Obama Stands with Ayatollahs

Trita Parsi & co. don't have much time left and don't have much to say; and neither does the regime, except mildly blaming it on the usuals. Things are looking increasingly worse for the regime.

Most importantly, however, how will the regime survive the public humiliation of knowing that people don't want the Islamic Republic, people don't want the ayatollahs, that despite all the spin and lies, Rouhani is a dictator and not a moderate, and that the West has been sold on pro-regime propaganda for years thanks to the Obama administration but now the world's eyes are finally open to the reality? Europe is quiet because of the deal. Obama and his apologists will never admit it, but they were actively supporting the dictatorship that the people actually did not want. They actively supported an international security threat so their crony companies could make money off the investments. The region is covered in blood and Israel is now at risk, and Iranian people have continued to be slaughtered with impunity, because Obama wanted his legacy and his cronies wanted their investments.

Obama stands with the ayatollahs.

How US Unequivocal Support for Iraqi Nationalism Will Lead to Radicalization and Extremism

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/how-us-unequivocal-support-for-iraqi-nationalism-will-lead-to-radicalization-and-extremism/

Seth Frantzman, in a recent article, analyzes US position of neutrality on Baghdad takeover of Kirkuk, and further silence on the alleged human rights violations, and punitive actions such as the shut down of Kurdish press, Kurdistan24 and Rudaw. In sum, the thinking is that encouraging Iraqi nationalism, which is based in substantial part in anti-Kurdish sentiment, US will turn Iraq away from Iranian influence, and unify the country under the Saudi Arabia aegis against the spread of Iranian influence. The idea there is that if the Shi'a Iraqi government aligns with the Sunni KSA, together they can counter Iran. And indeed, Iraq has signed a corresponding defense treaty with KSA. However, that is not a meaningful agreement for two reasons: first, Iraq will do just about anything to play all sides, including the US, which has been arming its army. Second, KSA is far away, and Iran is close. Abadi and the Islamic Republic has been getting along quite nicely, and Abadi invited Iran to participate in takeover of Kirkuk. It clearly does not see Iran as a threat, though KSA does. And when forced to choose between its Shi'a neighbor, which has helped Iraq with the Kurdish issue and the Sunni Saudi Arabia, which is known to sympathize with Iraq's Sunni population, tribal and religious considerations will prevail over piece of paper.

The fact that the United States does not realize that shows the extent of ignorance of our foreign policy leaders of the cultures, which they are now trying to bring together through fictitious borders and imaginary alliances. The British, when they did the same, at least cynically imposed divisions to perpetuate their own power. The US leaders actually believe that this policy is going to work and that it's in the best interests of the Middle East and the United States. It is quite amazing.  This vision of a Baghdad-Riyadh alliance puts aside the dream of a free and democratic Kurdistan. The reason for this groupthink at top levels may be deeply rooted in the underlying psychological need to stay consistent. In other words, the US has already invested so heavily into Baghdad, that having realign its policy now would be equivalent to conceding defeat. In other words, the excuse that this is all about American interests is rational, but the reasoning behind is not. Otherwise, the weight that the US would be giving to other considerations would be at least equal to its own wishful thinking to see this implausible alliance of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to work for more than five minutes, until Iran decides that it should be otherwise.

Much has already been said and written about the potential boons of an independent Kurdistan for the United States - a trading partner with a vibrant economy, a buffer state against Iran's and Turkey's expansionist ambitions, a new model of indigenous evolutionary liberalization, a friendly state, open to Western values and partnership with Israel. All of these potential benefits, in the eyes of the generals, who are spearheading US foreign policy in the Fertile Crescent, is of less interest than having Iraq not be quite-so-pro-Iran.  There is no official analysis on how such calculations are figured, but there is also a darker side of this conversation that likewise does not appear to figure into the equation: the potential for the radicalization of the Kurdish region. Neither friends nor critics are particularly interested in touching on this sensitive topics. Those, who favor independent Kurdistan focus the bulk of their attention on the perceived betrayal by the US - in other words, a valid, but largely emotional talking point, whereas the critics cite the dubious benefits of yet another tribal Muslim state at the cost of weakening another ally - Iraq. The underlying working assumption, however, is that the US decisionmakers are correct in one way: Kurdish independence will bring greater instability than Kurdish "remain", at least in the short term.

Such position relies on the erroneous assumption that Iraq is open to various potential positions, and will pivot in the desirable direction if only the United States will do what Baghdad claims needs to be done to earn its favor - return the oil fields to Abadi's forces without a question, stay moot on the Kurds, encourage peace talks through gentle rhetoric, and ignore the Iran-backed militias and IRGC presence in the vicinity. If only the US does all these things, at some point, all will be well. IRGC will not do much damage beyond security the territory for Iraq and ensuring that the rebellious Kurds will not tempt its own Kurdish population; Turkey is all talk; ISIS has been taken care of, and US can reap the boons of its cynical wisdom. Such wishful thinking is no more practical than believing that Kurdish independence will come without a bloody fight against a variety of regional forces. That's not a commentary on the morality or benefits or likelihood of such a move; that's just a statement of logical observation based in the Middle Eastern dynamics. You get what you are willing to fight for, and only if you win with overwhelming force. In the meantime, US is so focused on its own line of reasoning that it ignores major red flags that undermine its position.

First, Iraq has already and openly pivoted to Iran. The actions of the last few weeks demonstrate it amply. US reasoning that by sacrificing Kurdistan it can stop Iraq from growing closer to Iran is not only mistaken; it is nothing short of appeasement.  Iran's interest is regional dominance. Abadi, if he wants to stay in power in the region, needs to abide by Iran's decisionmaking. It will, therefore, cooperate to whatever extent necessary that it is seen as a fully ally, reliable in supporting Iran's ambitions.  Iran will not stop at building IRGC military basis and headquarters in Kirkuk, nor does it make it any sense to stop when there is no resistance from anyone.

Second, Iran's presence in the Kurdistan area far exceeds what can be gauged from the coverage, especially after Kurdistan24 and Rudaw were shut down. According to one source, Iran has as many as 700 secret houses in Suleimanya alone. If that's accurate, it's quite plausible that Iran has extensive presence, both overt and clandestine, in every corner of Kurdistan. And it is there to stay, long-term.  From disputed territory between Baghdad and Erbil, Kirkuk province are becoming occupied territories, essentially colonized by Iran. If Iran continues to grow its military presence in the area, and there's every reason to believe that without a war, Iran is not going anywhere, the next step is indoctrination of the local population - ranging from forced conversions to political brainwashing.

It may already be building schools, whereas Western educational opportunities in the region are woefully missing. Furthermore, with Baghdad banning all commercial flights in and out of  Erbil, and potentially cutting off access to Syrian and Turkish overpasses, Kurds are not only economically isolated, but become wholly dependent on Baghdad and Tehran for humanitarian aid, educational maintenance, and even the news.And Iran is likely to radicalize the local Shi'a population through joint educational programming.  The religious element may prevail over tribal concerns, if Iran is seen as an economic benefactor, rather than an oppressor to the Iraqi majority. Meanwhile, it is taking every step to show who's the boss. Iran is opening up its border with Kurdistan - that is a sign that the regime has achieved a decisive military and psychological victory. It has nothing to fear from the Kurds.

At the same time, however, the support of nationalist sentiments among Iraqis is taking a turn less towards unity and more into anti-Kurdish xenophobia. Already, a Kurdish journalist was stabbed to death in Kirkuk. Iranian militias, not Iraqi forces, arrested dozens of young Kurds in a cafe in Kirkuk. Their fate is unenviable, as anyone, familiar with the brutality of the regime and its treatment of rebellious ethnic minorities will testify. And religious minorities all over the Kurdish region are threatened by the IRGC and the Iran=backed militias. Jewish and Christian sites near Al Qosh are in danger. Multiple Christian and Yazidi groups have expressed concern.  Militias are on full alert protecting civilians, yet they are outnumbered and outgunned by the well-equipped Iraqi forces, and the Iran=backed militias that are not answerable to Abadi's command.  This destabilization is precisely what US support for national unity was supposed to prevent. Instead, it is turning into the scapegoating and vendetta against the Kurds.

Third, these divisions are likely to be exploited by Sunni extremist groups, like Al Qaeda and remnants of ISIS and their ilk. Seemingly defeated, these groups await opportunity for strife in order to make a triumphant comeback, sow discord, and take advantage of other violent situations.  And ideological extremists will surely take the opportunity to appeal to the disenfranchised groups, proselytize among embittered and marginalized Kurdish peripheral regions, and go after every resentful person or group left hopeless after the takeover of Kirkuk.

Worse still, if Iraq continues to try to destroy Kurdish nationalism and sense of identity, as it's doing now, the resistance that will arise will become increasingly radical and violent, and the potential for militant action, all the way to terrorism against civilians is not to be ruled out. We have seen the way the Soviet Union had sown chaos among Turkish Kurds, eliminating all nationalist groups except for the PKK, and turning PKK into a Soviet terrorist group (which after several decades finally reformed, but not before costing many lives of innocent civilians in the process). Interestingly, Russia is moving back into Kurdistan, and is seeking a closer relationship with the Kurds. It's also looking to utilize them more in Syria.  That Russia will use this opportunity to play on the anti-American backlash through what is widely perceived as betrayal is quite obvious.

To make a long story short, the downside to the chimeric US strategy involving the one-sided coddling of Baghdad to the exclusion of all other interested parties, is that instead of building bulwarks against extremists, including Iran, which is the whole goal of this exercise, the US is actually making active enemies out of absolutely everyone in the region, strengthening the potential for extremism, and allowing radical actors to assume the vacuum of leadership, all in the name of unity and the US interests. But the region united by extremism is not in the US interests at all, and neither is giving up opportunities for economic investments and partnerships fall into the hands of Russia and Iran, which have not done anything positive with any place they have ever been involved in.

The administration should snap out of this dangerous delusion quickly, and start drawing and enforcing boundaries for its "ally" Baghdad, which include, first and foremost, getting Iran and out of the picture completely, and only then creating positive bilateral and equanimeous conditions for further negotiations. It should send a clear signal to Kurds that their identity is recognized and respected, and to all other actors, that US has a central role to play in the region, and that chaos and extremism of any sort is not an option and will not be tolerated - not after all the lives the US has sacrificed to get to where we are today. Most importantly, the US should remember that alliances among former enemies are temporary, and for that reason Iraqi-Saudi alliance cannot be relied upon to last.

But strong long-term relationship among groups of people who have a baseline of common interests, values, and a history of fighting together for common goals can endure and move in the most positive direction. We should not continue following the same failed policy of putting all our eggs in one basket (in this case, Abadi), only to be bitterly disappointed and face new crisis yet again.  We have the luxury of hindsight to make better, more informed decisions, and the richness of our experience to build a better, more secure future for ourselves, and the world that we want to live in.

Why Baghdad's Move on Kirkuk Is Not about The Independence Referendum

Cross-posted at:

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/11/22/why-baghdads-move-on-kirkuk-is-not-about-the-independence-referendum/

By now, it should be abundantly obvious that  Baghdad’s move to take over Kirkuk has been pre-planned and would have advanced with or without the independence referendum.

Iraqi forces and Peshmerga were allied against ISIS in the liberation of the territories, yet Iraq’s ultimate priority has always been in retaining the control over the oil fields and revenue from the Kurdish-held territories. And with Barzani’s resignation as KRG President, we now know that whatever criticisms could be made about the latter’s hold on power well beyond the constitutional provisions, his concerns about Kurdish security and move for independence were a great deal more than just power play. Further proof of Baghdad’s disingenuous bluster about territorial integrity and “unity” (carved out by the British under the Sykes-Picot agreement, that would intentionally keep different nations with disparate identities cobbled together, foster divisions, and allow the British Empire to maintain control) are Abadi’s actions with respect to the Kurdish citizens the moment the Baghdad-Iran alliance assumed control of much of the disputed territories and the oil fields, which were, in fact the central concern.

The legitimacy of Baghdad’s concern for its national sovereignty is undermined by the unnecessary assault on the Kurdish autonomy, which can only make the Kurds yearn for independence more, not less. Though Middle East is all about overpowering and crushing your enemy to make him respect you, the excessively vindictive actions by Baghdad, and its welcoming of a foreign regime (IRGC) into this punitive takeover is likely to have the opposite effect. Baghdad’s reimposition of power began with a crackown on Kurdish media – the banning of Kurdistan24 and Rudaw, two of the major local outlets, which have been providing detailed information about both the military action of the past few weeks and internal Kurdish matters of interest to their families in Syria, Turkey, and Europe, and enhancing the understanding of world leaders who would otherwise be uninformed about the alphabet soup of Kurdish parties and factions in the region.

This move signals illegitimacy of having a separate Kurdish identity, a bitter point for a nation of approximately 30 million people with distinct languages, culture, and indigenous roots in the region, but to this day without an independent state.  Second, it is an insurance policy that the international community will have no access to real-time information on the ground, and certainly not the English-language Kurdish take on it. There is a small coterie of Western journalists presence, but as the Israeli journalist Seth Frantzman has pointed out, they tend to rely on other Western journalists for information, and thus likely miss a great deal of internal dynamics and the full spectrum of regional narratives.  Lack of alternative information will go a long way towards creating an appearance of only one perspective: Baghdad’s position, made public through official channels and formal meetings.  Whatever public support the Kurds are currently getting is largely fueled by the unrestricted access to their voices. The legitimacy of Baghdad’s own actions are severely undermined by its move to squash down criticism from the significant portion of its population, and its ally in the war against ISIS.

Second, Baghdad has moved to pay salaries directly to the Kurdish civil servants, bypassing the KRG. This undermines the authority of the Kurdish leadership, and makes the Kurdish infrastructure heavily depended on, and thus potentially loyal to, Baghdad. For sure, even if the bulk of the Kurdish civilian forces grow resentful of this deprivation of a sense of autonomy, others will cling to security for their immediate situation, and Baghdad thus far successfully divides-and-conquers the already splintered Kurdish groups.  For the same reason, Abadi’s forces are seeking to cut off Peshmerga access to the pipeline that delivers oil to Turkey, and to provide all oil to Turkey, bypassing the KRG. It’s just another way of undermining Kurdistan, weakening its economy, undermining its business relationship with Turkey, and ensuring that Iraq is viewed as the central authority, whereas Kurdistan is merely a province with no independent power to make deals or provide anything of value to the region.

Third, Baghdad is seeking to undermine the use of Kurdish languages in the region, in order to weaken the sense of a national identity and common destiny among the Kurds in Iraq, as well as a sense of unity with the Kurds in other countries. The first sign of this cultural crackdown is the attack against a Kurdish official, who used his own language rather than Arabic, in a formal media setting. While Baghdad has not yet made this move an official policy, this disturbing incident is a sign of what it could do, and what it will likely do, following the example of Turkey, if Kurds continue to resist. Suppression of national culture is the best way to weaken a potentially rebellious or troublesome population. The Soviet Union has done that systematically to the Jews; Iran has persisted in its tactics against a whole host of national minorities; and Turkey before and during Erdogan has imposed fascist policies to ensure cultural conformity.

Fourth, Baghdad is looking to divide the minorities living in Kurdish area, and has already done so, in that various groups have associated themselves with Peshmerga, PMU (connected to Iran), or with Iraqi forces, that have been trained and armed by Americans.  At the same time, Iraqi forces claimed to have no control over the Iran-backed militias, that are retaking the territories, and have opened up civilians and minorities to potential exploitation and destruction by the militias.  Having gone as far as Al Qosh, these groups have threatened a Jewish historical site, and the Christian sites in the area.  And Christian groups have reached out to the international community to complain of threats directed at them by Hashd. Yet the forces have not stopped at the borders of areas that are of strategic and geopolitical importance to the Iraqi government. They have pushed out outwards, and have been repelled by Peshmerga in multiple places, and have made way in others. Although strictly speaking there has been a ceasefire, between Iraqis and Peshmerga, that has not affected non=Peshmerga Kurdish forces protecting civilians and minorities, and who are still under threat of Iran-backed militias and IRGC. At the same time, these moves are a clear indication that Baghdad is not seeking a truce. It is seeking domination and full control of the Kurdish population, a repressive and punitive one at that.

Thus far, the response from the international community, particularly from the United States, has consisted of calls for peace and agreement, support for Iraq’s unity, and proposals of mediation to the tune of “why can’t we just all get along”. None of that was aimed at curbing Iraq’s abusive behavior or at seriously reassuring our Kurdish allies as to the commitment of the US to their security, cultural preservation, and autonomy, even under our official position of preserving Iraq as a cohesive state – quite ironic, given that there is nothing indigenous about the Sykes-Picot treaty imposed on Iraq by the British. Furthermore, there is radio silence from the US administration as to the article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, assembled with the help of US State Department and top American lawyers, which provides for Kurdish independence. Certainly, such a provision would at the very least provide a level of recognition and provision for Kurdish rights.

And ironically, it is this potential suppression of Kurdish autonomy that provides the greatest justification to independence under international law. (The Katanga case). At the end of the day, however, any nation that feels oppressed or that is otherwise dedicated to independence and pursuit of its own destiny must come to terms of having to organize its forces into strong cohesive units, making at least temporary alliances with its factions abroad, procuring whatever is needed for strong offensive and defensive fronts, through subterfuge, if necessary, and being prepared for a military triumph and complete capitulation of its opponents. In other words, if Kurds want their own state, they are going to have to fight for it, and international support will emerge only once it becomes clear that they can actually win, and have the wherewithal to support their own state without anyone’s help. It’s not pretty, but this is how it worked out for Israel, which likewise was surrounded by overwhelming enemy forces, had very limited access to inferior weapons, and no international recognition – yet there she is, nearly 70 years later, small but independent.  I hope that the US administration will see that the Baghdad government is losing its own legitimacy with each oppressive step that it takes, that its direction comes from the Iranian ayatollahs and will do the only right and practical thing under the circumstances – change its policy to fully backing the Kurds and keeping the worst of Baghdad’s actions at bay. But I wouldn’t hold my breath or rely on that.  I would also not remain passive, waiting for miracles to happen or for these problems to resolve themselves. Time may very well be ripe for a Kurdish state – but are the Kurds themselves ready?

Irina Tsukerman, human rights and national security lawyer based in New York.

Giving Credit Where It's Due - Pres. Trump's Speech to South Korean Assembly Was Excellent

The speech to the South Korean Assembly was not only the best speech Pres. Trump has delivered in his entire life, but an objectively excellent speech.

It gets everything right. Every single point. It has vision, and balance, and direct messaging to the peoples of both countries, and to the leadership and the regime in North Korea.

I have nothing to criticize, and furthermore, I wish with all my heart that the vision outlined in this speech comes through exactly as written. (Do I think it will actually happen? Unfortunately not. But was this exactly the right thing to say? Absolutely).

Kurdistan's Geopolitical Implications

Over 90% of Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan voted "yes" in the independence referendum.

Now what?

Well, there are actually several things going on with the Kurds.

First, the Iraqi Kurds decided to form an independent state.

Syrian Kurds are building an autonomy, and Damascus appears open to that possibility.

Iranian Kurds are increasingly antagonizing the state.

Turkish Kurds are increasingly under pressure by Erdogan, with heads of pro-Kurdish party HDP in prison, many Kurdish politicians under detention or threat of arrests,  and frequent raids and attacks against young Kurds suspected of being connected to the PKK or simply accused of it without any evidence whatsoever.

The consequences of the independence referendum have been manifold. The United States notoriously and repeatedly had asked the Kurds to postpone it in order to avoid tensions; Israel openly supported the vote; Canada and France stated that they would be ok with the results either way; and Russia was a big financial backer.

Most of the Western world, however, spoke out against the independence referendum. As Seth Frantzman points out.,  perhaps supporting Middle Eastern monarchies, once created by colonialists, but refusing self-determination to an indigenous nation with its own culture and democratic structure, is a way for perpetuating colonialist legacy for many European states. Meanwhile, the neighbors of the aspiring states took the vote even worse. Iraq refused to recognize the vote, and is threatening to expropriate Kurdish oil fields by force and to shut down flights to and from Erbil. Turkey is threatening to sanction the region into starvation. Iran is looking to military intervention as an option. And Iraq sent a military delegation to Iran to coordinate a potential military response.

Much like in 1948, when another indigenous nation became independent and formed a state, only to be immediately attacked by its neighbors, all hell appears to be about to break loose.

Iran, Iraq, and Turkey see Kurds as a threat, and for a good reason. Not only does Kurdistan have a potential to become a bulwark against the regional aggression of both Iran and Turkey, but it may inspire the Kurdish populations of both countries to rebellion, and may set a bad example for other minorities in Iran. Moreover, a democratic and relatively liberal Kurdistan in an unstable, illiberal, and deeply undemocratic Middle East is a dangerous entity, similar to Israel. The usual suspects, in fact, have been accusing Kurds of conspiring with Israel.  And both Iran and Turkey threatened not only Kurds, but Israelis over the support for the referendum and the idea of a Kurdish state.

As for Arab States, they have long had issues with Kurds, emanating from competition over oil, territory, tribal differences (particularly in Syria), cultural issues, and even religious tensions. Shi'a Iraqis took issue with Sunni Kurds, and Kurdish practice of Sunni Islam appears to be more liberal in comparison to their Sunni Arab neighbors. Complicating the situation is the fact that many of the Syrian and Turkish Kurds are secular/socialist, some Iraqi Kurds have reconverted to Zoroastrianism, some are Christian, and then there are Yazidis, who are of Kurdish descent but consider themselves the carriers of the true Kurdish religion and see Islam among Kurds as a remnant of Arab Muslim colonialism in the region. Most Kurds of Jewish descent have moved to Israel, but some have been living secretly in the Kurdish area, and Jewish Kurds in Israel are overall open and supportive.

Strategically, up until recently, Kurds in Syria presented a problem for Arab States, both because they were in conflict with many of the Sunni tribes, and because they were seen as a bulwark against the spread of Wahhabism through various insurgent and terrorist groups, which were backed by Saudi Arabia and embraced by Turkey. Kurdish ambitions for autonomy in Syria became a serious thorn in Turkey's side, since Turkey perceived a potential for contiguous Kurdish territory as a potential to destabilize Eastern Kurdistan in Turkey, which could lead to a separate independence movement and requisition of Turkish territory. For that reason, Turkey was willing to embrace and support ISIS, so long as ISIS focused its efforts on destroying the Kurds and prevented them from consolidating territory. Of course, eventually, ISIS got out of hand and became uncontrollable even inside Turkey. But even still, Turkey was willing to sacrifice its own forces to invade Syria, anger Western allies, and weaken itself internally, just to attack Kurds rather focus all of its efforts on ISIS. We see this attitude continue to this day.

Arab Gulf States, however, may sooner or later be forced to shift their positions, as long as Sunni Syrians and Kurds come to some sort of agreement. Iran's rapid expansionism and the increasing and seemingly inevitable possibility of land corridor from Syria to Lebanon presents a much greater and immediate problem that Kurdish limited ambitions for autonomous federalism in Syria. Kurds do not threaten the existence of the monarchies, whereas Iran backed Shi'a minorities inside the predominantly Sunni Gulf States do. Kurds are not looking to destabilize other states, whereas Iran has exactly that goal in mind. Kurds are still stateless and therefore by definition weaker than Iran, now pumped with unfrozen money delivered in cash by the Obama administration, and through all the investment deals by large Western countries. Kurds have significant internal differences,  and through disunity failed to achieve the same level of cohesion and prosperity as they could have otherwise (and still may as a state), and certainly somewhat more fragile than the Islamic Republic even at its most divided. So Kurds are not an immediate threat, and furthermore, increasingly, just like Israel, Kurds are a potential ally, though admitting that may take the Gulf monarchies even longer than finally putting their decades-old enmity with the State of Israel on ice.  Kurds are opposed to Iran and likewise proved to be a cogent and effective force against ISIS. Moreover, while the Arab states, with shocking levels of social inequality, are increasingly falling behind economically, Kurds are investing not just in oil but in education, and are likely to lead in the regional development with help from Israel, and eventually, other Western investors.  They are a viable regional trading partner... or competitor, depending on how these monarchies choose to play it. So far, they have been quiet comparatively to Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

However, right now they have an opportunity to make an important choice about their own future. Do they embrace progress, putting aside age-old tribal feuds, and invest into building up a relationship with a strong ally, who can help, at least temporarily, to fight back the increasingly aggressive and ever-nearing mutual enemy? Will they embrace modernity and progress, recognize Kurdistan's potential, and work together on joint ventures, on growing past oil, on modernizing and taking the region in a different direction? Or will they fall prey to internal divisions, corruption, clerical intransigence,  and petty rivalries, and fall behind the vanguard that is Kurdistan, perhaps forever? That remains to be seen, however, the positive influence of more liberal Arab states such as Morocco and Tunisia, and the seeming commitment to modernization that such younger regional leaders as KSA's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are promising in word as well as some action, are some of the signs that point to the fact that these Gulf States are at least considering a wiser, and more thoughtful approach to geopolitical strategy than the pessimists would have us believe. I hope they choose to embrace promise and vision instead of the past delusions and ghosts of outdated colonialism. These partnerships and their potential are worth the trouble.

As for Kurds? They are committed to fighting for their future, and just as Israel once with a little help from a few good friends, managed to break through all the obstacles and to come out stronger, smarter, and better in every way,  so will this nation that has been waiting its turn for far too long. And everyone else, sooner or later, will have no choice but to get used to it. The only question is, will they reap the rewards of early loyalty and friendship, or will they close the ranks of the belated  sour grapes consumers, grumbling over remaining scraps.