http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/how-us-unequivocal-support-for-iraqi-nationalism-will-lead-to-radicalization-and-extremism/
Seth Frantzman, in a recent article, analyzes US position of neutrality on Baghdad takeover of Kirkuk, and further silence on the alleged human rights violations, and punitive actions such as the shut down of Kurdish press, Kurdistan24 and Rudaw. In sum, the thinking is that encouraging Iraqi nationalism, which is based in substantial part in anti-Kurdish sentiment, US will turn Iraq away from Iranian influence, and unify the country under the Saudi Arabia aegis against the spread of Iranian influence. The idea there is that if the Shi'a Iraqi government aligns with the Sunni KSA, together they can counter Iran. And indeed, Iraq has signed a corresponding defense treaty with KSA. However, that is not a meaningful agreement for two reasons: first, Iraq will do just about anything to play all sides, including the US, which has been arming its army. Second, KSA is far away, and Iran is close. Abadi and the Islamic Republic has been getting along quite nicely, and Abadi invited Iran to participate in takeover of Kirkuk. It clearly does not see Iran as a threat, though KSA does. And when forced to choose between its Shi'a neighbor, which has helped Iraq with the Kurdish issue and the Sunni Saudi Arabia, which is known to sympathize with Iraq's Sunni population, tribal and religious considerations will prevail over piece of paper.
The fact that the United States does not realize that shows the extent of ignorance of our foreign policy leaders of the cultures, which they are now trying to bring together through fictitious borders and imaginary alliances. The British, when they did the same, at least cynically imposed divisions to perpetuate their own power. The US leaders actually believe that this policy is going to work and that it's in the best interests of the Middle East and the United States. It is quite amazing. This vision of a Baghdad-Riyadh alliance puts aside the dream of a free and democratic Kurdistan. The reason for this groupthink at top levels may be deeply rooted in the underlying psychological need to stay consistent. In other words, the US has already invested so heavily into Baghdad, that having realign its policy now would be equivalent to conceding defeat. In other words, the excuse that this is all about American interests is rational, but the reasoning behind is not. Otherwise, the weight that the US would be giving to other considerations would be at least equal to its own wishful thinking to see this implausible alliance of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to work for more than five minutes, until Iran decides that it should be otherwise.
Much has already been said and written about the potential boons of an independent Kurdistan for the United States - a trading partner with a vibrant economy, a buffer state against Iran's and Turkey's expansionist ambitions, a new model of indigenous evolutionary liberalization, a friendly state, open to Western values and partnership with Israel. All of these potential benefits, in the eyes of the generals, who are spearheading US foreign policy in the Fertile Crescent, is of less interest than having Iraq not be quite-so-pro-Iran. There is no official analysis on how such calculations are figured, but there is also a darker side of this conversation that likewise does not appear to figure into the equation: the potential for the radicalization of the Kurdish region. Neither friends nor critics are particularly interested in touching on this sensitive topics. Those, who favor independent Kurdistan focus the bulk of their attention on the perceived betrayal by the US - in other words, a valid, but largely emotional talking point, whereas the critics cite the dubious benefits of yet another tribal Muslim state at the cost of weakening another ally - Iraq. The underlying working assumption, however, is that the US decisionmakers are correct in one way: Kurdish independence will bring greater instability than Kurdish "remain", at least in the short term.
Such position relies on the erroneous assumption that Iraq is open to various potential positions, and will pivot in the desirable direction if only the United States will do what Baghdad claims needs to be done to earn its favor - return the oil fields to Abadi's forces without a question, stay moot on the Kurds, encourage peace talks through gentle rhetoric, and ignore the Iran-backed militias and IRGC presence in the vicinity. If only the US does all these things, at some point, all will be well. IRGC will not do much damage beyond security the territory for Iraq and ensuring that the rebellious Kurds will not tempt its own Kurdish population; Turkey is all talk; ISIS has been taken care of, and US can reap the boons of its cynical wisdom. Such wishful thinking is no more practical than believing that Kurdish independence will come without a bloody fight against a variety of regional forces. That's not a commentary on the morality or benefits or likelihood of such a move; that's just a statement of logical observation based in the Middle Eastern dynamics. You get what you are willing to fight for, and only if you win with overwhelming force. In the meantime, US is so focused on its own line of reasoning that it ignores major red flags that undermine its position.
First, Iraq has already and openly pivoted to Iran. The actions of the last few weeks demonstrate it amply. US reasoning that by sacrificing Kurdistan it can stop Iraq from growing closer to Iran is not only mistaken; it is nothing short of appeasement. Iran's interest is regional dominance. Abadi, if he wants to stay in power in the region, needs to abide by Iran's decisionmaking. It will, therefore, cooperate to whatever extent necessary that it is seen as a fully ally, reliable in supporting Iran's ambitions. Iran will not stop at building IRGC military basis and headquarters in Kirkuk, nor does it make it any sense to stop when there is no resistance from anyone.
Second, Iran's presence in the Kurdistan area far exceeds what can be gauged from the coverage, especially after Kurdistan24 and Rudaw were shut down. According to one source, Iran has as many as 700 secret houses in Suleimanya alone. If that's accurate, it's quite plausible that Iran has extensive presence, both overt and clandestine, in every corner of Kurdistan. And it is there to stay, long-term. From disputed territory between Baghdad and Erbil, Kirkuk province are becoming occupied territories, essentially colonized by Iran. If Iran continues to grow its military presence in the area, and there's every reason to believe that without a war, Iran is not going anywhere, the next step is indoctrination of the local population - ranging from forced conversions to political brainwashing.
It may already be building schools, whereas Western educational opportunities in the region are woefully missing. Furthermore, with Baghdad banning all commercial flights in and out of Erbil, and potentially cutting off access to Syrian and Turkish overpasses, Kurds are not only economically isolated, but become wholly dependent on Baghdad and Tehran for humanitarian aid, educational maintenance, and even the news.And Iran is likely to radicalize the local Shi'a population through joint educational programming. The religious element may prevail over tribal concerns, if Iran is seen as an economic benefactor, rather than an oppressor to the Iraqi majority. Meanwhile, it is taking every step to show who's the boss. Iran is opening up its border with Kurdistan - that is a sign that the regime has achieved a decisive military and psychological victory. It has nothing to fear from the Kurds.
At the same time, however, the support of nationalist sentiments among Iraqis is taking a turn less towards unity and more into anti-Kurdish xenophobia. Already, a Kurdish journalist was stabbed to death in Kirkuk. Iranian militias, not Iraqi forces, arrested dozens of young Kurds in a cafe in Kirkuk. Their fate is unenviable, as anyone, familiar with the brutality of the regime and its treatment of rebellious ethnic minorities will testify. And religious minorities all over the Kurdish region are threatened by the IRGC and the Iran=backed militias. Jewish and Christian sites near Al Qosh are in danger. Multiple Christian and Yazidi groups have expressed concern. Militias are on full alert protecting civilians, yet they are outnumbered and outgunned by the well-equipped Iraqi forces, and the Iran=backed militias that are not answerable to Abadi's command. This destabilization is precisely what US support for national unity was supposed to prevent. Instead, it is turning into the scapegoating and vendetta against the Kurds.
Third, these divisions are likely to be exploited by Sunni extremist groups, like Al Qaeda and remnants of ISIS and their ilk. Seemingly defeated, these groups await opportunity for strife in order to make a triumphant comeback, sow discord, and take advantage of other violent situations. And ideological extremists will surely take the opportunity to appeal to the disenfranchised groups, proselytize among embittered and marginalized Kurdish peripheral regions, and go after every resentful person or group left hopeless after the takeover of Kirkuk.
Worse still, if Iraq continues to try to destroy Kurdish nationalism and sense of identity, as it's doing now, the resistance that will arise will become increasingly radical and violent, and the potential for militant action, all the way to terrorism against civilians is not to be ruled out. We have seen the way the Soviet Union had sown chaos among Turkish Kurds, eliminating all nationalist groups except for the PKK, and turning PKK into a Soviet terrorist group (which after several decades finally reformed, but not before costing many lives of innocent civilians in the process). Interestingly, Russia is moving back into Kurdistan, and is seeking a closer relationship with the Kurds. It's also looking to utilize them more in Syria. That Russia will use this opportunity to play on the anti-American backlash through what is widely perceived as betrayal is quite obvious.
To make a long story short, the downside to the chimeric US strategy involving the one-sided coddling of Baghdad to the exclusion of all other interested parties, is that instead of building bulwarks against extremists, including Iran, which is the whole goal of this exercise, the US is actually making active enemies out of absolutely everyone in the region, strengthening the potential for extremism, and allowing radical actors to assume the vacuum of leadership, all in the name of unity and the US interests. But the region united by extremism is not in the US interests at all, and neither is giving up opportunities for economic investments and partnerships fall into the hands of Russia and Iran, which have not done anything positive with any place they have ever been involved in.
The administration should snap out of this dangerous delusion quickly, and start drawing and enforcing boundaries for its "ally" Baghdad, which include, first and foremost, getting Iran and out of the picture completely, and only then creating positive bilateral and equanimeous conditions for further negotiations. It should send a clear signal to Kurds that their identity is recognized and respected, and to all other actors, that US has a central role to play in the region, and that chaos and extremism of any sort is not an option and will not be tolerated - not after all the lives the US has sacrificed to get to where we are today. Most importantly, the US should remember that alliances among former enemies are temporary, and for that reason Iraqi-Saudi alliance cannot be relied upon to last.
But strong long-term relationship among groups of people who have a baseline of common interests, values, and a history of fighting together for common goals can endure and move in the most positive direction. We should not continue following the same failed policy of putting all our eggs in one basket (in this case, Abadi), only to be bitterly disappointed and face new crisis yet again. We have the luxury of hindsight to make better, more informed decisions, and the richness of our experience to build a better, more secure future for ourselves, and the world that we want to live in.
Analysis and random thoughts on national security, human rights, international affairs, politics, current events, and whatever strikes the author's fancy while she is sipping on her tea.
Showing posts with label Abadi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abadi. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 22, 2017
How US Unequivocal Support for Iraqi Nationalism Will Lead to Radicalization and Extremism
Labels:
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Tuesday, October 17, 2017
What US Neutrality on Iraq's Invasion of Kirkuk Means for Our Interests in the Region
Cross-Posted:
http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/what-us-neutrality-on-iraqs-invasion-of-kirkuk-means-for-our-interests-in-the-region/
President Trump responded to the entrance of the Iraqi forces and Iran-based militias into Kirkuk this morning by stating that US is not taking sides between Kurds and the Iraqi government and is engaged in encouraging all sides to avoid clashes and continue dialogue.
However, in the context of the current tensions, US neutrality and commitment to non-intervention is taken as betrayal by the Kurds and as tacit approval by Iraq, Iran, and even Turkey. Qassem Soleimani's role in the fall of Kirkuk was the first test of the White House's new policy on Iran, which includes designating IRGC as a terrorist organization and opposing Iranian expansionism in the Middle east. Nevertheless, thus far, the administration has failed to show commitment to upholding US law and going after the terrorist leader, despite an opportunity to do so in the course of this operation.
From the perspective of tribal Middle Eastern societies, no matter what President Trump's actual intentions are, he has chosen sides by failing to stop the Iraqi forces from entering Kirkuk, raising the Iraqi flag, lowering the Kurdish flag, seizing the oil field in the area, and in every respect asserting dominion and control over the area. That is a sign of not only a political betrayal, but of a strategic choice that will have long-term repercussion for the region. Despite the lofty rhetoric about stopping Iran, the United States cannot overlook the alliance about the Abadi forces, trained and supplied by the United States, and Iran-backed Shi'a militias, that in the past, have pressured the Kurds, threatened religious minorities in the area, including Yazidis and Christians, and despite some limited cooperation with the United States on the issues of fighting ISIS (mainly out of self-interest), have otherwise acted as agents of the ayatollah-led Iranian regime. Both indecisiveness and conscious choice to allow Baghdad and Iranian agents to do as they wish with the Kurdish areas, send the same signals to all involve, and make the United States both unwelcome with the allies, and irrelevant with the adversaries in the region.
Strategic withdrawal from an active role in the region may have its place, but only if it's done on our terms, to our advantage, and in a way that signals a well-thought out foreign policy and defense of interests, rather than weakness, inability to make decisive move, or a choice of undemocratic regimes and bad allies over dependable allies whose help will be needed many times over in the future. Indeed, however, many are not convinced that the position of the administration on this issue is sincere. For instance, Turkey's position on the matter of Kurdish independence may have been the lodestar in this decisionmaking process. Turkey has recently come to an agreement with Iran on a variety of matters, which included increased military cooperation and the issue of Kurdistan's independence referendum. After the fall of Kirkuk, Ankara issued its approval of the invasion.
The administration has been careful in maintaining good relations with Turkey. It had previously pressured Barzani to postpone the referendum, after both Abadi and Erdogan expressed strong opposition. President Trump, despite major policy differences, recently called Erdogan a friend, and Turkey and the US recently concluded a deal over Boeing airplanes. Turkish lobby has been strong in the US. Michael Flynn, President Trump's former national security adviser, had worked for Turkish interests. In fact, shortly before being removed from his position, Flynn had reportedly blocked a military move in Syria that Turkey had opposed. Moreover, as we now know, Turkey had paid off a number of major think tanks that had advised President Trump shortly prior to Erdogan's visit to the White House in May of this year. President Trump is likely getting very bad advise from the Secretary of State, who views the independence referendum as illegitimate, and from an assortment of sources, who are taken in by the extensive Turkish lobby in the United States.
None of it changes matters. The current calculus throws the Kurds into the arms of Russia, which has already ascended to power along with Iran in Syria, pushing the United States out of a position of significant influence altogether due to our short-sighted focus on only dealing with ISIS. Furthermore, Russia has stayed away from publicly condemning the referendum, and in fact, acted as the biggest financial backer of KRG. Although the Kurdish leadership is generally distrustful of Russia, Russia has proven itself to be a stalwart ally to Assad, and has deftly advocated for the Kurds in Turkey when it suited her interests. Putin's backing of the Kurds in Iraq is not sentimental; rather, he is shrewdly taking advantage of the US inaction to establish Kurdistan as Russia's sphere of influence and rise to power in the Middle East, all without having to expend significant power or resources.
As our influence diminishes and our presence becomes marginal, the US is likely to miss significant opportunities for business and educational investment in Kurdistan; infrastructure projects with potential for job growth for American workers; creation of a stable buffer state in the Middle East that would likely protect our security interests vis-a-vis Iran and Turkey, and spread elements of democracy and liberalization naturally through the people indigineous to the region rather than through conquest, occupation, or or other policies likely to be viewed as colonialist. What we are losing, however, Russia, Turkey, and Iran are gaining. Sooner or later, the imperial ambitions of these three aggressive states will come to a head in the oil-rich region; however, either one of the three belligerent actors prevails, which will not benefit the region, or the three countries come to a power-sharing agreement, in which case minorities, Israel, and the US will all lose out, or the situation deteriorates to the point of chaos, with civil war, strife, and new waves of refugees repeating the tragic events in Syria. In all cases excepting the instance where US rises to the occasion, shows moral and strategic leadership, and backs Kurdish aspiration to independence, we are looking at some very dismal scenarios that will place America dead last not only in the Middle East, but in the international arena as well.
http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/what-us-neutrality-on-iraqs-invasion-of-kirkuk-means-for-our-interests-in-the-region/
President Trump responded to the entrance of the Iraqi forces and Iran-based militias into Kirkuk this morning by stating that US is not taking sides between Kurds and the Iraqi government and is engaged in encouraging all sides to avoid clashes and continue dialogue.
However, in the context of the current tensions, US neutrality and commitment to non-intervention is taken as betrayal by the Kurds and as tacit approval by Iraq, Iran, and even Turkey. Qassem Soleimani's role in the fall of Kirkuk was the first test of the White House's new policy on Iran, which includes designating IRGC as a terrorist organization and opposing Iranian expansionism in the Middle east. Nevertheless, thus far, the administration has failed to show commitment to upholding US law and going after the terrorist leader, despite an opportunity to do so in the course of this operation.
From the perspective of tribal Middle Eastern societies, no matter what President Trump's actual intentions are, he has chosen sides by failing to stop the Iraqi forces from entering Kirkuk, raising the Iraqi flag, lowering the Kurdish flag, seizing the oil field in the area, and in every respect asserting dominion and control over the area. That is a sign of not only a political betrayal, but of a strategic choice that will have long-term repercussion for the region. Despite the lofty rhetoric about stopping Iran, the United States cannot overlook the alliance about the Abadi forces, trained and supplied by the United States, and Iran-backed Shi'a militias, that in the past, have pressured the Kurds, threatened religious minorities in the area, including Yazidis and Christians, and despite some limited cooperation with the United States on the issues of fighting ISIS (mainly out of self-interest), have otherwise acted as agents of the ayatollah-led Iranian regime. Both indecisiveness and conscious choice to allow Baghdad and Iranian agents to do as they wish with the Kurdish areas, send the same signals to all involve, and make the United States both unwelcome with the allies, and irrelevant with the adversaries in the region.
Strategic withdrawal from an active role in the region may have its place, but only if it's done on our terms, to our advantage, and in a way that signals a well-thought out foreign policy and defense of interests, rather than weakness, inability to make decisive move, or a choice of undemocratic regimes and bad allies over dependable allies whose help will be needed many times over in the future. Indeed, however, many are not convinced that the position of the administration on this issue is sincere. For instance, Turkey's position on the matter of Kurdish independence may have been the lodestar in this decisionmaking process. Turkey has recently come to an agreement with Iran on a variety of matters, which included increased military cooperation and the issue of Kurdistan's independence referendum. After the fall of Kirkuk, Ankara issued its approval of the invasion.
The administration has been careful in maintaining good relations with Turkey. It had previously pressured Barzani to postpone the referendum, after both Abadi and Erdogan expressed strong opposition. President Trump, despite major policy differences, recently called Erdogan a friend, and Turkey and the US recently concluded a deal over Boeing airplanes. Turkish lobby has been strong in the US. Michael Flynn, President Trump's former national security adviser, had worked for Turkish interests. In fact, shortly before being removed from his position, Flynn had reportedly blocked a military move in Syria that Turkey had opposed. Moreover, as we now know, Turkey had paid off a number of major think tanks that had advised President Trump shortly prior to Erdogan's visit to the White House in May of this year. President Trump is likely getting very bad advise from the Secretary of State, who views the independence referendum as illegitimate, and from an assortment of sources, who are taken in by the extensive Turkish lobby in the United States.
None of it changes matters. The current calculus throws the Kurds into the arms of Russia, which has already ascended to power along with Iran in Syria, pushing the United States out of a position of significant influence altogether due to our short-sighted focus on only dealing with ISIS. Furthermore, Russia has stayed away from publicly condemning the referendum, and in fact, acted as the biggest financial backer of KRG. Although the Kurdish leadership is generally distrustful of Russia, Russia has proven itself to be a stalwart ally to Assad, and has deftly advocated for the Kurds in Turkey when it suited her interests. Putin's backing of the Kurds in Iraq is not sentimental; rather, he is shrewdly taking advantage of the US inaction to establish Kurdistan as Russia's sphere of influence and rise to power in the Middle East, all without having to expend significant power or resources.
As our influence diminishes and our presence becomes marginal, the US is likely to miss significant opportunities for business and educational investment in Kurdistan; infrastructure projects with potential for job growth for American workers; creation of a stable buffer state in the Middle East that would likely protect our security interests vis-a-vis Iran and Turkey, and spread elements of democracy and liberalization naturally through the people indigineous to the region rather than through conquest, occupation, or or other policies likely to be viewed as colonialist. What we are losing, however, Russia, Turkey, and Iran are gaining. Sooner or later, the imperial ambitions of these three aggressive states will come to a head in the oil-rich region; however, either one of the three belligerent actors prevails, which will not benefit the region, or the three countries come to a power-sharing agreement, in which case minorities, Israel, and the US will all lose out, or the situation deteriorates to the point of chaos, with civil war, strife, and new waves of refugees repeating the tragic events in Syria. In all cases excepting the instance where US rises to the occasion, shows moral and strategic leadership, and backs Kurdish aspiration to independence, we are looking at some very dismal scenarios that will place America dead last not only in the Middle East, but in the international arena as well.
Monday, October 16, 2017
The Fall of Kirkuk - and of the US new policy on Iran
Left mostly to civilians, PKK volunteers, and others Kirkuk fell to Iraqi troops and Iran-based militias in a matter of hours. Iraq is seeking to take back the oil-rich region from Kurdish control.
US stood by and did nothing.
President Trump recently announced a shift in policy in Iran, which would include designating IRGC as a terrorist organization, responding to Iranian militias engaged in terrorism with harshness, and preventing Iran's expansionism in the region.
Well, today's assault on Kirkuk following the recent independence referendum and a week of tensions, threats, and attempted negotiations was the first test of our commitment to the new policy and we failed it.
We have allowed Iraqi forces, armed with US weaponry, and on the dole from the US government for many years, as well as Iran backed militias, adversarial to our efforts in the region and inimical to US interests and those of her allies, to attack an ally who has stalwartly backed us in our fight against ISIS, showed an openness to Western values of democracy and liberalization, and a strong interest in a growing alliance with the United States.
Furthermore, we have hypocritically allowed the source of the many factionalist troubles in the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot treaty, to continue dictating the present and the future of the region, effectively killing the dream of self-determination, moving away from colonialist maps, and towards a future, where nations can forge their own paths and choose their own governments. Foolishly, we have also allowed a large supply of oil to end up in the hands of groups backed by an expansionist regime, and committed to terrorism and domination of the region.
It would have taken but one phone call from President Trump to stop Abadi's forces from entering Kirkuk, bring all parties to the table for a negotiation, and resolve the matters civilly, peacefully, and diplomatically. Instead, we have allowed our ally, the Kurds, to be publicly brutalized and humiliated by the presence of the enemy forces in the city they helped liberate from ISIS.
And the head of this operation is none other than the fearsome Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, who plays a key role in the intelligence and the IRGC, the very organization President Trump just designated as part of Global Terrorists organization, enforcing the law he signed as part of the sanctions package on Russia, North Korea, and Iran earlier this year. We had multiple opportunities to nab Soleimani in the last few years of the Obama administration, but let him get away, liberating him from the sanctions lists, and allowing him to cut weapons deal in Russia, in violation of our own security interests.
I need not tell you what is likely to happen when someone like Soleimani is in charge. But let's not leave the matter to our imagination. Let's look at Iran's treatment of its own significant Kurdish minority - treatment that includes disproportional executions, facilitation of drug flow into the regions, frequent denial of civil rights, and brutal torture of even peaceful human rights activists. Our failure to stop Soleimani from playing an active role in the fall of Kirkuk, as well as our lack of will in enforcing both our own existing laws and the newly articulated policy by the White House shows that our interest in stopping IRGC is significantly less than our apparent interest in appeasing Abadi, Erdogan, and various Arab states vehemently opposed to the existence of a Kurdish state.
Besides showing ourselves once again as a poor ally to the one group that is openly embracing our interest in liberalization, diversity, and enlightenment in the region, we are also shooting ourselves in the foot by opposing an important buffer state against Iran and increasingly bellicose Turkey, who would likely have positive relations with Israel, could be a good trade partner, and could move the region in a positive direction through its commitment to education and business investments. There's only one thing that's worse than betraying good allies, and that is betraying our own constituents. Americans and Congress have shown strong opposition to the IRGC, articulated by the sanctions signed into law this summer. We were explicitly promised the end of the Obama administration's failed appeasement posture and the beginning of a stronger, more assertive US that looks out for US national security interests above all else. Instead, we are getting more of the same - failure to contain an organization we just designated as terrorist, spread of strife and needless violence in the one part of the region that showed signs of promising stability, and endless deception over what standing up to Iran means in practice as opposed to what we were led to believe we were getting.
I urge President Trump to listen to good advice not from former and still interested oil executives, but from regional and national security experts well familiar with the dangers of IRGC and Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambitions, to take all action that would get Abadi to back off, to secure Kirkuk against invasions, and to have Soleimani taken into custody or killed, as the head of a terrorist organization that he is. That is the only way to show our commitment to our new policy on Iran, and to secure our national security interests and those of our regional allies, and to be taken seriously on the international stage by friends and foes alike.
US stood by and did nothing.
President Trump recently announced a shift in policy in Iran, which would include designating IRGC as a terrorist organization, responding to Iranian militias engaged in terrorism with harshness, and preventing Iran's expansionism in the region.
Well, today's assault on Kirkuk following the recent independence referendum and a week of tensions, threats, and attempted negotiations was the first test of our commitment to the new policy and we failed it.
We have allowed Iraqi forces, armed with US weaponry, and on the dole from the US government for many years, as well as Iran backed militias, adversarial to our efforts in the region and inimical to US interests and those of her allies, to attack an ally who has stalwartly backed us in our fight against ISIS, showed an openness to Western values of democracy and liberalization, and a strong interest in a growing alliance with the United States.
Furthermore, we have hypocritically allowed the source of the many factionalist troubles in the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot treaty, to continue dictating the present and the future of the region, effectively killing the dream of self-determination, moving away from colonialist maps, and towards a future, where nations can forge their own paths and choose their own governments. Foolishly, we have also allowed a large supply of oil to end up in the hands of groups backed by an expansionist regime, and committed to terrorism and domination of the region.
It would have taken but one phone call from President Trump to stop Abadi's forces from entering Kirkuk, bring all parties to the table for a negotiation, and resolve the matters civilly, peacefully, and diplomatically. Instead, we have allowed our ally, the Kurds, to be publicly brutalized and humiliated by the presence of the enemy forces in the city they helped liberate from ISIS.
And the head of this operation is none other than the fearsome Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, who plays a key role in the intelligence and the IRGC, the very organization President Trump just designated as part of Global Terrorists organization, enforcing the law he signed as part of the sanctions package on Russia, North Korea, and Iran earlier this year. We had multiple opportunities to nab Soleimani in the last few years of the Obama administration, but let him get away, liberating him from the sanctions lists, and allowing him to cut weapons deal in Russia, in violation of our own security interests.
I need not tell you what is likely to happen when someone like Soleimani is in charge. But let's not leave the matter to our imagination. Let's look at Iran's treatment of its own significant Kurdish minority - treatment that includes disproportional executions, facilitation of drug flow into the regions, frequent denial of civil rights, and brutal torture of even peaceful human rights activists. Our failure to stop Soleimani from playing an active role in the fall of Kirkuk, as well as our lack of will in enforcing both our own existing laws and the newly articulated policy by the White House shows that our interest in stopping IRGC is significantly less than our apparent interest in appeasing Abadi, Erdogan, and various Arab states vehemently opposed to the existence of a Kurdish state.
Besides showing ourselves once again as a poor ally to the one group that is openly embracing our interest in liberalization, diversity, and enlightenment in the region, we are also shooting ourselves in the foot by opposing an important buffer state against Iran and increasingly bellicose Turkey, who would likely have positive relations with Israel, could be a good trade partner, and could move the region in a positive direction through its commitment to education and business investments. There's only one thing that's worse than betraying good allies, and that is betraying our own constituents. Americans and Congress have shown strong opposition to the IRGC, articulated by the sanctions signed into law this summer. We were explicitly promised the end of the Obama administration's failed appeasement posture and the beginning of a stronger, more assertive US that looks out for US national security interests above all else. Instead, we are getting more of the same - failure to contain an organization we just designated as terrorist, spread of strife and needless violence in the one part of the region that showed signs of promising stability, and endless deception over what standing up to Iran means in practice as opposed to what we were led to believe we were getting.
I urge President Trump to listen to good advice not from former and still interested oil executives, but from regional and national security experts well familiar with the dangers of IRGC and Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambitions, to take all action that would get Abadi to back off, to secure Kirkuk against invasions, and to have Soleimani taken into custody or killed, as the head of a terrorist organization that he is. That is the only way to show our commitment to our new policy on Iran, and to secure our national security interests and those of our regional allies, and to be taken seriously on the international stage by friends and foes alike.
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