing with ISIS. Furthermore, Russia has stayed away from publicly condemning the referendum, and in fact, acted as the biggest financial backer of KRG. Although the Kurdish leadership is generally distrustful of Russia, Russia has proven itself to be a stalwart ally to Assad, and has deftly advocated for the Kurds in Turkey when it suited her interests. Putin's backing of the Kurds in Iraq is not sentimental; rather, he is shrewdly taking advantage of the US inaction to establish Kurdistan as Russia's sphere of influence and rise to power in the Middle East, all without having to expend significant power or resources.

As our influence diminishes and our presence becomes marginal, the US is likely to miss significant opportunities for business and educational investment in Kurdistan; infrastructure projects with potential for job growth for American workers; creation of a stable buffer state in the Middle East that would likely protect our security interests vis-a-vis Iran and Turkey, and spread elements of democracy and liberalization naturally through the people indigineous to the region rather than through conquest, occupation, or or other policies likely to be viewed as colonialist.  What we are losing, however, Russia, Turkey, and Iran are gaining. Sooner or later, the imperial ambitions of these three aggressive states will come to a head in the oil-rich region; however, either one of the three belligerent actors prevails, which will not benefit the region, or the three countries come to a power-sharing agreement, in which case minorities, Israel, and the US will all lose out, or the situation deteriorates to the point of chaos, with civil war, strife, and new waves of refugees repeating the tragic events in Syria. In all cases excepting the instance where US rises to the occasion, shows moral and strategic leadership, and backs Kurdish aspiration to independence, we are looking at some very dismal scenarios that will place America dead last not only in the Middle East, but in the international arena as well.

It's All About the Pipelines - and it's in the Pipeline

While the international community is focused on Russia's aggressive military actions in George, Ukraine, Moldova, Syria, and elsewhere, much of Russia's geopolitical reconquista has been focused on bypassing sanctions and competitions via forging bonds with new allies and old competitors through joint economic projects, which would play up its own strength - the abundance of natural resources. Russia's strategy of using oil and gas to pressure Europe into submission had initially backfired as the European Union eventually developed new rules to secure its gas supply and prevent isolation by focusing too much on single source, such as the fickle and manipulative Putin regime.

Russia is looking to profit from a major pipeline into Turkey, that brings Turkey and Russia closer together and bypassing its competitors.

In a similar move earlier this year, Putin took steps to bypass Ukraine.

Russia uses natural resources to pressure its rivals and to wield power over those who are perceived to threaten its dominance.

The pipeline to Turkey would also be a way of getting around US and European sanctions:

The effect of this project would also to bring KRG back to doing business with Erdogan.  This is undesirable, because so long as Erdogan enjoys any sort of legitimacy from his intended victims, much less the international community, he will continue on his downward path.

Meanwhile, the construction of the planned Russian-Turkish pipeline is going full steam ahead.

Last December, at around the time the Russian ambassador was assassinated under suspicious circumstances in Turkey, there were rumors of secret negotiations between Russia and Turkey over the pipeline and defense deals that would repair relations between the countries, even as the assassination story was allegedly  concocted to cover up the growing closeness despite the macho rhetoric of both leaders only shortly before. As we now see, those negotiations came to pass and are bearing fruit, with the blessing of the US government, which, at the time, informed by then-NSA Michael Flynn (who was found to have business-related conflicts of interests with both Russia and Turkey), chose not to intervene.

The result? Loss of leverage over Turkey as it seeks to shift its revenue stream to a business relationship with Russia, and increased disregard for other countries' sovereignty, NATO's concern over terrorist organization, and interest in maintaining a relationship with the United States. As Turkey grows closer with Russia and becomes independent of the West, it's becoming increasingly more brazen and difficult to control, and moreover our relative ability to benefit from that relationship is becoming limited by the minute.  

At this point, in order to regain control of the situation, the US must embark on very decisive combination of tough economic and diplomatic policies against both Russia and Turkey, while stimulating and improving relationships with those countries in the region that can balance out this unhealthy predicament. These actions would have to include blacklisting individuals connected to gross human rights violations, and in Turkey's case, anyone connected to improper detention and imprisonment of an American evangelical pastor, freezing the off-shore accounts by corrupt Russian and Turkish officials and stopping the flow of dirty money into the United Stats, cutting off unregistered lobbying and propaganda efforts by the agents of both countries, and preventing the intelligence services of both regimes from aggressive active measures, including infiltration and intimidation of diaspora communities and dissidents, in the United States.

Keep in mind that Turkey is not exactly waiting for the US to iron out every aspect of its foreign policy. Turkey is plunging into Syria, willing to coordinate its actions with Syria, and sidelining its initial misgivings about keeping Assad in power, so long as it is free to take action to keep Kurds from acquiring contiguous territory that would border the Kurdish majority territories of Turkey. Turkey is also looking at Syria as a potential area for further development, and wants to exert both political and economic influence there to the degree possible.

 Forming a stronger and more invested relationship with KRG, and despite all difficulties, placing more weight on the Georgia-Azerbaijan angle as well as carefully reorienting the Greece-Cyprus-Israel triangle may help shift the events in that region towards our interests. It looks like the four countries most concerned about Russia's expansionism - Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova -  are already on the way to create a free trade zone. US should encourage this alliance and look at it as an important opportunity.  Keep in mind that Azerbaijan is dictatorial, incompetent, and pro-Turkey, but it's also in desperate economic need, anti-Russian, and anti-Iranian, and just corrupt enough that it can be temporarily shifted towards a more productive political line.

At the end of the day, the United States has to remember that developing positive business relationship with old friends and new allies is just as important as taking punitive measures against adversaries and political frienemies who need to be shown their place. Identifying and actively pursuing attractive economic opportunities is the key to a successful and positive geopolitical strategy, as well as innovative possibilities for American workers of all backgrounds. This is one example of how today's globalized world can actually help and provide important pathways to job creation rather than the destructive and pessimistic view of international job outsourcing we've been presented by populist economic nationalists throughout the Obama administration leading up to where we are today.

How I learned to stay calm and love the Taliban

The new administration's strategy in Afghanistan is basically to bomb the Taliban until their will is broken and they come to negotiating table. All of that will require several thousand more US troops and likely years of engagement.

Let me translate that for you: it means that after 16 years of trying to destroy the Taliban, the US now believes that it's not only OK but desirable to negotiate with Taliban, and that after all the lives lost, US would be ok with the Taliban being potentially part of the Afghani government.

That was the part of President Trump's big speech on Afghanistan that I found most disturbing, and as I now see, my fears bore out.  We spent years trying to liberate Afghanistan from an entity that was no better than Al Qaeda, but regional, and which turned Afghanistan into an oppressive quagmire after the Soviet Union left.  We were first against them before we were for them. Being ok with Taliban as part of Afghanistan is completely incompatible with our other stated goals for continuing to stay in Afghanistan: stability, democracy, and security. First off, Taliban is already backed by Russia and Iran.  We are then stating that depending on how negotiations go (and Taliban without a question will want some permanent role in the government - or they will continue to recruit and die trying, because that's what mujahedeen are trained to do), we are ok with Russia and Iran playing a central role in that country. Why don't we just skip the fighting part, engage in direct negotiations with these two states over the future of Aghanistan, and ask them to help us with Taliban in exchange for playing a direct and stabilizing role in the government? That's essentially what's actually happening.

China and India will not be ok with each other or with this turn of events. China is interested in mining opportunities, and Afghanistan's role in the regional network of roads that is part of its geopolitical ambitions. India sees China as a major threat. Having these two states engaged in Afghanistan simultaneously guarantees tensions. Mattis claims that he will put pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting terrorists, such as Taliban and Al Qaeda that are flowing in and out of Afghanistan and finding a safe haven in Pakistan. But at the hearing he himself stated that the Pakistani government is ready to play ball, but the ISI, Pakistan, secretive and scary spy agency, is playing its own game. And ISI cares little about sanctions, and appears out of control significantly more so than the government. To complicate matters, Pakistan is significantly more dependent on China than it is on the United States, which means we must get China on the same page. China may not necessarily want to support a failed states run by terrorist organizations because it threatens regional stability and its own economic ambitions,, but so far, it's been perfectly ok with having Pakistan on the dole as is.  And if China agrees to be helpful, that will likely be in exchange for having us out of Afghanistan as soon as possible.

As for democracy and liberalization, those two concepts are foreign to Afghanistan. It was for a time more liberal under Soviet occupation, but the Soviet occupation would have proved short-lived even without our backing of the mujahedeen, because for a variety of historical and geographic fctors, it's extremely difficult to occupy a country such as Afghanistan, highly tribal, surrounded by mountains, and strongly opposed to foreign occupants. No empire had lasted very long, and neither would have the Soviets. Without substantially changing the culture and mindset of the locals, democracy and liberal values are just not going to stick. Security and stability can only be guaranteed when various types of terrorists, drug lords, and state actors are done fighting it out over this piece of territory and passages to the outside world. THat is the bitter reality Mattis was not acknowledging. If the only goal here is to diminish the influence of Taliban as such, he should have said so. However, implying that Taliban alone is the root of all evil is naive and disingenuous. Multiple terrorist organizations are finding Afghanistan a safe haven, the drugs flowing out of the country are funding international terrorism, not just Taliban, and Iran is using Afghanistan as a drug supply route for its own reasons. Furthermore, Iran is recruiting Afghan children to fight in Syria, further radicalizing the population.    Plus some of the state actors involved believe in maintaining a perpetual state of war for reasons of facilitating arms trade, distracting from their own activity elsewhere, and utilizing it to weaken the United States and other countries they see as opposing their own geopolitical ambitions.

At this rate, it won't take 3000 people and several more years. It will take many tens of thousands of people and decades to achieve even what is stated to be the goal. Taliban is not going anywhere without a bloody fight, and will try to drag as many people with them in the process as possible. And having Taliban as part of the government is implicitly legitimizing them anyway. If US is basically saying that they want Taliban to be viewed as a negotiating partner, they are implicitly undermining whatever limited authority the Afghani government already has. It's big schtick with the population was that it's fighting the Taliban. If it cannot even be seen as strong enough to destroy the Taliban as an entity even with all the US help, then what legitimacy does it have, and how is it preferable to the Taliban that is NOT giving up on its ultimate goal of domination? And the US is also undermining its own moral case for being involved in Afghanistan in the first place, without, by the way, in any way guaranteeing that none of this will eventually come back to bite US in other places around the world.

Kurds Have All the Reasons in the World To Seek Independence from Iraq

Sunni Saddam Hussein gassed Kurds during the Iran-Iraq war.

Current Shia Iraqi government cancelled flights to and from Erbil, conducting joint exercises with the Islamic Republic near Iraqi Kurdistan border, and threatening to repossess Kurdish oil fields.

Just why exactly would anyone in his right mind wish to stay part of that country under such circumstances?

Kurdistan's Geopolitical Implications

Over 90% of Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan voted "yes" in the independence referendum.

Now what?

Well, there are actually several things going on with the Kurds.

First, the Iraqi Kurds decided to form an independent state.

Syrian Kurds are building an autonomy, and Damascus appears open to that possibility.

Iranian Kurds are increasingly antagonizing the state.

Turkish Kurds are increasingly under pressure by Erdogan, with heads of pro-Kurdish party HDP in prison, many Kurdish politicians under detention or threat of arrests,  and frequent raids and attacks against young Kurds suspected of being connected to the PKK or simply accused of it without any evidence whatsoever.

The consequences of the independence referendum have been manifold. The United States notoriously and repeatedly had asked the Kurds to postpone it in order to avoid tensions; Israel openly supported the vote; Canada and France stated that they would be ok with the results either way; and Russia was a big financial backer.

Most of the Western world, however, spoke out against the independence referendum. As Seth Frantzman points out.,  perhaps supporting Middle Eastern monarchies, once created by colonialists, but refusing self-determination to an indigenous nation with its own culture and democratic structure, is a way for perpetuating colonialist legacy for many European states. Meanwhile, the neighbors of the aspiring states took the vote even worse. Iraq refused to recognize the vote, and is threatening to expropriate Kurdish oil fields by force and to shut down flights to and from Erbil. Turkey is threatening to sanction the region into starvation. Iran is looking to military intervention as an option. And Iraq sent a military delegation to Iran to coordinate a potential military response.

Much like in 1948, when another indigenous nation became independent and formed a state, only to be immediately attacked by its neighbors, all hell appears to be about to break loose.

Iran, Iraq, and Turkey see Kurds as a threat, and for a good reason. Not only does Kurdistan have a potential to become a bulwark against the regional aggression of both Iran and Turkey, but it may inspire the Kurdish populations of both countries to rebellion, and may set a bad example for other minorities in Iran. Moreover, a democratic and relatively liberal Kurdistan in an unstable, illiberal, and deeply undemocratic Middle East is a dangerous entity, similar to Israel. The usual suspects, in fact, have been accusing Kurds of conspiring with Israel.  And both Iran and Turkey threatened not only Kurds, but Israelis over the support for the referendum and the idea of a Kurdish state.

As for Arab States, they have long had issues with Kurds, emanating from competition over oil, territory, tribal differences (particularly in Syria), cultural issues, and even religious tensions. Shi'a Iraqis took issue with Sunni Kurds, and Kurdish practice of Sunni Islam appears to be more liberal in comparison to their Sunni Arab neighbors. Complicating the situation is the fact that many of the Syrian and Turkish Kurds are secular/socialist, some Iraqi Kurds have reconverted to Zoroastrianism, some are Christian, and then there are Yazidis, who are of Kurdish descent but consider themselves the carriers of the true Kurdish religion and see Islam among Kurds as a remnant of Arab Muslim colonialism in the region. Most Kurds of Jewish descent have moved to Israel, but some have been living secretly in the Kurdish area, and Jewish Kurds in Israel are overall open and supportive.

Strategically, up until recently, Kurds in Syria presented a problem for Arab States, both because they were in conflict with many of the Sunni tribes, and because they were seen as a bulwark against the spread of Wahhabism through various insurgent and terrorist groups, which were backed by Saudi Arabia and embraced by Turkey. Kurdish ambitions for autonomy in Syria became a serious thorn in Turkey's side, since Turkey perceived a potential for contiguous Kurdish territory as a potential to destabilize Eastern Kurdistan in Turkey, which could lead to a separate independence movement and requisition of Turkish territory. For that reason, Turkey was willing to embrace and support ISIS, so long as ISIS focused its efforts on destroying the Kurds and prevented them from consolidating territory. Of course, eventually, ISIS got out of hand and became uncontrollable even inside Turkey. But even still, Turkey was willing to sacrifice its own forces to invade Syria, anger Western allies, and weaken itself internally, just to attack Kurds rather focus all of its efforts on ISIS. We see this attitude continue to this day.

Arab Gulf States, however, may sooner or later be forced to shift their positions, as long as Sunni Syrians and Kurds come to some sort of agreement. Iran's rapid expansionism and the increasing and seemingly inevitable possibility of land corridor from Syria to Lebanon presents a much greater and immediate problem that Kurdish limited ambitions for autonomous federalism in Syria. Kurds do not threaten the existence of the monarchies, whereas Iran backed Shi'a minorities inside the predominantly Sunni Gulf States do. Kurds are not looking to destabilize other states, whereas Iran has exactly that goal in mind. Kurds are still stateless and therefore by definition weaker than Iran, now pumped with unfrozen money delivered in cash by the Obama administration, and through all the investment deals by large Western countries. Kurds have significant internal differences,  and through disunity failed to achieve the same level of cohesion and prosperity as they could have otherwise (and still may as a state), and certainly somewhat more fragile than the Islamic Republic even at its most divided. So Kurds are not an immediate threat, and furthermore, increasingly, just like Israel, Kurds are a potential ally, though admitting that may take the Gulf monarchies even longer than finally putting their decades-old enmity with the State of Israel on ice.  Kurds are opposed to Iran and likewise proved to be a cogent and effective force against ISIS. Moreover, while the Arab states, with shocking levels of social inequality, are increasingly falling behind economically, Kurds are investing not just in oil but in education, and are likely to lead in the regional development with help from Israel, and eventually, other Western investors.  They are a viable regional trading partner... or competitor, depending on how these monarchies choose to play it. So far, they have been quiet comparatively to Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

However, right now they have an opportunity to make an important choice about their own future. Do they embrace progress, putting aside age-old tribal feuds, and invest into building up a relationship with a strong ally, who can help, at least temporarily, to fight back the increasingly aggressive and ever-nearing mutual enemy? Will they embrace modernity and progress, recognize Kurdistan's potential, and work together on joint ventures, on growing past oil, on modernizing and taking the region in a different direction? Or will they fall prey to internal divisions, corruption, clerical intransigence,  and petty rivalries, and fall behind the vanguard that is Kurdistan, perhaps forever? That remains to be seen, however, the positive influence of more liberal Arab states such as Morocco and Tunisia, and the seeming commitment to modernization that such younger regional leaders as KSA's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are promising in word as well as some action, are some of the signs that point to the fact that these Gulf States are at least considering a wiser, and more thoughtful approach to geopolitical strategy than the pessimists would have us believe. I hope they choose to embrace promise and vision instead of the past delusions and ghosts of outdated colonialism. These partnerships and their potential are worth the trouble.

As for Kurds? They are committed to fighting for their future, and just as Israel once with a little help from a few good friends, managed to break through all the obstacles and to come out stronger, smarter, and better in every way,  so will this nation that has been waiting its turn for far too long. And everyone else, sooner or later, will have no choice but to get used to it. The only question is, will they reap the rewards of early loyalty and friendship, or will they close the ranks of the belated  sour grapes consumers, grumbling over remaining scraps.