Why Baghdad's Move on Kirkuk Is Not About the Independence Referendum

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/11/22/why-baghdads-move-on-kirkuk-is-not-about-the-independence-referendum/

By now, it should be abundantly obvious that  Baghdad's move to take over Kirkuk has been pre-planned and would have advanced with or without the independence referendum. Iraqi forces and Peshmerga were allied against ISIS in the liberation of the territories, yet Iraq's ultimate priority has always been in retaining the control over the oil fields and revenue from the Kurdish-held territories.  And with Barzani's resignation as KRG President, we now know that whatever criticisms could be made about the latter's hold on power well beyond the constitutional provisions, his concerns about Kurdish security and move for independence were a great deal more than just power play. Further proof of Baghdad's disingenuous bluster about territorial integrity and "unity" (carved out by the British under the Sykes-Picot agreement, that would intentionally keep different nations with disparate identities cobbled together, foster divisions, and allow the British Empire to maintain control) are Abadi's actions with respect to the Kurdish citizens the moment the Baghdad-Iran alliance assumed control of much of the disputed territories and the oil fields, which were, in fact the central concern.

The legitimacy of Baghdad's concern for its national sovereignty is undermined by the unnecessary assault on the Kurdish autonomy, which can only make the Kurds yearn for independence more, not less. Though Middle East is all about overpowering and crushing your enemy to make him respect you, the excessively vindictive actions by Baghdad, and its welcoming of a foreign regime (IRGC) into this punitive takeover is likely to have the opposite effect. Baghdad's reimposition of power began with a crackown on Kurdish media - the banning of Kurdistan24 and Rudaw, two of the major local outlets, which have been providing detailed information about both the military action of the past few weeks and internal Kurdish matters of interest to their families in Syria, Turkey, and Europe, and enhancing the understanding of world leaders who would otherwise be uninformed about the alphabet soup of Kurdish parties and factions in the region.

This move signals illegitimacy of having a separate Kurdish identity, a bitter point for a nation of approximately 30 million people with distinct languages, culture, and indigenous roots in the region, but to this day without an independent state.  Second, it is an insurance policy that the international community will have no access to real-time information on the ground, and certainly not the English-language Kurdish take on it. There is a small coterie of Western journalists presence, but as the Israeli journalist Seth Frantzman has pointed out, they tend to rely on other Western journalists for information, and thus likely miss a great deal of internal dynamics and the full spectrum of regional narratives.  Lack of alternative information will go a long way towards creating an appearance of only one perspective: Baghdad's position, made public through official channels and formal meetings.  Whatever public support the Kurds are currently getting is largely fueled by the unrestricted access to their voices. The legitimacy of Baghdad's own actions are severely undermined by its move to squash down criticism from the significant portion of its population, and its ally in the war against ISIS.

Second, Baghdad has moved to pay salaries directly to the Kurdish civil servants, bypassing the KRG. This undermines the authority of the Kurdish leadership, and makes the Kurdish infrastructure heavily depended on, and thus potentially loyal to, Baghdad. For sure, even if the bulk of the Kurdish civilian forces grow resentful of this deprivation of a sense of autonomy, others will cling to security for their immediate situation, and Baghdad thus far successfully divides-and-conquers the already splintered Kurdish groups.  For the same reason, Abadi's forces are seeking to cut off Peshmerga access to the pipeline that delivers oil to Turkey, and to provide all oil to Turkey, bypassing the KRG. It's just another way of undermining Kurdistan, weakening its economy, undermining its business relationship with Turkey, and ensuring that Iraq is viewed as the central authority, whereas Kurdistan is merely a province with no independent power to make deals or provide anything of value to the region.

Third, Baghdad is seeking to undermine the use of Kurdish languages in the region, in order to weaken the sense of a national identity and common destiny among the Kurds in Iraq, as well as a sense of unity with the Kurds in other countries. The first sign of this cultural crackdown is the attack against a Kurdish official, who used his own language rather than Arabic, in a formal media setting. While Baghdad has not yet made this move an official policy, this disturbing incident is a sign of what it could do, and what it will likely do, following the example of Turkey, if Kurds continue to resist. Suppression of national culture is the best way to weaken a potentially rebellious or troublesome population. The Soviet Union has done that systematically to the Jews; Iran has persisted in its tactics against a whole host of national minorities; and Turkey before and during Erdogan has imposed fascist policies to ensure cultural conformity.

Fourth, Baghdad is looking to divide the minorities living in Kurdish area, and has already done so, in that various groups have associated themselves with Peshmerga, PMU (connected to Iran), or with Iraqi forces, that have been trained and armed by Americans.  At the same time, Iraqi forces claimed to have no control over the Iran-backed militias, that are retaking the territories, and have opened up civilians and minorities to potential exploitation and destruction by the militias.  Having gone as far as Al Qosh, these groups have threatened a Jewish historical site, and the Christian sites in the area.  And Christian groups have reached out to the international community to complain of threats directed at them by Hashd. Yet the forces have not stopped at the borders of areas that are of strategic and geopolitical importance to the Iraqi government. They have pushed out outwards, and have been repelled by Peshmerga in multiple places, and have made way in others. Although strictly speaking there has been a ceasefire, between Iraqis and Peshmerga, that has not affected non=Peshmerga Kurdish forces protecting civilians and minorities, and who are still under threat of Iran-backed militias and IRGC. At the same time, these moves are a clear indication that Baghdad is not seeking a truce. It is seeking domination and full control of the Kurdish population, a repressive and punitive one at that.

Thus far, the response from the international community, particularly from the United States, has consisted of calls for peace and agreement, support for Iraq's unity, and proposals of mediation to the tune of "why can't we just all get along". None of that was aimed at curbing Iraq's abusive behavior or at seriously reassuring our Kurdish allies as to the commitment of the US to their security, cultural preservation, and autonomy, even under our official position of preserving Iraq as a cohesive state - quite ironic, given that there is nothing indigenous about the Sykes-Picot treaty imposed on Iraq by the British. Furthermore, there is radio silence from the US administration as to the article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, assembled with the help of US State Department and top American lawyers, which provides for Kurdish independence. Certainly, such a provision would at the very least provide a level of recognition and provision for Kurdish rights.

And ironically, it is this potential suppression of Kurdish autonomy that provides the greatest justification to independence under international law. (The Katanga case). At the end of the day, however, any nation that feels oppressed or that is otherwise dedicated to independence and pursuit of its own destiny must come to terms of having to organize its forces into strong cohesive units, making at least temporary alliances with its factions abroad, procuring whatever is needed for strong offensive and defensive fronts, through subterfuge, if necessary, and being prepared for a military triumph and complete capitulation of its opponents. In other words, if Kurds want their own state, they are going to have to fight for it, and international support will emerge only once it becomes clear that they can actually win, and have the wherewithal to support their own state without anyone's help. It's not pretty, but this is how it worked out for Israel, which likewise was surrounded by overwhelming enemy forces, had very limited access to inferior weapons, and no international recognition - yet there she is, nearly 70 years later, small but independent.  I hope that the US administration will see that the Baghdad government is losing its own legitimacy with each oppressive step that it takes, that its direction comes from the Iranian ayatollahs and will do the only right and practical thing under the circumstances - change its policy to fully backing the Kurds and keeping the worst of Baghdad's actions at bay. But I wouldn't hold my breath or rely on that.  I would also not remain passive, waiting for miracles to happen or for these problems to resolve themselves. Time may very well be ripe for a Kurdish state - but are the Kurds themselves ready?

How US Unequivocal Support for Iraqi Nationalism Will Lead to Radicalization and Extremism

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/how-us-unequivocal-support-for-iraqi-nationalism-will-lead-to-radicalization-and-extremism/

Seth Frantzman, in a recent article, analyzes US position of neutrality on Baghdad takeover of Kirkuk, and further silence on the alleged human rights violations, and punitive actions such as the shut down of Kurdish press, Kurdistan24 and Rudaw. In sum, the thinking is that encouraging Iraqi nationalism, which is based in substantial part in anti-Kurdish sentiment, US will turn Iraq away from Iranian influence, and unify the country under the Saudi Arabia aegis against the spread of Iranian influence. The idea there is that if the Shi'a Iraqi government aligns with the Sunni KSA, together they can counter Iran. And indeed, Iraq has signed a corresponding defense treaty with KSA. However, that is not a meaningful agreement for two reasons: first, Iraq will do just about anything to play all sides, including the US, which has been arming its army. Second, KSA is far away, and Iran is close. Abadi and the Islamic Republic has been getting along quite nicely, and Abadi invited Iran to participate in takeover of Kirkuk. It clearly does not see Iran as a threat, though KSA does. And when forced to choose between its Shi'a neighbor, which has helped Iraq with the Kurdish issue and the Sunni Saudi Arabia, which is known to sympathize with Iraq's Sunni population, tribal and religious considerations will prevail over piece of paper.

The fact that the United States does not realize that shows the extent of ignorance of our foreign policy leaders of the cultures, which they are now trying to bring together through fictitious borders and imaginary alliances. The British, when they did the same, at least cynically imposed divisions to perpetuate their own power. The US leaders actually believe that this policy is going to work and that it's in the best interests of the Middle East and the United States. It is quite amazing.  This vision of a Baghdad-Riyadh alliance puts aside the dream of a free and democratic Kurdistan. The reason for this groupthink at top levels may be deeply rooted in the underlying psychological need to stay consistent. In other words, the US has already invested so heavily into Baghdad, that having realign its policy now would be equivalent to conceding defeat. In other words, the excuse that this is all about American interests is rational, but the reasoning behind is not. Otherwise, the weight that the US would be giving to other considerations would be at least equal to its own wishful thinking to see this implausible alliance of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to work for more than five minutes, until Iran decides that it should be otherwise.

Much has already been said and written about the potential boons of an independent Kurdistan for the United States - a trading partner with a vibrant economy, a buffer state against Iran's and Turkey's expansionist ambitions, a new model of indigenous evolutionary liberalization, a friendly state, open to Western values and partnership with Israel. All of these potential benefits, in the eyes of the generals, who are spearheading US foreign policy in the Fertile Crescent, is of less interest than having Iraq not be quite-so-pro-Iran.  There is no official analysis on how such calculations are figured, but there is also a darker side of this conversation that likewise does not appear to figure into the equation: the potential for the radicalization of the Kurdish region. Neither friends nor critics are particularly interested in touching on this sensitive topics. Those, who favor independent Kurdistan focus the bulk of their attention on the perceived betrayal by the US - in other words, a valid, but largely emotional talking point, whereas the critics cite the dubious benefits of yet another tribal Muslim state at the cost of weakening another ally - Iraq. The underlying working assumption, however, is that the US decisionmakers are correct in one way: Kurdish independence will bring greater instability than Kurdish "remain", at least in the short term.

Such position relies on the erroneous assumption that Iraq is open to various potential positions, and will pivot in the desirable direction if only the United States will do what Baghdad claims needs to be done to earn its favor - return the oil fields to Abadi's forces without a question, stay moot on the Kurds, encourage peace talks through gentle rhetoric, and ignore the Iran-backed militias and IRGC presence in the vicinity. If only the US does all these things, at some point, all will be well. IRGC will not do much damage beyond security the territory for Iraq and ensuring that the rebellious Kurds will not tempt its own Kurdish population; Turkey is all talk; ISIS has been taken care of, and US can reap the boons of its cynical wisdom. Such wishful thinking is no more practical than believing that Kurdish independence will come without a bloody fight against a variety of regional forces. That's not a commentary on the morality or benefits or likelihood of such a move; that's just a statement of logical observation based in the Middle Eastern dynamics. You get what you are willing to fight for, and only if you win with overwhelming force. In the meantime, US is so focused on its own line of reasoning that it ignores major red flags that undermine its position.

First, Iraq has already and openly pivoted to Iran. The actions of the last few weeks demonstrate it amply. US reasoning that by sacrificing Kurdistan it can stop Iraq from growing closer to Iran is not only mistaken; it is nothing short of appeasement.  Iran's interest is regional dominance. Abadi, if he wants to stay in power in the region, needs to abide by Iran's decisionmaking. It will, therefore, cooperate to whatever extent necessary that it is seen as a fully ally, reliable in supporting Iran's ambitions.  Iran will not stop at building IRGC military basis and headquarters in Kirkuk, nor does it make it any sense to stop when there is no resistance from anyone.

Second, Iran's presence in the Kurdistan area far exceeds what can be gauged from the coverage, especially after Kurdistan24 and Rudaw were shut down. According to one source, Iran has as many as 700 secret houses in Suleimanya alone. If that's accurate, it's quite plausible that Iran has extensive presence, both overt and clandestine, in every corner of Kurdistan. And it is there to stay, long-term.  From disputed territory between Baghdad and Erbil, Kirkuk province are becoming occupied territories, essentially colonized by Iran. If Iran continues to grow its military presence in the area, and there's every reason to believe that without a war, Iran is not going anywhere, the next step is indoctrination of the local population - ranging from forced conversions to political brainwashing.

It may already be building schools, whereas Western educational opportunities in the region are woefully missing. Furthermore, with Baghdad banning all commercial flights in and out of  Erbil, and potentially cutting off access to Syrian and Turkish overpasses, Kurds are not only economically isolated, but become wholly dependent on Baghdad and Tehran for humanitarian aid, educational maintenance, and even the news.And Iran is likely to radicalize the local Shi'a population through joint educational programming.  The religious element may prevail over tribal concerns, if Iran is seen as an economic benefactor, rather than an oppressor to the Iraqi majority. Meanwhile, it is taking every step to show who's the boss. Iran is opening up its border with Kurdistan - that is a sign that the regime has achieved a decisive military and psychological victory. It has nothing to fear from the Kurds.

At the same time, however, the support of nationalist sentiments among Iraqis is taking a turn less towards unity and more into anti-Kurdish xenophobia. Already, a Kurdish journalist was stabbed to death in Kirkuk. Iranian militias, not Iraqi forces, arrested dozens of young Kurds in a cafe in Kirkuk. Their fate is unenviable, as anyone, familiar with the brutality of the regime and its treatment of rebellious ethnic minorities will testify. And religious minorities all over the Kurdish region are threatened by the IRGC and the Iran=backed militias. Jewish and Christian sites near Al Qosh are in danger. Multiple Christian and Yazidi groups have expressed concern.  Militias are on full alert protecting civilians, yet they are outnumbered and outgunned by the well-equipped Iraqi forces, and the Iran=backed militias that are not answerable to Abadi's command.  This destabilization is precisely what US support for national unity was supposed to prevent. Instead, it is turning into the scapegoating and vendetta against the Kurds.

Third, these divisions are likely to be exploited by Sunni extremist groups, like Al Qaeda and remnants of ISIS and their ilk. Seemingly defeated, these groups await opportunity for strife in order to make a triumphant comeback, sow discord, and take advantage of other violent situations.  And ideological extremists will surely take the opportunity to appeal to the disenfranchised groups, proselytize among embittered and marginalized Kurdish peripheral regions, and go after every resentful person or group left hopeless after the takeover of Kirkuk.

Worse still, if Iraq continues to try to destroy Kurdish nationalism and sense of identity, as it's doing now, the resistance that will arise will become increasingly radical and violent, and the potential for militant action, all the way to terrorism against civilians is not to be ruled out. We have seen the way the Soviet Union had sown chaos among Turkish Kurds, eliminating all nationalist groups except for the PKK, and turning PKK into a Soviet terrorist group (which after several decades finally reformed, but not before costing many lives of innocent civilians in the process). Interestingly, Russia is moving back into Kurdistan, and is seeking a closer relationship with the Kurds. It's also looking to utilize them more in Syria.  That Russia will use this opportunity to play on the anti-American backlash through what is widely perceived as betrayal is quite obvious.

To make a long story short, the downside to the chimeric US strategy involving the one-sided coddling of Baghdad to the exclusion of all other interested parties, is that instead of building bulwarks against extremists, including Iran, which is the whole goal of this exercise, the US is actually making active enemies out of absolutely everyone in the region, strengthening the potential for extremism, and allowing radical actors to assume the vacuum of leadership, all in the name of unity and the US interests. But the region united by extremism is not in the US interests at all, and neither is giving up opportunities for economic investments and partnerships fall into the hands of Russia and Iran, which have not done anything positive with any place they have ever been involved in.

The administration should snap out of this dangerous delusion quickly, and start drawing and enforcing boundaries for its "ally" Baghdad, which include, first and foremost, getting Iran and out of the picture completely, and only then creating positive bilateral and equanimeous conditions for further negotiations. It should send a clear signal to Kurds that their identity is recognized and respected, and to all other actors, that US has a central role to play in the region, and that chaos and extremism of any sort is not an option and will not be tolerated - not after all the lives the US has sacrificed to get to where we are today. Most importantly, the US should remember that alliances among former enemies are temporary, and for that reason Iraqi-Saudi alliance cannot be relied upon to last.

But strong long-term relationship among groups of people who have a baseline of common interests, values, and a history of fighting together for common goals can endure and move in the most positive direction. We should not continue following the same failed policy of putting all our eggs in one basket (in this case, Abadi), only to be bitterly disappointed and face new crisis yet again.  We have the luxury of hindsight to make better, more informed decisions, and the richness of our experience to build a better, more secure future for ourselves, and the world that we want to live in.

Why Baghdad's Move on Kirkuk Is Not about The Independence Referendum

Cross-posted at:

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/11/22/why-baghdads-move-on-kirkuk-is-not-about-the-independence-referendum/

By now, it should be abundantly obvious that  Baghdad’s move to take over Kirkuk has been pre-planned and would have advanced with or without the independence referendum.

Iraqi forces and Peshmerga were allied against ISIS in the liberation of the territories, yet Iraq’s ultimate priority has always been in retaining the control over the oil fields and revenue from the Kurdish-held territories. And with Barzani’s resignation as KRG President, we now know that whatever criticisms could be made about the latter’s hold on power well beyond the constitutional provisions, his concerns about Kurdish security and move for independence were a great deal more than just power play. Further proof of Baghdad’s disingenuous bluster about territorial integrity and “unity” (carved out by the British under the Sykes-Picot agreement, that would intentionally keep different nations with disparate identities cobbled together, foster divisions, and allow the British Empire to maintain control) are Abadi’s actions with respect to the Kurdish citizens the moment the Baghdad-Iran alliance assumed control of much of the disputed territories and the oil fields, which were, in fact the central concern.

The legitimacy of Baghdad’s concern for its national sovereignty is undermined by the unnecessary assault on the Kurdish autonomy, which can only make the Kurds yearn for independence more, not less. Though Middle East is all about overpowering and crushing your enemy to make him respect you, the excessively vindictive actions by Baghdad, and its welcoming of a foreign regime (IRGC) into this punitive takeover is likely to have the opposite effect. Baghdad’s reimposition of power began with a crackown on Kurdish media – the banning of Kurdistan24 and Rudaw, two of the major local outlets, which have been providing detailed information about both the military action of the past few weeks and internal Kurdish matters of interest to their families in Syria, Turkey, and Europe, and enhancing the understanding of world leaders who would otherwise be uninformed about the alphabet soup of Kurdish parties and factions in the region.

This move signals illegitimacy of having a separate Kurdish identity, a bitter point for a nation of approximately 30 million people with distinct languages, culture, and indigenous roots in the region, but to this day without an independent state.  Second, it is an insurance policy that the international community will have no access to real-time information on the ground, and certainly not the English-language Kurdish take on it. There is a small coterie of Western journalists presence, but as the Israeli journalist Seth Frantzman has pointed out, they tend to rely on other Western journalists for information, and thus likely miss a great deal of internal dynamics and the full spectrum of regional narratives.  Lack of alternative information will go a long way towards creating an appearance of only one perspective: Baghdad’s position, made public through official channels and formal meetings.  Whatever public support the Kurds are currently getting is largely fueled by the unrestricted access to their voices. The legitimacy of Baghdad’s own actions are severely undermined by its move to squash down criticism from the significant portion of its population, and its ally in the war against ISIS.

Second, Baghdad has moved to pay salaries directly to the Kurdish civil servants, bypassing the KRG. This undermines the authority of the Kurdish leadership, and makes the Kurdish infrastructure heavily depended on, and thus potentially loyal to, Baghdad. For sure, even if the bulk of the Kurdish civilian forces grow resentful of this deprivation of a sense of autonomy, others will cling to security for their immediate situation, and Baghdad thus far successfully divides-and-conquers the already splintered Kurdish groups.  For the same reason, Abadi’s forces are seeking to cut off Peshmerga access to the pipeline that delivers oil to Turkey, and to provide all oil to Turkey, bypassing the KRG. It’s just another way of undermining Kurdistan, weakening its economy, undermining its business relationship with Turkey, and ensuring that Iraq is viewed as the central authority, whereas Kurdistan is merely a province with no independent power to make deals or provide anything of value to the region.

Third, Baghdad is seeking to undermine the use of Kurdish languages in the region, in order to weaken the sense of a national identity and common destiny among the Kurds in Iraq, as well as a sense of unity with the Kurds in other countries. The first sign of this cultural crackdown is the attack against a Kurdish official, who used his own language rather than Arabic, in a formal media setting. While Baghdad has not yet made this move an official policy, this disturbing incident is a sign of what it could do, and what it will likely do, following the example of Turkey, if Kurds continue to resist. Suppression of national culture is the best way to weaken a potentially rebellious or troublesome population. The Soviet Union has done that systematically to the Jews; Iran has persisted in its tactics against a whole host of national minorities; and Turkey before and during Erdogan has imposed fascist policies to ensure cultural conformity.

Fourth, Baghdad is looking to divide the minorities living in Kurdish area, and has already done so, in that various groups have associated themselves with Peshmerga, PMU (connected to Iran), or with Iraqi forces, that have been trained and armed by Americans.  At the same time, Iraqi forces claimed to have no control over the Iran-backed militias, that are retaking the territories, and have opened up civilians and minorities to potential exploitation and destruction by the militias.  Having gone as far as Al Qosh, these groups have threatened a Jewish historical site, and the Christian sites in the area.  And Christian groups have reached out to the international community to complain of threats directed at them by Hashd. Yet the forces have not stopped at the borders of areas that are of strategic and geopolitical importance to the Iraqi government. They have pushed out outwards, and have been repelled by Peshmerga in multiple places, and have made way in others. Although strictly speaking there has been a ceasefire, between Iraqis and Peshmerga, that has not affected non=Peshmerga Kurdish forces protecting civilians and minorities, and who are still under threat of Iran-backed militias and IRGC. At the same time, these moves are a clear indication that Baghdad is not seeking a truce. It is seeking domination and full control of the Kurdish population, a repressive and punitive one at that.

Thus far, the response from the international community, particularly from the United States, has consisted of calls for peace and agreement, support for Iraq’s unity, and proposals of mediation to the tune of “why can’t we just all get along”. None of that was aimed at curbing Iraq’s abusive behavior or at seriously reassuring our Kurdish allies as to the commitment of the US to their security, cultural preservation, and autonomy, even under our official position of preserving Iraq as a cohesive state – quite ironic, given that there is nothing indigenous about the Sykes-Picot treaty imposed on Iraq by the British. Furthermore, there is radio silence from the US administration as to the article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, assembled with the help of US State Department and top American lawyers, which provides for Kurdish independence. Certainly, such a provision would at the very least provide a level of recognition and provision for Kurdish rights.

And ironically, it is this potential suppression of Kurdish autonomy that provides the greatest justification to independence under international law. (The Katanga case). At the end of the day, however, any nation that feels oppressed or that is otherwise dedicated to independence and pursuit of its own destiny must come to terms of having to organize its forces into strong cohesive units, making at least temporary alliances with its factions abroad, procuring whatever is needed for strong offensive and defensive fronts, through subterfuge, if necessary, and being prepared for a military triumph and complete capitulation of its opponents. In other words, if Kurds want their own state, they are going to have to fight for it, and international support will emerge only once it becomes clear that they can actually win, and have the wherewithal to support their own state without anyone’s help. It’s not pretty, but this is how it worked out for Israel, which likewise was surrounded by overwhelming enemy forces, had very limited access to inferior weapons, and no international recognition – yet there she is, nearly 70 years later, small but independent.  I hope that the US administration will see that the Baghdad government is losing its own legitimacy with each oppressive step that it takes, that its direction comes from the Iranian ayatollahs and will do the only right and practical thing under the circumstances – change its policy to fully backing the Kurds and keeping the worst of Baghdad’s actions at bay. But I wouldn’t hold my breath or rely on that.  I would also not remain passive, waiting for miracles to happen or for these problems to resolve themselves. Time may very well be ripe for a Kurdish state – but are the Kurds themselves ready?

Irina Tsukerman, human rights and national security lawyer based in New York.

Veterans's Day Thought:

A Veterans' Day thought:

What will the administration do to keep our troops in Iraq safe from IRGC and Iranian militias, if the administration won't even admit that our enemies are there on the ground.

Here's the difference between US and Russia.

Putin would lie to his people and claim that their boys weren't in the hotspots everyone knew they were, getting killed.

Our government is lying to us and pretending that our enemies are not where everyone knows they are.

What's better?

Who Is Lying About Kirkuk And Why It Matters

cross-posted in Times of Israel:

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/who-is-lying-about-kirkuk-and-why-it-matters/


Among the growing Baghdad-Barzani rift, various claims have been made about who knew what and when, and who said what and why.

The  three competing perspectives are as follows:

* US betrayed Kurds by failing to stop the invasion by Iraqi forces, Iran-backed Shi'a militias, and the IRGC. Kurds have been strong allies to the US during the fight against ISIS, and have peacefully voted to secede from a state, which is increasingly manipulated by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thus is not a good fit for the significant Kurdish population. The oil fields can and should be peacefully negotiated by the two governments, but the Iraqi forces have no business invading Kurdish-held territories, which the latter have liberated from the ISIS presence. Moreover, Iraqi Constitution, Article 140, provides for Kurdish independence, and given that the Constitution was comprised with the assistance from US lawyers and the State Department, US is well aware of that provision and should be respectful of it.

* Kurdish leadership new full well from CIA, State Department, and Pentagon statements before the referendum that US was strongly opposed to secession and would not be supportive if Baghdad decided to take back its territory in the aftermath. Barzani blatantly lied to its population, leading them to believe that the US was deceptive about its support for Kurds. There was no reason to believe that the independence referendum had international support. Barzani overstepped his authority in the attempt to distract from his own illegitimate hold on power despite the constitution.

* The well trained Iraqi forces, armed by the United States, had significantly more field experience in long-term operations than Peshmerga. Furthermore, Baghdad was planning to invade Kirkuk regardless of whether or not Kurds held the referendum, so it was only a matter of time before the region was overrun with Iraqi forces coupled with Iran-backed Shi'a militias. Barzani did not necessarily count on the Talabani faction to sell out to the IRGC, but had decided to call the referendum, knowing that they would be taken over regardless, to draw attention to the upcoming takeover, and also to start taking active steps towards the future, knowing that putting that off would likely make it less, not MORE likely to gain international support and recognition with time.  Furthermore, regardless of US statements, it was in the US interests to support Kurds and to avoid clashes between allies, so regardless of US statements about the referendum, it was reasonable to expect that they would mediate in a manner that would avoid violent takeover and could help negotiate oil. It's not in the US interests to have IRGC presence regardless of how the US administration feels about Baghdad's claims to Kirkuk, or or other issues complicating Kurdish path to independence.

These three narratives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. And the Kurdish people should have had realistic expectations of the US role in their own story, and had demanded better preparation and organization of troops, clear communications, and an actual plan from the Barzani government, not to mention dealing with the election issue instead of going for populist slogans. However, none of these considerations takes away from the legitimacy of the following concerns:

Whatever the concerns of the US in balancing various interests in the region and preventing further destabilization, failure to take a leadership role in preventing conflict, actually led to the very destabilization it was trying to prevent. Pentagon's denials about the role of IRGC in this avoidable situation are not helping the US credibility, and further, play into the hands of the very actors no one wants to see play a decisive role in the future of Iraq and Kurds. These lies and denials make US look treacherous, deceptive, anti-Kurdish and do nothing to dissuade the Kurds from moving forward with whatever faulty narrative Barzani may be peddling. In fact, it is pushing them into the embrace of the Russians, while IRGC and Baghdad government feel emboldened to disregard Kurdish claims, and act in a matter that is punitive and vindictive, rather than defensive of Baghdad's legitimate claims and interests.  As a direct consequence of US failure to intervene, several disturbing developments occurred:

IRGC, dressed as Shi'a militias, and in conjunction with actual Iran-backed militias,  have continued plundering and raiding their way through the territory, up to Al-Qosh, increasingly placing minority civilian populations and Jewish and Christian historical sites in danger.  Minorities, such as Christians and Yazidis, have been forced to choose among three factions - Kurdish Peshmerga, the PMU units, now linked to Iran, and Iraqi forces,  in order to protect their civilians and interests. That does nothing to simplify the situation, as the continuous clashes may force these groups to pick up weapons against each other.  Christian militias that run their own defense in Nineveh are paid by PMU, which is troubling to US interests in preventing Iranian financial transactions that benefit the IRGC, recently designated as a terrorist organization. Qasem Soleimani, despite being recognized as a terrorist by the State Department in a recent statement, continues to play an active organizing role in the planning and implementation of the regional takeover.

Second, Turkey and Iraq are moving to cut off Kurdish access to Syrian and Turkish overpasses, which will ease the likelihood of future Turkish entry into the area. Turkey views Kirkuk as its own sphere of interests, and considers the prevention of contiguous Kurdish territories between Iraq, a likely Syrian Kurdish federation,and Kurdish territories in Turkey as central to its interests.  There is also a growing possibility that Turkey may target the oil pipelines remaining under Kurdish control, which will deprive the Kurds of their essential livelihood and further empower and embolden Erdogan's expansionist neo-Ottoman ambitions in the region. Turkey is becoming an increasing threat to US interests in the region and elsewhere, and this additional step will make that much harder for the US to defend its foothold, access to energy, defense of minorities, or relationships with more stable and less aggressive allies.

For now, however, Iraq is more likely to gain control of that pipeline and has already taken steps to bypass the Kurdish region in providing oil to Turkey. Iraq and Turkey are on the same page with regards to Baghdad's regaining control and dominating Kurdistan, and Turkey has already made a similar security agreement with Iran. This triumvirate will ultimately prove hostile to US interests in the region, and should be broken up by the US, regardless of Barzani's flaws. US needs to prioritize what is at stake. Iran-oriented Iraq is no great ally and will likely prove a hindrance in the US's future battles against Iranian aggression. And Turkey is proving increasingly less of a friend and more of a menace as it opposes US presence in the region, detains US citizens, interferes with US strategy in Syria, and threatens US allies. The more time the US wastes maintaining supposed neutrality that only strengthens our enemies, the more likely we are to find ourselves friendless when our neutrality inevitably backfires.

US is grasping defeat from the jaws of victory in Iraq

Two disturbing developments: Hashd, an Iran-backed militia, basically told US forces in Iraq to get lost. So if the US has been supporting Abadi vis-a-vis Kurds in hopes that Abadi is going to be better than someone more pro-Iranian leader, they are in for a disappointment. Iraq now has much more powerful buddies - Iran and Russia, which is seeking to widen its business operations in Iraq, and particularly, Iraqi Kurdistan, and increasingly doesn't need the US. US is losing out not only with Kurds but with Iraq as well entirely due to its show of weakness. That's an important cultural point that the administration simply doesn't get, because it thinks only in terms of short-term military tactics, without understanding the tribal nature of the societies it's dealing with. Furthermore, US is endangering the local minorities. Iraqi military has made it clear that it doesn't have control over Iranian militias and what they choose to do to Yazidis, Christians, and others. Second, Iraq is seeking to not only control 100% of oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, but to block important passages to Syria and Turkey. That will prevent freedom of movements for Kurds who have passed back and forth unrestricted since the beginning of life in that area. It's actually very, very dangerous and will enable Turkey to potentially enter the area in the future. It will also prevent Peshmerga from assisting with fight against ISIS or other terrorists in Syria.

We're Living An Old Joke About the Nazis

Rex Tillerson: It's time for Iranian militias to go home.

IRGC + Iranian militias immediately picked up their marbles and went home.

Or not. No, they actually didn't even blink.

No Friends But the Mountains

Couldn't agree more with this statement on Kurdistan by Bernard-Henry Levy:
"As for the others, it is an unmitigated disaster. For the United States, in particular, it is one more step in the discrediting of an administration that has become incapable of the elementary political act of distinguishing friends from enemies".

Lame Excuses from the Pentagon

The Pentagon is claiming ignorance about the blitz takeover of Kirkuk by IRGC and Iraqi forces.

If so, one of the three things is true:

1. Our own "allies" just stabbed us in the back by failing to inform us about an attack on another ally - and we are perfectly ok with that.

2. Our intelligence capabilities are at an all-time low.

3. Someone's lying, and we actually knew all along, but didn't want to get involved, and now, after international criticism for inaction, are trying to make ourselves look somewhat better by claiming incompetence and victimhood over malice.

Either way, shame on DoD.

Dangerous Words Lead to Dangerous Actions

In an earlier post, I surmised that dehumanization of Kurds and other minorities in Turkey can eventually lead to the justification of mass atrocities against them, just as in 1915, the Ottomans used political enmity to justify the massacre of over a million Armenian men, women, and children.

However, the US ally Erdogan is not the only one capable of riling up the masses into an extreme nationalistic (and also religious) fervor. Our other ally, supported, supplied, and strengthened by the United States, Iraqi VP Nouri Al-Maliki, recently stated that ISIS was created in Erbil in order to lead to the partition of Iraq.  This level of political propaganda, and there is no doubt that's what this is, is aimed to manipulate tribal, deeply divided, and in many cases, largely uninformed public to shift the blame for lack of unity inside the country from the people who drew the maps with the purpose of creating internal divisions and thus minimizing the possibility of rebellion against the British Empire to the Kurds, who are seeking a peaceful separation.

There is no question that in an unstable region fraught with tensions, such comments are inherently incendiary and can be interpreted as an incitement to hatred, if not to outright violence. The people of Iraq who have suffered greatly in the hands of ISIS are now being pointed in the directions of the Kurdish region, which played a significant part in the fight against the common enemy, as a perpetrator. The idea that Kurds created ISIS is as preposterous as comparing right-wing Jews to Nazis, and yet, this comment was made by the Vice President of the country.  This is the government the United States supports and considers a legitimate democratic representation of all of the people of Iraq. Despite President Trump's comments that the United States is not taking sides in any tensions between Baghdad and Erbil, the State Department stated otherwise, specifically calling for joint administration of all regions, and claiming that separation might be exploited by ISIS, and likewise referring to all parties involved as Iraqi partners, despite the fact that the recent independence referendum established that at the very least, the Kurds no longer think of themselves as such, nor wish to stay in this dubious union.

However, even such commitment to the chimeric idea of Iraqi national unity does not justify excusing and ignoring blatantly provocative comments from top level officials, who are maliciously and deliberately encouraging strife and violence against a particular group of people. US should pressure Al-Maliki into disavowing his comments, issuing an official apology to the Kurds, and explaining that Kurds were equal partners in the fight against ISIS and can in no way be blamed for its creation. What makes these comments particularly dangerous is that they complemented by action. Specifically, despite earlier claims from the Pentagon that the invasion of Kirkuk was due to a misunderstanding of the official instructions, the Iraqi forces, backed by IRGC and Iran-supported militias, are on the march for the second day and have now entered Sinjar.

Sinjar is an area that is home to a large  number of Yazidis, who have also formed their own forces. IRGC is not known for being particularly welcoming to minorities, and Iran and Shi'a militias have threatened Yazidis in the past. Despite tensions with the Barzani government, Yazidis are better off under Kurdish control of the area than should the likes of Soleimani and Al-Maliki be left in charge.  Barzani, meanwhile, issued a non-commital statement expressing an unspecified hope for the creation of an independent Kurdistan one day in the future. With PUK reportedly having abandoned Barzani's coalition due to an agreement with or perhaps pressure from the IRGC forces, Kurdish unity is likewise in question. As they quarrel and point fingers, Baghdad's agents continue to gain control of essential oil fields, leaving the Kurds with not much to go on at this juncture. The visuals of the Iraqi forces on the march with their Iranian partners while the Vice President is making comments blaming the Kurds for the creation of ISIS are striking and horrific. Kirkuk was largely empty and for now the troops are under control, focusing on their military targets, but it takes but a match to light the fires of enmity, fear, and nationalist fervor that could lead to bloody attacks against the locals. Such reprisals may indeed be planned by the Iraqi government in order to ensure complete control and kill off the Kurdish dream altogether. The Pentagon threatened the cessation of armament and supply of the Iraqi troops in the event they attack and cause harm to the Kurds, but it's unclear that this will either actually happen or, even if it does, will in any way undermine the Iraqi determination to subdue the Kurds, in thought as well as in deed.

What should Barzani do now?  Regrouping... and planning a more strategic response that will not, in the future, rely on untrustworthy groups. Including leaders of other tribes and factions into the decisionmaking process regarding further plans may ensure the groups remaining on the same page and being less likely to be divided by IRGC or anyone else. Kurdish democracy is imperfect, and an adversary can easily pick off different parties one by one by promising them future leadership, threatening that particular group, or bad-mouthing Barzani's leadership. There's nothing new to exploitation of internal divisions. In fact, to provide a historical comparison, Israel went through much the same in the early stages of the formation of the state. However, at the end of the day, the leadership managed to summon just enough unity and agreement to do what was needed to be done to achieve independence (and then happily continued to fight and backstab each other from the day Israel was created until now).

Disunity is not an impediment to creation of the state, just so long as there is enough commitment among the core group to make a strategic victory possible. Barzani should take lesson from this experience, and not leave major cities or other sites in the hands of small groups of people. Additionally, this is the time to come to an agreement with Kurds in Syria and Turkey, and start forming and organizing a real army, strong, numerous, and committed enough to stand up to Iraq and its militias, with or without support from the United States, Israel, or anyone else. There will be help, but in the beginning it will be clandestine, limited, and highly dependent on circumstances. Once the Kurds show their commitment to victory through strengths, even the United States will start coming around. But for now, hard times lie ahead, and the Kurds should look inwards for solution, while receiving consultation and limited supported from a few early enthusiasts until such time as they start showing signs of clear success and military superiority.

What US Neutrality on Iraq's Invasion of Kirkuk Means for Our Interests in the Region

Cross-Posted:

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/what-us-neutrality-on-iraqs-invasion-of-kirkuk-means-for-our-interests-in-the-region/

President Trump responded to the entrance of the Iraqi forces and Iran-based militias into Kirkuk this morning by stating that US is not taking sides between Kurds and the Iraqi government and is engaged in encouraging all sides to avoid clashes and continue dialogue.

However, in the context of the current tensions, US neutrality and commitment to non-intervention is taken as betrayal by the Kurds and as tacit approval by Iraq, Iran, and even Turkey. Qassem Soleimani's role in the fall of Kirkuk was the first test of the White House's  new policy on Iran, which includes designating IRGC as a terrorist organization and opposing Iranian expansionism in the Middle east.  Nevertheless, thus far, the administration has failed to show commitment to upholding US law and going after the terrorist leader, despite an opportunity to do so in the course of this operation.

From the perspective of tribal Middle Eastern societies, no matter what President Trump's actual intentions are, he has chosen sides by failing to stop the Iraqi forces from entering Kirkuk, raising the Iraqi flag, lowering the Kurdish flag, seizing the oil field in the area, and in every respect asserting dominion and control over the area. That is a sign of not only a political betrayal, but of a strategic choice that will have long-term repercussion for the region.  Despite the lofty rhetoric about stopping Iran, the United States cannot overlook the alliance about the Abadi forces, trained and supplied by the United States, and Iran-backed Shi'a militias, that in the past, have pressured the Kurds, threatened religious minorities in the area, including Yazidis and Christians, and despite some limited cooperation with the United States on the issues of fighting ISIS (mainly out of self-interest), have otherwise acted as agents of the ayatollah-led Iranian regime.  Both indecisiveness and conscious choice to allow Baghdad and Iranian agents to do as they wish with the Kurdish areas, send the same signals to all involve, and make the United States both unwelcome with the allies, and irrelevant with the adversaries in the region.

Strategic withdrawal from an active role in the region may have its place, but only if it's done on our terms, to our advantage, and in a way that signals a well-thought out foreign policy and defense of interests, rather than weakness, inability to make decisive move, or a choice of undemocratic regimes and bad allies over dependable allies whose help will be needed many times over in the future. Indeed, however, many are not convinced that the position of the administration on this issue is sincere. For instance, Turkey's position on the matter of Kurdish independence may have been the lodestar in this decisionmaking process. Turkey has recently come to an agreement with Iran on a variety of matters, which included increased military cooperation and the issue of Kurdistan's independence referendum. After the fall of Kirkuk, Ankara issued its approval of the invasion.

The administration has been careful in maintaining good relations with Turkey. It had previously pressured Barzani to postpone the referendum, after both Abadi and Erdogan expressed strong opposition. President Trump, despite major policy differences, recently called Erdogan a friend, and Turkey and the US recently concluded a deal over Boeing airplanes. Turkish lobby has been strong in the US. Michael Flynn, President Trump's former national security adviser, had worked for Turkish interests. In fact, shortly before being removed from his position, Flynn had reportedly blocked a military move in Syria that Turkey had opposed. Moreover, as we now know, Turkey had paid off a number of major think tanks that had advised President Trump shortly prior to Erdogan's visit to the White House in May of this year.  President Trump is likely getting very bad advise from the Secretary of State, who views the independence referendum as illegitimate, and from an assortment of sources, who are taken in by the extensive Turkish lobby in the United States.

None of it changes matters. The current calculus throws the Kurds into the arms of Russia, which has already ascended to power along with Iran in Syria, pushing the United States out of a position of significant influence altogether due to our short-sighted focus on only dealing with ISIS. Furthermore, Russia has stayed away from publicly condemning the referendum, and in fact, acted as the biggest financial backer of KRG. Although the Kurdish leadership is generally distrustful of Russia, Russia has proven itself to be a stalwart ally to Assad, and has deftly advocated for the Kurds in Turkey when it suited her interests. Putin's backing of the Kurds in Iraq is not sentimental; rather, he is shrewdly taking advantage of the US inaction to establish Kurdistan as Russia's sphere of influence and rise to power in the Middle East, all without having to expend significant power or resources.

As our influence diminishes and our presence becomes marginal, the US is likely to miss significant opportunities for business and educational investment in Kurdistan; infrastructure projects with potential for job growth for American workers; creation of a stable buffer state in the Middle East that would likely protect our security interests vis-a-vis Iran and Turkey, and spread elements of democracy and liberalization naturally through the people indigineous to the region rather than through conquest, occupation, or or other policies likely to be viewed as colonialist.  What we are losing, however, Russia, Turkey, and Iran are gaining. Sooner or later, the imperial ambitions of these three aggressive states will come to a head in the oil-rich region; however, either one of the three belligerent actors prevails, which will not benefit the region, or the three countries come to a power-sharing agreement, in which case minorities, Israel, and the US will all lose out, or the situation deteriorates to the point of chaos, with civil war, strife, and new waves of refugees repeating the tragic events in Syria. In all cases excepting the instance where US rises to the occasion, shows moral and strategic leadership, and backs Kurdish aspiration to independence, we are looking at some very dismal scenarios that will place America dead last not only in the Middle East, but in the international arena as well.

The Anti-Climactic Defeat of ISIS

The defeat of ISIS in Raqqa, Mosul, and other places, has been oddly anti-climactic for several reasons:

1. We in the West are not the ones who received the majority of suffering in the hands of these vicious brutes.

2. Media coverage had largely focused on the graphic coverage of the atrocities, much less on the battles that forced ISIS to cede territory inch by inch.

3. Domestic afffairs and trepidation over the Iran deal next steps takes up the majority of time and space in the US in particular.

4. The Defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq frees its prisoners, but does not affect matters in Libya and other parts of the world where iSIS still has a foothold or is actually growing; Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are making a comeback; evil state actors are taking advantage of the chaos to assert themselves in the region. Russia's and Iran's growing control of Syria is at least as troubling as ISIS presence there. Destroying ISIS was a matter of political will. Getting rid of state actors, which are building naval basis and gaining control and even fealty of entire populations would be much harder.

Furthermore, ISIS was much better at bad-boy PR. Practically everyone in the West perceived that group as an extreme threat and a top priority to destroy; large swaths of Westerners do not care about Syria at all, as long as Syria doesn't come to the US in the form of ISIS or refugees; and most people don't seem to care all that much that Russia is in control in Syria, even when people perceive it as antithetical to our own goals in the region. Furthermore, Turkey's encroachment into that space bothers very few people, because that whole region seems far away, and largely irrelevant except to the extent that it gives us more opportunity to waste money on inept operations.

5. I doubt much will change when Iran builds a base in Syria and completes the land corridor to Lebanon. Unless people perceive an immediate threat to their personal interests or unless the visuals are gruesome and shocking, most people will care a lot more about what's going on at home than in a country that is barely even a country anymore.

I find all of this disheartening because so many people sacrificed so much standing up to ISIS, while barely receiving any aid from the United States. Now that they've cleared up the mess that US has allowed to take root through incompetent policies and dithering by the Obama administration, they once again will be abandoned, because the US has been focused so single-mindedly on the defeat of ISIS, even though it was clear from the start that the state actors operating in the region are more powerful, more dangerous, better trained & equipped, and will be around for far longer. I think our problems are actually just getting started.

The Fall of Kirkuk - and of the US new policy on Iran

Left mostly to civilians, PKK volunteers, and others Kirkuk fell to Iraqi troops and Iran-based militias in a matter of hours.  Iraq is seeking to take back the oil-rich region from Kurdish control.

US stood by and did nothing.

President Trump recently announced a shift in policy in Iran, which would include designating IRGC as a terrorist organization, responding to Iranian militias engaged in terrorism with harshness, and preventing Iran's expansionism in the region.

Well, today's assault on Kirkuk following the recent independence referendum and a week of tensions, threats, and attempted negotiations was the first test of our commitment to the new policy and we failed it.

We have allowed Iraqi forces, armed with US weaponry, and on the dole from the US government for many years, as well as Iran backed militias, adversarial to our efforts in the region and inimical to US interests and those of her allies, to attack an ally who has stalwartly backed us in our fight against ISIS, showed an openness to Western values of democracy and liberalization, and a strong interest in a growing alliance with the United States.

Furthermore, we have hypocritically allowed the source of the many factionalist troubles in the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot treaty, to continue dictating the present and the future of the region, effectively killing the dream of self-determination, moving away from colonialist maps, and towards a future, where nations can forge their own paths and choose their own governments. Foolishly, we have also allowed a large supply of oil to end up in the hands of groups backed by an expansionist regime, and committed to terrorism and domination of the region.

It would have taken but one phone call from President Trump to stop Abadi's forces from entering Kirkuk, bring all parties to the table for a negotiation, and resolve the matters civilly, peacefully, and diplomatically. Instead, we have allowed our ally, the Kurds, to be publicly brutalized and humiliated by the presence of the enemy forces in the city they helped liberate from ISIS.

And the head of this operation is none other than the fearsome Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, who plays a key role in the intelligence and the IRGC, the very organization President Trump just designated as part of Global Terrorists  organization, enforcing the law he signed as part of the sanctions package on Russia, North Korea, and Iran earlier this year. We had multiple opportunities to nab Soleimani in the last few years of the Obama administration, but let him get away, liberating him from the sanctions lists, and allowing him to cut weapons deal in Russia, in violation of our own security interests.

I need not tell you what is likely to happen when someone like Soleimani is in charge. But let's not leave the matter to our imagination. Let's look at Iran's treatment of its own significant Kurdish minority - treatment that includes disproportional executions, facilitation of drug flow into the regions, frequent denial of civil rights, and brutal torture of even peaceful human rights activists. Our failure to stop Soleimani from playing an active role in the fall of Kirkuk, as well as our lack of will in enforcing both our own existing laws and the newly articulated policy by the White House shows that our interest in stopping IRGC is significantly less than our apparent interest in appeasing Abadi, Erdogan, and various Arab states vehemently opposed to the existence of a Kurdish state.

Besides showing ourselves once again as a poor ally to the one group that is openly embracing our interest in liberalization, diversity, and enlightenment in the region, we are also shooting ourselves in the foot by opposing an important buffer state against Iran and increasingly bellicose Turkey, who would likely have positive relations with Israel, could be a good trade partner, and could move the region in a positive direction through its commitment to education and business investments. There's only one thing that's worse than betraying good allies, and that is betraying our own constituents. Americans and Congress have shown strong opposition to the IRGC, articulated by the sanctions signed into law this summer. We were explicitly promised the end of the Obama administration's failed appeasement posture and the beginning of a stronger, more assertive US that looks out for US national security interests above all else. Instead, we are getting more of the same - failure to contain an organization we just designated as terrorist, spread of strife and needless violence in the one part of the  region that showed signs of promising stability, and endless deception over what standing up to Iran means in practice as opposed to what we were led to believe we were getting.

I urge President Trump to listen to good advice not from former and still interested oil executives, but from regional and national security experts well familiar with the dangers of IRGC and Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambitions, to take all action that would get Abadi to back off, to secure Kirkuk against invasions, and to have Soleimani taken into custody or killed, as the head of a terrorist organization that he is. That is the only way to show our commitment to our new policy on Iran, and to secure our national security interests and those of our regional allies, and to be taken seriously on the international stage by friends and foes alike.

How US Can Do the Right Thing By the Kurds, While Avoiding Crisis

The US at this juncture has significant leverage over Baghdad.

President Trump can exercise that leverage effectively by having the airport ban lifted, not with loud proclamations that can only create indignation with the Iraqi government, but with nuanced behind the scenes diplomacy.

The ban is not going to change anyone's mind about independence, only gets people more intent to move forward as soon as possible unilaterally and with no negotiations.

At the same time, it's causing damage to Kurdish economy, creates undue suffering for civilians, and causing problems for US investors working on oil projects in the region.

The US has invested untold amount of money into Iraqi government - just so they could repay us by creating a de facto blockade against our allies, and preventing us from getting in and out?

It serves no legitimate purpose and actually causes the US to look weak - weaker than the Iraqi government, and unable to defend our own interests.

Weighing in on this issue will allow the US to retain credibility with the Kurds while also pushing both sides towards a negotiated solution to the current face-off.

Second, the US should play a role in negotiations over Kirkuk and oil, which are central to any successful bilateral discussion.

Kurds, Iraq, and even Turkey are all making a play for that crucial territory. While many can argue about what legitimacy any one of these sides has towards a territory that has at one point been woefully allocated to the fictional country of Iraq by the British,  from US perspective, there is a simple, straightforward answer to the dilemma. It's not in the US interests to have the Iran-backed Baghdad have complete access to the oil, and there are few things more alarming than seeing the increasingly unfriendly Turkey with an independent revenue inside what is essentially Kurdish territory. While Turkey is making plans to invade the Kurdish region of Iraq, even if that means having to overcome peshmerga guarding all current routes, and dealing with PKK, which finally found a bit of a safe harbor with the KRG,  the US is interested in avoiding additional protracted regional conflicts, and keeping oil out of the hands of the increasingly dictatorial Erdogan.

US has credibility, because ultimately it doesn't need Kirkuk oil. US is growing independent of foreign oil through increased development of its own resources and research into alternative sources of energy. Some businesses still benefit from investment into oil extraction in that area, but ultimately, US has other sources of revenue, and for that reason would make for a fair and acceptable arbiter. US, for instance, can reasonably ask Kurds to compensate Iraq for the perceived loss of oil-related revenue, or to negotiate a rental or sharing agreement of some sort, as a precondition for a peaceful parting of ways.  US involvement is infinitely preferable to Russia's, which may be looking to gain leverage over Iran and Turkey, via its backing of KRG, but is also a largely self-interested actor, whose involvement in Syria has been anything but stabilizing and peaceful, and the expansion of whose role throughout the region is not something the US or anyone else ultimately would want to see.

The alternative to US involvement is either a very high likelihood of an international conflict between several allies and an adversary thrown in, or a significant empowerment of Russia in the role of an international broker. These are the scenarios best avoided.

Finally, US can ensure a peaceful transition by continuing being perceived as a strong, well-meaning ally, whose perspective deserves consideration - both by the Kurds and by Iraq. To do so with the Kurds, US should immediately renew the payment of stipends to peshmerga, initiated last year by the Obama administration. The Trump administration ceased payment as soon as the year-long agreement expired, and so far, has not renegotiated the continuation of the agreement, due to perceived uncertainty over the referendum.

Now, however, is not the time for Swiss neutrality, but rather for an active role in supporting one ally and reassuring the other one, while showing strength and resolution in the face of enemies and frienemies, who are all too ready to exploit the vacuum.  We are much more likely to resolve tensions and avoid conflict by keeping to our alliances and showing our worth as a dependable and respectable friend, than by fleeing at the first sign of trouble, and leaving those who have served our purposes by bravely fighting ISIS out to dry.

Staying out of the issue and refusing to back Kurds in times of need will not win us friends or allies in the Middle East, a region that values strength, loyalty, and strategic consistence over quibbling, appeasement, and insecurity. And US has much to be secure about. It has strength, moral clarity, and a set of values that have made it a desirable harbor for aspiring immigrants and refugees from around the world. It can play an important in diplomatic role in preventing conflicts before they begin, not just having to resolve them once the die is cast. I suggest we do so, before the chaos and disputes plaguing the region engulf even the places that are currently enjoying relative stability and can serve as exemplars for peace and prosperity if we play our cards right.

Measuring Progress in Afghanistan

The bottom line on Afghanistan is this:

President Trump's speech made me somewhat optimistic that the administration has clear goals and is willing to put aside timelines to achieve them.

However, since the speech there's been no public communication at all about what the concrete, measurable goals are, what success looks like more specifically besides "stability with no terrorists", and what are the measurable steps to get there. I'd be ok with no timelines, as long as I knew what exactly we are looking to do, and how, generally speaking, we are planning to get there.

George W. Bush's administration may have been well-meaning when it came to Iraq, but it completely and utterly failed to communicate what it was they were hoping to achieve and how, and not only came out looking like liars, but wasted valuable resources and human lives until they finally came to some sort of conclusion.

I am really concerned that this is where we are headed on Afghanistan with Trump's administration. I am impressed with Mattis' ability to communicate and defend the president's comments and positions, but he is not a policymaker. He is an executive.

I have yet to see the core of the message that is being communicated here.

The Story of Kurdistan: When the Moral and the Necessary Converge

Kurds don't have a big lobby in the United States. And the total Kurdish population here is about 50,000 people. Europe boasts of much higher numbers. KRG and several parties from Iran, Syria, and Turkey largely make their own case, helped along by a few vocal sympathizers, and an open mind from much of Congress. If you are looking to make big bucks off pushing a cause, you should probably go elsewhere.

However, if you are looking to help achieve something that's both right and necessary, the case for an independent Kurdish state is one you should adopt. I've written in the past that for US, supporting a Kurdish state would mean having another stable, pro-Western, democratic, and increasingly liberalizing ally in the Middle East, which could be an effective buffer against Iran, Turkey, and various terrorist organizations, while taking the Middle East in a new direction through education, technological development, and more pluralistic and inclusive aspirations. It is also one of the world's oldest indigenous nations without a state. And just like any other nation, Kurds have a right to self-determination, a right which they peacefully but vocally asserted in the recent independence referendum.

I could go on and on and post plenty of articles supporting my case, but instead I'll just post two items that are striking me personally, and which have been noted elsewhere by many more eloquent writers and analysts than me.

I can identify with the Kurdish aspirations on a deeply personal level.

First, in some of the countries where they have resided, Kurds haven't been allowed to study their own language or engage with their own identity in any way. Turkey has been particularly brutal and oppressive, and only has its own fascist conformism to blame for the rise of the PKK and violent clashes with Kurdish separatists over the span of several decades. Kurdish culture has been brutally suppressed. Kurds who have dared to stand up for their national identity have been imprisoned and on many occasions brutally tortured. They are a significant percentage of Turkey, and yet, are increasingly dehumanized, where physical attacks on civilians are excused, and first signs of genocide are slowly becoming acceptable to Erdogan's most ardent grassroots followers. Where have we heard this story before? It's the story that the Jewish nation has itself relieved many times over, in my family's case in the former Soviet Union, where Jews were not allowed to study Hebrew, and for many decades, to study or practice Judaism and cultural traditions. It is only with the break up of the Soviet Union, that Jewish community started reestablishing its own identity with a lot of help from abroad, and I was blessed to be able to attend the first Jewish day school in Ukraine since the 1930s.

When I first heard these stories, I trembled inside, because it was like listening to my own history. It was the feeling of the keen awareness of own identity, but also the remembrance of having to hide, of having to always be careful not to draw attention to one's Jewishness, not to sing beautiful Jewish songs in public, of the fact that my family has had to change their Jewish names to Russian ones to avoid harassment. The same was true for many of the Kurds who deliberately named their children with Turkish names to ensure a greater likelihood that they could attend better schools. Just like in the Soviet Union, where Jews faced the infamous "fifth paragraph" in their passport - indication of their ethnic background that could forever doom their career aspirations - Kurds faced official discrimination in Turkey. And in Iran, a short-lived Kurdish state was brutally suppressed, and Kurds have been hanged at disproportionate rates to their own population. With the coming of the Islamic Republic, persecution of minorities intensified.

 At times, Kurds and others would be allowed to study their languages in the universities to keep down the pressure and to avoid disruptive attacks by the rebels. But overall, anti-minority sentiment and open discrimination have been rampant, visible, and well documented, with Iranian forces frequently raping women,  disrupting daily life, trying to ruin the population with drugs, and then executing Kurds in absurd numbers for the very crimes the regime spread throughout their areas. The Jewish history in the countries where they were suppressed is almost never bloody on their end, with the exception being the Russian revolution that was supposed to make life better, but of course, brought about anti-Semitic communism. I haven't lived through any of these events, but was keenly aware of the Jews' "special status" in the Soviet Union through all the family conversations and all the reading I have done from a very young age. I absorbed it culturally and naturally, and so have the young Kurds growing up in the sad reality of not having their own place under the sun. "Kurds have no friends but the mountains" goes a common saying, referring to the fact that the nation has faced numerous betrayals from their allies, including, shamefully from the West, over the past century.

And there is another historical parallel - the circumstances surrounding the creation of the State of Israel. Once again, by the time I was born and achieved sentience, Israel had already existed for many decades, and yet, to me, since I first knew of its existence, it was an awe-inspiring miracle. Israel came about not because Jews were so united (they fought over everything and nearly killed each other in the process), or because the world recognized that it was time (don't make me laugh - that was absolutely not the case, and even the US was very split and reluctant on this issue). or because their neighbors gave in to reason and accepted the Jewish presence in the region - Zionists were harassed for decades leading up to the creation of the State of Israel, and the war broke out immediately upon the signing of independence. Israel was born when Jews stopped listening to what everyone else was saying and decided that it was time to reclaim their own land and chart out our own destiny - whether anyone liked it or not. They fought off multiple Arab forces that sought to destroy the nascent state with poor weapons procured through the black market from Czechoslovakia. Many of those who were fighting were liberated Holocaust survivors, who were still traumatized from the war horrors. There was no mercy, no vocal advocates for their case. The United States, only a few years prior, turned away a ship full of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi horror from its shores. The friends of the Jews and the new found state were few and far between, and it took the finality of its existence and willingness to physically fight for its future and refuse to take no for an answer to finally win a grudging respect from the international community - a respect that could be yanked away at any moment.

When I am observing the birth pangs of the Kurdish state, something inside me flutters with excitement, because it's as if I get to relive the birth of the State of Israel, not with the memories that come from storytellers and history books, but with my own eyes. It is one of the most exciting developments one could witness - the fulfillment of a national destiny, the rising of millions of people ready to build and create and grow and dream and act on those dreams.  Some part of my soul must have been there in the ranks of those who were fighting for Israel, because to this day the excitement of reliving mentally the events that led up to the creation of the State of Israel fill me with breathless wonder. And I experience intensely the same stirring of deep-seated emotion when I think of the Kurds finally gathering the strength, the will, and the courage to build their own home from the ashes of past suffering and persecution by their neighbors.  I see the people dancing and singing, wealthy and poor, speaking different languages,  coming from different traditions, mercurial, used to having to smuggle people and things over imaginary borders, intellectual and poorly educated, of different religions and of no religions at all, arguing over every little item, but all sharing in one dream, in one goal. These people may be broken up, may be scattered, may be disunited by tribal interests, different experiences, politics, infiltrated by enemies - but at the end of the day, they are one nation, with one heart and one soul. I could not live with myself if I remained on the sidelines, when a nation of friends and brothers is rising up to embrace their own path and make their way forward towards creating a country, building a home.

I cannot leave my friends, those who have fought side by side with American forces against ISIS, those who have the same enemies - cruel, heartless, illegitimate regimes that know only how to divide and persecute and suppress, which are destructive, greedy, and expansionist - surrounded by  hostile forces with nothing but cold, calculating condemnation of their national aspiration, of their long suffered dream by the international community which wanted and got their help when it was needed the most. For the first time, Iraq openly invited Iran to enter its territory for the sole sake of conducting exercises by the Iraqi Kurdish borders, threatening to invade. It is punishing the Kurds for holding a peaceful referendum in favor of independence by cruelly shutting down airports and forbidding anyone from getting in and out of the region. Iraq, our ally, supported by the United States, is threatening to deny these people access to their own oil, effectively depriving them of a valuable resource and livelihood. It is seeking to isolate Kurds, and to make them into international pariahs - all for daring to dream, and to act on those dreams.

And it is backed by Erdogan and Assad, who perhaps, may never dare to do much but to bark, but who have effectively vetoed Kurdish aspirations, and who are supporting the isolation of the would-be new country. The Kurds had placed their hopes in the United States, and in the new leadership of President Trump, only to be spurned, shoved aside, out of the consideration for the feelings of their enemies, and alleged, non-existent stability in the region which to whatever extent still exists they helped wrench away from the hands of ISIS and other regional thugs. President Trump, by denying the legitimacy of the referendum, is not only throwing our allies to the wolves, not only empowering the enemies of the US and placing foundation for decades of havoc and expansionism by Iran, Turkey and other bad actors, but he is stripping away from the US its role as a moral leader and the kind of country that everyone wants to live in or even be. He is, ultimately, betraying the American essence, that recognizes national sovereignty of others, and bases itself on a foundation of mutual respect and non-interference, except in defense of our own interests. Our interests are not served by arming thugs and appeasing bullies. Our interests are best served in supporting and strengthening loyal allies, who, in turn, will promote and defend the principles and values we share.

I am asking both President Trump and Congress to do what is both necessary and moral, and to announce our unequivocal support for Kurdish independence, and willingness to stand by our allies at a difficult time when they are threatened by hostile forces. I am asking them not to make a monumental mistake in denying our help to those who are looking up at us at this moment. I am asking the United States to return to its core and its roots and to lead by example, at a time when true leadership in the world is in short supply. I am asking our government to show vision, courage, strength, and dedication to truth - a tall order, I know, given the political climate of today's day and age - but an order worthy of America's greatness. Being great means showing leadership, choosing one's battles carefully, and defending what is necessary for one's own security but also, what is moral and right.

Kurdistan - It's Personal

I knew about Saddam Hussein and the Kurds before I knew how to read.

The memory... it runs deep.

Hell, YES, I support Kurdish independence.

Kurds Have All the Reasons in the World To Seek Independence from Iraq

Sunni Saddam Hussein gassed Kurds during the Iran-Iraq war.

Current Shia Iraqi government cancelled flights to and from Erbil, conducting joint exercises with the Islamic Republic near Iraqi Kurdistan border, and threatening to repossess Kurdish oil fields.

Just why exactly would anyone in his right mind wish to stay part of that country under such circumstances?

Kurdistan's Geopolitical Implications

Over 90% of Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan voted "yes" in the independence referendum.

Now what?

Well, there are actually several things going on with the Kurds.

First, the Iraqi Kurds decided to form an independent state.

Syrian Kurds are building an autonomy, and Damascus appears open to that possibility.

Iranian Kurds are increasingly antagonizing the state.

Turkish Kurds are increasingly under pressure by Erdogan, with heads of pro-Kurdish party HDP in prison, many Kurdish politicians under detention or threat of arrests,  and frequent raids and attacks against young Kurds suspected of being connected to the PKK or simply accused of it without any evidence whatsoever.

The consequences of the independence referendum have been manifold. The United States notoriously and repeatedly had asked the Kurds to postpone it in order to avoid tensions; Israel openly supported the vote; Canada and France stated that they would be ok with the results either way; and Russia was a big financial backer.

Most of the Western world, however, spoke out against the independence referendum. As Seth Frantzman points out.,  perhaps supporting Middle Eastern monarchies, once created by colonialists, but refusing self-determination to an indigenous nation with its own culture and democratic structure, is a way for perpetuating colonialist legacy for many European states. Meanwhile, the neighbors of the aspiring states took the vote even worse. Iraq refused to recognize the vote, and is threatening to expropriate Kurdish oil fields by force and to shut down flights to and from Erbil. Turkey is threatening to sanction the region into starvation. Iran is looking to military intervention as an option. And Iraq sent a military delegation to Iran to coordinate a potential military response.

Much like in 1948, when another indigenous nation became independent and formed a state, only to be immediately attacked by its neighbors, all hell appears to be about to break loose.

Iran, Iraq, and Turkey see Kurds as a threat, and for a good reason. Not only does Kurdistan have a potential to become a bulwark against the regional aggression of both Iran and Turkey, but it may inspire the Kurdish populations of both countries to rebellion, and may set a bad example for other minorities in Iran. Moreover, a democratic and relatively liberal Kurdistan in an unstable, illiberal, and deeply undemocratic Middle East is a dangerous entity, similar to Israel. The usual suspects, in fact, have been accusing Kurds of conspiring with Israel.  And both Iran and Turkey threatened not only Kurds, but Israelis over the support for the referendum and the idea of a Kurdish state.

As for Arab States, they have long had issues with Kurds, emanating from competition over oil, territory, tribal differences (particularly in Syria), cultural issues, and even religious tensions. Shi'a Iraqis took issue with Sunni Kurds, and Kurdish practice of Sunni Islam appears to be more liberal in comparison to their Sunni Arab neighbors. Complicating the situation is the fact that many of the Syrian and Turkish Kurds are secular/socialist, some Iraqi Kurds have reconverted to Zoroastrianism, some are Christian, and then there are Yazidis, who are of Kurdish descent but consider themselves the carriers of the true Kurdish religion and see Islam among Kurds as a remnant of Arab Muslim colonialism in the region. Most Kurds of Jewish descent have moved to Israel, but some have been living secretly in the Kurdish area, and Jewish Kurds in Israel are overall open and supportive.

Strategically, up until recently, Kurds in Syria presented a problem for Arab States, both because they were in conflict with many of the Sunni tribes, and because they were seen as a bulwark against the spread of Wahhabism through various insurgent and terrorist groups, which were backed by Saudi Arabia and embraced by Turkey. Kurdish ambitions for autonomy in Syria became a serious thorn in Turkey's side, since Turkey perceived a potential for contiguous Kurdish territory as a potential to destabilize Eastern Kurdistan in Turkey, which could lead to a separate independence movement and requisition of Turkish territory. For that reason, Turkey was willing to embrace and support ISIS, so long as ISIS focused its efforts on destroying the Kurds and prevented them from consolidating territory. Of course, eventually, ISIS got out of hand and became uncontrollable even inside Turkey. But even still, Turkey was willing to sacrifice its own forces to invade Syria, anger Western allies, and weaken itself internally, just to attack Kurds rather focus all of its efforts on ISIS. We see this attitude continue to this day.

Arab Gulf States, however, may sooner or later be forced to shift their positions, as long as Sunni Syrians and Kurds come to some sort of agreement. Iran's rapid expansionism and the increasing and seemingly inevitable possibility of land corridor from Syria to Lebanon presents a much greater and immediate problem that Kurdish limited ambitions for autonomous federalism in Syria. Kurds do not threaten the existence of the monarchies, whereas Iran backed Shi'a minorities inside the predominantly Sunni Gulf States do. Kurds are not looking to destabilize other states, whereas Iran has exactly that goal in mind. Kurds are still stateless and therefore by definition weaker than Iran, now pumped with unfrozen money delivered in cash by the Obama administration, and through all the investment deals by large Western countries. Kurds have significant internal differences,  and through disunity failed to achieve the same level of cohesion and prosperity as they could have otherwise (and still may as a state), and certainly somewhat more fragile than the Islamic Republic even at its most divided. So Kurds are not an immediate threat, and furthermore, increasingly, just like Israel, Kurds are a potential ally, though admitting that may take the Gulf monarchies even longer than finally putting their decades-old enmity with the State of Israel on ice.  Kurds are opposed to Iran and likewise proved to be a cogent and effective force against ISIS. Moreover, while the Arab states, with shocking levels of social inequality, are increasingly falling behind economically, Kurds are investing not just in oil but in education, and are likely to lead in the regional development with help from Israel, and eventually, other Western investors.  They are a viable regional trading partner... or competitor, depending on how these monarchies choose to play it. So far, they have been quiet comparatively to Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

However, right now they have an opportunity to make an important choice about their own future. Do they embrace progress, putting aside age-old tribal feuds, and invest into building up a relationship with a strong ally, who can help, at least temporarily, to fight back the increasingly aggressive and ever-nearing mutual enemy? Will they embrace modernity and progress, recognize Kurdistan's potential, and work together on joint ventures, on growing past oil, on modernizing and taking the region in a different direction? Or will they fall prey to internal divisions, corruption, clerical intransigence,  and petty rivalries, and fall behind the vanguard that is Kurdistan, perhaps forever? That remains to be seen, however, the positive influence of more liberal Arab states such as Morocco and Tunisia, and the seeming commitment to modernization that such younger regional leaders as KSA's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are promising in word as well as some action, are some of the signs that point to the fact that these Gulf States are at least considering a wiser, and more thoughtful approach to geopolitical strategy than the pessimists would have us believe. I hope they choose to embrace promise and vision instead of the past delusions and ghosts of outdated colonialism. These partnerships and their potential are worth the trouble.

As for Kurds? They are committed to fighting for their future, and just as Israel once with a little help from a few good friends, managed to break through all the obstacles and to come out stronger, smarter, and better in every way,  so will this nation that has been waiting its turn for far too long. And everyone else, sooner or later, will have no choice but to get used to it. The only question is, will they reap the rewards of early loyalty and friendship, or will they close the ranks of the belated  sour grapes consumers, grumbling over remaining scraps.