Saudi Arabia and the Holocaust

On the subject of Saudi Arabia: I have NOT been a big fan of the vast human rights violations that took place inside the country, nor their past policy of funding Wahhabist around the world, anti-Israel rhetoric, positions inside the UN, and much else. Nor of vast hypocrisy of forcing women into the guardianship system and burqas while going to strip clubs in Europe and the US. Nor of the horrendous treatment of their servants. I can go on and on, but you get the picture.

You can see where I stand on human rights in Saudi Arabia from the cover of my wall. My foray into human rights advocacy has started in Saudi Arabia, with Raif Badawi's situation. You can be assured, that I have no plan of backing away from that position until such time as Raif, his brother-in-law Walid Abulkhair, and other such prisoners of conscience are set free, and conditions inside the country are such that innocent people are no longer persecuted for their views. I hope that the Saudi government acts quickly to shift from decades of terrible policies on all level.

That said, it should be obvious to anyone with a bit of common sense, that real social changes do not happen overnight even when the government aggressively moves in the right direction - and particularly when the government is still struggling to finds its place. I am glad, however, that they have started moving away from funding Wahhabist education, moving towards modernizing religion (whatever the heck it ends up meaning in the end, but 100% freedom of conscience is at the center of true religious practice), and that they are trying to act positively in other ways, such as a statement on Holocaust. It may be imperfect, and did not specifically mention Jews, but it was a start, and no one forced them to say anything. You think Israel would stop its cooperation with Saudi Arabia if they hadn't issued that statement? Do you think the US government would stop selling them arms if they hadn't done that? To me, the fact that they are taking steps no one had asked them to take is evidence of good faith.

And when someone who can be swayed towards positive or negative, chooses, thanks to good counsel to act constructively, despite bad habits, decades of bad policies, and natural suspicion from the international community, the right thing to do, in my opinion, is to acknowledge that they are doing the right thing, offer support in the face of internal frictions that may be pushing in the other direction, and politely encourage them to continue in that right direction and take future next steps that will be even better. Bashing them, calling them evil, and saying that their leader is a corrupt loser who will never get anything right just because he was born Saudi and the country's been bad, will not accomplish anything positive, in my estimation. That doesn't mean letting them off the hook if they start backsliding or offering excuses for truly unacceptable things, or end up lying and backstabbing us. But it does mean consistently praising good actions and building a relationship, in the course of which the advisers pushing for a movement in better direction are more likely to prevail.

But what do I know about these things? *shrugs*

Obama Stands with Ayatollahs

Trita Parsi & co. don't have much time left and don't have much to say; and neither does the regime, except mildly blaming it on the usuals. Things are looking increasingly worse for the regime.

Most importantly, however, how will the regime survive the public humiliation of knowing that people don't want the Islamic Republic, people don't want the ayatollahs, that despite all the spin and lies, Rouhani is a dictator and not a moderate, and that the West has been sold on pro-regime propaganda for years thanks to the Obama administration but now the world's eyes are finally open to the reality? Europe is quiet because of the deal. Obama and his apologists will never admit it, but they were actively supporting the dictatorship that the people actually did not want. They actively supported an international security threat so their crony companies could make money off the investments. The region is covered in blood and Israel is now at risk, and Iranian people have continued to be slaughtered with impunity, because Obama wanted his legacy and his cronies wanted their investments.

Obama stands with the ayatollahs.

Satellite coverage of Iran protests

I'm glad that President Trump is ordering the army to use satellite to cover the protests in Iran. Everyone should be aware of the people's fight for freedom, even former Secretary of State John Kerry, who apparently lives under a rock, and has been affected by the regime's cutting off Internet services.

Why anti-Jerusalem statement protests around the world are fake news

Interestingly, governments in the countries where there are massive protests going on, as well as physical attacks on Jewish sites (here's looking at you, Sweden), have not issued any statements calling for peace and dialogue. That's because such protests against an uncontrollable course of events related to people they have absolutely nothing to do with and living far away, is in the interests of those governments. Rather than refocusing on the needs of their people, they are far happier having the attention diverted elsewhere = as has been the case for decades. Same people who are now protesting over the alleged violation of rights for Palestinians by the mere statement of recognition of an already Jewish portion of Jerusalem with Israeli government in it would not grant Palestinians full citizenship in their own land. (AHEM, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, etc.) So let's see what's really going on:

1. Either this is not about Trump's statement (because Trump did not explicitly recognize any particular Jerusalem borders), and it's all about Israel not having a right to exist, even including specifically Jewish sites)

or

2. No one actually cares about it just as no one cares about the Palestinians, and people just want to let out their generalized rage at life, but they don't have the freedom to protest their own government, so to make themselves feel better, they pretend to be outraged about some distant cause to which they have little connection. Also, when was the last time Palestinians stood up for their rights to anything? Have Palestinians picked up the human rights issue in Egypt? Have they protested against al-Assad in Syria? Taken an issue with Hizbullah's corruption and control in Lebanon? No? And yet all these people are rioting on their behalf.

So What of the Waiver?

Trump publicly signing the embassy waiver right after his speech is a political move, not a security move.

As I have stated repeatedly in the past, and have yet to be proven wrong, Trump intends to delay the process for the sake of keeping his base, and in particular, funders, and to ensure they will back him against any primary challengers in 2020.

If anything, prolonging this situation will probably result in more security threats. It would be easier to get everything over with at once, and just move the building, get all the riots out of the system and move on. Making this an endless process with an unclear due date will ensure some level of dissatisfaction from everyone concern, and possibly additional riots or other problems whenever the building IS moved.

Reform Jews Are No Shtetl Jews

To call today's left-wing, largely Reform and Conservative Jews, "shtetl Jews" would be a tragic misnomer. I come from shtetl Jews; they are no shtetl Jews. Most shtetl Jews and their offspring, who did not join the Communist party in the Soviet Union, retained a very strong sense of identity if by force, as well as a clear awareness of threats and danger. Those of them who were HOlocaust survivors, in many cases went to Palestine, and fought for the creation of the State of Israel. They did not wait for anyone's permission to do so. Weizmann and the rest, men who came from humble roots, rather than from elitist stock, (Weizmann, a biochemist, came from a village), lobbied President Truman to do the right thing and to recognize the nascent state, in spite of his own State Department, and threats from high level foreign policy officials, which he eventually did.

Violence preceded the creation of the State of Israel, not the least to the spread of propaganda by the Nazis in the Middle East, and ensued once again immediately upon the recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. It then followed the young state through its history, and at each turning point, including the reunification of Jerusalem, there were surely some American Jewish "leaders" who clamored for "sha, shtill!" mentality, claiming that innocent people will die if Israel asserts her rights, and that surely sooner or later the right time will come and Israel can reclaim what's rightfully hers peacefully. My friends, such time will never come.

If you want what's yours, you have to fight for it, sometimes through aggressive lobbying and diplomatic work, and sometimes, upon meeting with blind hatred, corruption, and instigation, with overwhelming force, if that's the only thing your enemy recognizes. Israel is now positioned better than at any time in her history. Many countries find blessing in conducting relations with Israel, and care far more about the advantages such an alliance brings to their people than about empty rhetoric from far-away corrupt politicos, who care nothing about them or their countries and cultures. Let us find courage and wisdom in the lessons of the past, and stand behind President Trump's decision to finally do the right thing that we have been waiting for 70 years, and stop treating ISrael like a pariah among sovereign states by recognizing its own chosen political capital as such. I think it's idiotic to pretend that Israel does not have its entire government in Jerusalem. Being blind to the facts on the ground will not somehow strengthen the claims of the Muslims to the Al Aqsa mosque.

On the contrary, readiness to engage in unprovoked violence against their neighbors, readiness to slaughter civilians to show their displeasure with political moves, weakens their claim of desire for peace, and their claim for spiritual connection with the Holy City. Israel is in a tough neighborhood, where strength, not weakness, is respected and recognized. Saudi Arabia is drawing closer with ISrael not out of desire to protect her, but because she sees ISrael as a strong country, a potentially useful ally against a mutual threat. Don't be under illusion that things would be different if somehow Israel grew softer on any point. The demands would be greater, the violence more intense. Israel should stand up for her basic rights, being treated as an equal among sovereign nations, and the United States should act out of position of strength and pursue an independent foreign policy, based on its own interests, not on empty threats from greedy corrupt illegitimate thugs, who also demand money from US taxpayers to avoid inciting their own abused and manipulated populations towards terrorism and misery.

Enough With the Threats About Jerusalem

If, as a result of any White House Jerusalem-related announcements, mass violence occurs, the full blame will be with the rioters and their corrupt instigators, not with the President of the United States for conducting reasonable and fair foreign policy in doing nothing more than recognizing the political capital of a sovereign state and declaring intent to move the US embassy there. Particularly unwelcome are riots from people who have been on the US taxpayer dole for many decades and have paid us back with the murders of our citizens.

No Coherent Strategy Without Core Principles in Foreign Policy

Contrary to conventional wisdom and widely embraced foreign policy dogma, strategic defense of national interests is not possible without adoption of certain core principles. Saying that “United States doesn’t have allies, it has interests” really misses the mark with regards to carrying out the tasks that secures those interests , which include the safety of  our borders, our cyber domain, our troops, and strategically important sites, such as bases and embassies, abroad. Our interests, beyond security objectives, may include regional stability, preservation and growth of important relationships and alliances, resolution of trade deficit, and various internal economic goals.  Those are interests, which are not to be confused with strategy, or a set of long-term steps in securing particular objectives with regards to those interests. If our interest, for instance, is border protection, the securing that interest would be lowering the number of known actionable threats in sensitive border areas from X to Y.

Get The Times of Israel's Daily Edition by email
and never miss our top stories   FREE SIGN UP!

A strategic objective towards that end would include identifying those threads, recognizing those threats as they come in, and developing standard operating procedures towards eliminating them, which may include working closely with allies on surveillance of the areas, toughening border patrol or immigration procedures, building security fences in areas known to be vulnerable in order to slow down the path of the would-be interlopers, and creating additional electronic surveillance and means of interception. The tactical steps would be the procedures towards the identification, recognition, interception, and elimination of those threats including developing of better situational awareness, purchase of more sensitive technology, and funding for the construction of fences, border patrol watch towers, and creating a successful communications and messaging system that allows for better interaction among border patrol areas.

None of these steps, however, are possible without core values that guide us in the process. For instance, we have to abide by Constitutional restraints on our side of the border, whatever those restraints happen to be and however applicable they are in any given situation. We can debate the limits of those restraints, and specific factual scenarios in which they do or do not apply, but no one will argue against the understanding that our Constitution provides a guiding set of considerations with respect to the way we can implement certain internal security procedures. The balance of individual security and freedoms from government intervention are examples of such principles. And because of our vigorous checks-and-balance systems, despite various disagreements over how the system is applied, we overall enjoy relative internal stability, and few would argue that such principles are of little value in insuring the kind of environment that is overall beneficial.

Furthermore, the aims of most domestic policy initiatives are clear, even if the execution frequently falls short of the promise. With foreign policy, however, we seem to have lost our way, despite the general sense of where it is that we wish to end up with. And that sense comes more by way of generic slogans: “Greatness, respect by other countries, security, stability, economic victories, and peace”, than through specific visions compatible with current realities, reasonable timelines, and offsetting past mistakes. There has been no shortage of recent criticism of seeming lack of strategy in the Middle East,  Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.  Our inability to develop a serious response to Russia in Syria is rivaled only by our circuitous meanderings over 16 years of failed and stagnated policies in Afghanistan.  I won’t go into the missed opportunities with regards to TPP/trade with a number of Latin American countries, which since then, joined in to make China great again or our failure of imagination with regards to the 54 vastly different African countries, an entire continent we have dismissed but with one naval base, partially controlled by the French, and a few perfunctory visits in recent years, while other countries, such as China, are engaging in aggressive neo-colonialist policies, defensive and business buildups (such as Saudis and Turkey, building all along the Gulf of Horn, and investing in Somalia), or strengthening relationships through joint ventures, green energy investments, and personal attention, such as what Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu has been doing in a series of highly successful diplomatic overtures and a barnstorming tour.

There is more to our anemic foreign policy than Obama’s legacy of failure, takeover of the agencies by career officials in strong disagreement with President Trump’s paradigm and aiming to derail his success, or even the tunnel vision obsession with eliminating ISIS at the expense of every other threat and concern by the generals in charge of our military policy. Sure, those are all important and challenging factors, but our history of poor strategic decisionmaking dates back to the Cold War, when, through the decades of perceiving the Communist threat as our main ideological adversary, we focused on its containment (mistake # 1) to the exclusion of everything else (mistake # 2) and yet once the Soviet Union fell did not finish off the remnants of these ideological proclivities at home and abroad (mistake # 3). Despite Reaganesque rhetoric of freedom, it wasn’t the freedom or long-term security of our society that was the driving force behind our action, but rather fear of a seemingly existential threat to our own way of life on a very limited immediate level. Had it been motivated by freedom, containment would not have sufficed, and all other ideologies that could be an obstacle to freedom due to their anti-individualist worldviews would have been likewise seen as threats. Our actions were entirely reactive; and though the successful Star Wars response, the first time we finally decided to act from a position of strength, finally doomed the Soviet Union’s economic paper tiger, that was merely a successful conclusion of one battle, and a defensive rather than affirmative and forward-looking one at that.

In essence, the idea that any country can subsists on interests alone, without developing strong long-term relationships based in shared values and shared visions of the future, is pure nonsense. Furthermore, any country’s basic interests – internal and external security, strong economy, its citizens’ ability to travel and do business, is heavily interdependent with the analagous interests of other states, and to some extent, every country has identical interests. Where they differ is how they interpret those interests, and what actions they are willing to take in defense of these concepts, as well as in furtherance of their vision of their own country’s prosperity, regional and global role, and cultural contributions to the outside world.  Just as Rules of Engagement drive our military approach out of concern for the lives of civilians, as well as reciprocity in the treatment of our troops, certain basic principles of civilized behavior drive (or ought to drive) foreign policy, and when some country fails to abide by such norms, conflicts and mayhem may ensue. US is no different from others in that respect. Arguing over semantics whether “friends” or “allies” are one and the same or largely different brings us no closer to understanding how it is that we have gotten ourselves into such a confusing mess in so many places simultaneously. We have had a number of very stable, largely dependable long-term relationships with the countries that share the most with us in terms of common vision, goals for regional and global roles, and dedication to pursuit of prosperity through peaceful means; our relationships with countries which have had less in common have shifted from time to time or focused on the limited number of common approaches and issues.

Nevertheless, each relationship has focused on the observation of certain norm. If our partner in that relationship violates those norms to the extent that it impedes on our own interests in a significant way, we are forced to revaluate our relationship and set appropriate boundaries. And to the extent our partners have taken care to maintain good relationship, be responsive to our needs, and show utility and interest in forging stronger bond, over time, we respond in kind, to the extent it is helpful in addressing our own needs and other interests. Seems simple and straight-forward enough, but over time we seem to have lost track of these very basic driving factors in policymaking, and rather, have reverted to reactionary approaches predicated on attempting to utilize relational variables to resolve complex geopolitical situations.  Instead, we get our further and further flummoxed by competing demands and pressures from various actors, making it difficult to decide how to react to various parties tugging us in different directions, without alienating vital partnerships or blowing up delicate sand castles of assorted relational contingencies. This confusion is driven not just by the fact that there are too many factors to be considered but by the fact that we forget  that a paradigm of basic expected behavior should be our driving force, not simple reaction to what others believe that behavior ought to be.

Let’s take a hypothetical and abstract scenario of a military operation, in the course of which we are involved in a coalition with partners from UK, and a number of countries from EU. Let’s suppose that as the operation is winding down, with the task appearing largely accomplished, several UK troops are captured by the enemy. What would we do in such a situation? Common sense would surely bring us to try to free the hostages to the extent we are able to do so. And most likely, other coalition partners would do the same, despite the acrimony between UK and EU over Brexit. Let’s take it a step further, and imagine that it is not UK, but Spain that is the coalition partner, whose soldiers are captured, and those soldiers happen to be Catalan. They have supported the recent independence move, but have remained committed to finishing off the operation. What do you suppose would happen? The prediction is not too difficult here: Spain, the US, and everybody else would do whatever is practicable to free the hostages, and deal with the political differences at some other point in time and away from the field.  The underlying principle driving this understanding is that first, you have certain obligations to your partners, both in terms of existing defense treaties, and in terms of basic ethical considerations that makes it worth everyone’s while to fight together, and second, in the future, you want to know that someone has your back if in this instance you’ve had his. That’s a basic guarantee of mutual survival and the long term survival of your societies.  And even if you happen to have some political differences at the moment, they are presumably of lesser importance that whatever task united you to fight together.

But let’s say, you are fighting with a new partner you’ve never worked with before, and an inherently untrustworthy one at that, liable to switch side on you at any given moment. You are in that situation because that partner knows local condition better than anyone else, and frankly, the risk is worth it, considering that the enemy is quite formidable and your options are limited. What do you do? You watch your back, exercise caution, keep your options open, do your due diligence in terms of keeping yourself informed about your partner’s current and potential actions, and otherwise do exactly what you would have done with a long-standing ally. If nothing goes wrong, and your task is complete, you can choose to try to build trust and additional ties with that partner, or just peacefully part your ways. And if the partner betrays you during the course of the operation, you can always start treating it as an adversary. None of that seems terribly complicated, but we have failed on several fronts:

1. Keeping ourselves sufficiently informed about the intents and nature of our friends and enemies
2. Separating various actors into enemies, friends, short-term partners, and other temporary categories that make sense according to the situation.
3. Distinguishing potential and current long-term partners who have proven trustworthy from those partners, where the relationships are not yet at that level, where the visions of the future are not shared, approach to developing interests do not coincide, and where, in fact, there is potential for friction and conflict.
4. Treating each category according to what makes sense for that level of partnership in that situation if you take propaganda, social pressures, and past habits out of the equation.

How could we have made such basic errors in judgments? Because we have confused terms – we have mixed goals, strategic objectives, strategy in pursuit of those objectives, tactics, and underlying principles of engagement into an incoherent mishmash of incoherent concepts that merely obfuscate the situation. Somehow, using the terms “morality” and “foreign policy” in the same sentence has become taboo, even laughable. And yet it is morality that has allowed humans to survive, because at the end of the day, morality is based in pragmatic evolutionary considerations, that has kept everyone from eliminating everyone else to the point of extinction at the very outset of our sentience. I would posit that contemporary theories of international relations – idealism and realism – have failed where policies based in some underlying and focused principles likely would have helped us remain focus and develop coherent paradigms appropriate for the long-time pursuit of strategies in defense of our interests. Realism has been based in short-term reactionism, which of course, caused us to ignore long-term implications of unwise decisions. Idealism forces us to ignore realities on the ground and to try to force facts to feet our vision of what should be. It’s bound to fail, and it has failed us, again and again. We have exercised various combinations of these competing extremes to some degree for many decades, resulting in further problems, repetition of the same approach, and a self-perpetuating cycle of overlooking threats and underutilizing valuable tools and relationships.

We are doing so yet again, in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia. Leaving aside emotionally loaded terms such as “friends” and “allies” to describe our joint actions in some of these places, we have clearly forgotten that we need to do what makes sense for us, rather than what makes sense to assorted other parties pushing their demands on us. The largely theoretical construction that if we let Baghdad do what they will in Kurdistan, along with our clearly designated adversary, Iran, they will eventually go along with our vision of stability in the Middle East, is ludicrous. No country will place US interests above its own vision; it’s up to US to enforce what it has in mind through effective negotiations and utilizing partnerships to achieve specific results in the mutually beneficial directions. US is not benefiting from the instant scenario; on the contrary, we are losing respect, losing money, losing other potential partners, losing resources, wasting time, and seeing undesirable strategies of our adversaries successfully unfold before eyes.

There is no practical reason why we should not be treating our Peshmerga partners captured by adversarial Iran-backed militias the same way we would have treated our British or French or German partners under similar circumstances – if possible in the field, conducting operations to release them. Theoretical constructs about what Baghdad would possibly do if we did that are irrelevant if we abide by basic principles – we want our goals to be respected, and therefore we cannot allow the partners that have proven trustworthy be captured with no response. If our other partners are unwilling to assist in the matter, we have to act on our own, and if they interfere – well, that makes it clear where their loyalties are, doens’t it? Our partners should be able to settle political differences among themselves, but if we want our own interests to meet with success, we need to ensure that the principles that make our strategies successful prevail. If we lose one partner to another, we have actually lost both.  And then we are on our own against an enemy. And we have lost one partner to the enemy, and our partner is siding with that enemy, we have two enemies instead of one, and it makes sense to strengthen our relationship with our one existing partner for our own sake. It’s in our self-interest to be in a position of strength in any given conflict to the extent possible. That’s a basic principle, just as it’s a basic principle to protect those partners that are helpful in a particular scenario and that can be just as helpful in the future.

We cannot have a strategy if we do not have basic guides by which we operate.

The reason why the world seems messy and confusing is because we ourselves choose to view it as such and because we act in a haphazard way, instead of utilizing a specific lens that would help us guide us to where we actually want to be – in a position when we can make a positive impact towards clearly identified desirable results, and in a relationship with partners, who, by nature of sharing similar objectives, are bound to stick with the same principles and strategies, rather than switch back and forth among various sides depending on which way the wind blows. No, we want to have a system. The system works like a compass and guides us safely through whatever storms come our way, because if you know the direction you’re going in, even if you have to adjust for various obstacles along the way, you are bound to get where you need to be sooner or later. And conversely, if you are wondering from place to place with no direction and no plan to find direction and no tools to help with finding direction, you are very likely to spend your time perpetually lost. The only way to have a successful journey is to have a system for determining your location and adjusting accordingly until you get back on track to where you need to be.

The only way to have a successful foreign policy is to have a principled one, firmly based in foundations that will give you a system for formulating coherent responses, no matter what the circumstances or changes in circumstances appear to be, flexible in adjusting to reality, but strong enough to move you past all obstacle in the direction where you, and not the wind, or the sunset, or other people who likely have no idea where they are going, are trying to get you to go.

Why Baghdad's Move on Kirkuk Is Not About the Independence Referendum

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/11/22/why-baghdads-move-on-kirkuk-is-not-about-the-independence-referendum/

By now, it should be abundantly obvious that  Baghdad's move to take over Kirkuk has been pre-planned and would have advanced with or without the independence referendum. Iraqi forces and Peshmerga were allied against ISIS in the liberation of the territories, yet Iraq's ultimate priority has always been in retaining the control over the oil fields and revenue from the Kurdish-held territories.  And with Barzani's resignation as KRG President, we now know that whatever criticisms could be made about the latter's hold on power well beyond the constitutional provisions, his concerns about Kurdish security and move for independence were a great deal more than just power play. Further proof of Baghdad's disingenuous bluster about territorial integrity and "unity" (carved out by the British under the Sykes-Picot agreement, that would intentionally keep different nations with disparate identities cobbled together, foster divisions, and allow the British Empire to maintain control) are Abadi's actions with respect to the Kurdish citizens the moment the Baghdad-Iran alliance assumed control of much of the disputed territories and the oil fields, which were, in fact the central concern.

The legitimacy of Baghdad's concern for its national sovereignty is undermined by the unnecessary assault on the Kurdish autonomy, which can only make the Kurds yearn for independence more, not less. Though Middle East is all about overpowering and crushing your enemy to make him respect you, the excessively vindictive actions by Baghdad, and its welcoming of a foreign regime (IRGC) into this punitive takeover is likely to have the opposite effect. Baghdad's reimposition of power began with a crackown on Kurdish media - the banning of Kurdistan24 and Rudaw, two of the major local outlets, which have been providing detailed information about both the military action of the past few weeks and internal Kurdish matters of interest to their families in Syria, Turkey, and Europe, and enhancing the understanding of world leaders who would otherwise be uninformed about the alphabet soup of Kurdish parties and factions in the region.

This move signals illegitimacy of having a separate Kurdish identity, a bitter point for a nation of approximately 30 million people with distinct languages, culture, and indigenous roots in the region, but to this day without an independent state.  Second, it is an insurance policy that the international community will have no access to real-time information on the ground, and certainly not the English-language Kurdish take on it. There is a small coterie of Western journalists presence, but as the Israeli journalist Seth Frantzman has pointed out, they tend to rely on other Western journalists for information, and thus likely miss a great deal of internal dynamics and the full spectrum of regional narratives.  Lack of alternative information will go a long way towards creating an appearance of only one perspective: Baghdad's position, made public through official channels and formal meetings.  Whatever public support the Kurds are currently getting is largely fueled by the unrestricted access to their voices. The legitimacy of Baghdad's own actions are severely undermined by its move to squash down criticism from the significant portion of its population, and its ally in the war against ISIS.

Second, Baghdad has moved to pay salaries directly to the Kurdish civil servants, bypassing the KRG. This undermines the authority of the Kurdish leadership, and makes the Kurdish infrastructure heavily depended on, and thus potentially loyal to, Baghdad. For sure, even if the bulk of the Kurdish civilian forces grow resentful of this deprivation of a sense of autonomy, others will cling to security for their immediate situation, and Baghdad thus far successfully divides-and-conquers the already splintered Kurdish groups.  For the same reason, Abadi's forces are seeking to cut off Peshmerga access to the pipeline that delivers oil to Turkey, and to provide all oil to Turkey, bypassing the KRG. It's just another way of undermining Kurdistan, weakening its economy, undermining its business relationship with Turkey, and ensuring that Iraq is viewed as the central authority, whereas Kurdistan is merely a province with no independent power to make deals or provide anything of value to the region.

Third, Baghdad is seeking to undermine the use of Kurdish languages in the region, in order to weaken the sense of a national identity and common destiny among the Kurds in Iraq, as well as a sense of unity with the Kurds in other countries. The first sign of this cultural crackdown is the attack against a Kurdish official, who used his own language rather than Arabic, in a formal media setting. While Baghdad has not yet made this move an official policy, this disturbing incident is a sign of what it could do, and what it will likely do, following the example of Turkey, if Kurds continue to resist. Suppression of national culture is the best way to weaken a potentially rebellious or troublesome population. The Soviet Union has done that systematically to the Jews; Iran has persisted in its tactics against a whole host of national minorities; and Turkey before and during Erdogan has imposed fascist policies to ensure cultural conformity.

Fourth, Baghdad is looking to divide the minorities living in Kurdish area, and has already done so, in that various groups have associated themselves with Peshmerga, PMU (connected to Iran), or with Iraqi forces, that have been trained and armed by Americans.  At the same time, Iraqi forces claimed to have no control over the Iran-backed militias, that are retaking the territories, and have opened up civilians and minorities to potential exploitation and destruction by the militias.  Having gone as far as Al Qosh, these groups have threatened a Jewish historical site, and the Christian sites in the area.  And Christian groups have reached out to the international community to complain of threats directed at them by Hashd. Yet the forces have not stopped at the borders of areas that are of strategic and geopolitical importance to the Iraqi government. They have pushed out outwards, and have been repelled by Peshmerga in multiple places, and have made way in others. Although strictly speaking there has been a ceasefire, between Iraqis and Peshmerga, that has not affected non=Peshmerga Kurdish forces protecting civilians and minorities, and who are still under threat of Iran-backed militias and IRGC. At the same time, these moves are a clear indication that Baghdad is not seeking a truce. It is seeking domination and full control of the Kurdish population, a repressive and punitive one at that.

Thus far, the response from the international community, particularly from the United States, has consisted of calls for peace and agreement, support for Iraq's unity, and proposals of mediation to the tune of "why can't we just all get along". None of that was aimed at curbing Iraq's abusive behavior or at seriously reassuring our Kurdish allies as to the commitment of the US to their security, cultural preservation, and autonomy, even under our official position of preserving Iraq as a cohesive state - quite ironic, given that there is nothing indigenous about the Sykes-Picot treaty imposed on Iraq by the British. Furthermore, there is radio silence from the US administration as to the article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, assembled with the help of US State Department and top American lawyers, which provides for Kurdish independence. Certainly, such a provision would at the very least provide a level of recognition and provision for Kurdish rights.

And ironically, it is this potential suppression of Kurdish autonomy that provides the greatest justification to independence under international law. (The Katanga case). At the end of the day, however, any nation that feels oppressed or that is otherwise dedicated to independence and pursuit of its own destiny must come to terms of having to organize its forces into strong cohesive units, making at least temporary alliances with its factions abroad, procuring whatever is needed for strong offensive and defensive fronts, through subterfuge, if necessary, and being prepared for a military triumph and complete capitulation of its opponents. In other words, if Kurds want their own state, they are going to have to fight for it, and international support will emerge only once it becomes clear that they can actually win, and have the wherewithal to support their own state without anyone's help. It's not pretty, but this is how it worked out for Israel, which likewise was surrounded by overwhelming enemy forces, had very limited access to inferior weapons, and no international recognition - yet there she is, nearly 70 years later, small but independent.  I hope that the US administration will see that the Baghdad government is losing its own legitimacy with each oppressive step that it takes, that its direction comes from the Iranian ayatollahs and will do the only right and practical thing under the circumstances - change its policy to fully backing the Kurds and keeping the worst of Baghdad's actions at bay. But I wouldn't hold my breath or rely on that.  I would also not remain passive, waiting for miracles to happen or for these problems to resolve themselves. Time may very well be ripe for a Kurdish state - but are the Kurds themselves ready?

Obama, Trump, foreign policy, and the Amazing Party Support Switcheroo

Obama and the Iran Deal.

The left: Obama is playing the long game.

The Right: Obama is endangering US national security, Israel, and world stability.

Trump ignoring Iran as it makes progress throughout the Middle East; Hamas and Hizbullah making deals.

The left: Trump has no idea what he's doing; this is a disaster.

The right: Trump is playing the long game; he knows what he's doing, you just don't have all the information. He'll first take out ISIS, and then he'll deal with Iran.

ISIS is taken out.

The left: So what about Iran and all the oil

The Right: Don't worry about it; Trump will take care of everything.

This sort of "logic" didn't work for me under Obama, and it doesn't work for me now.

I see no reason to trust the government, when the government is clearly being short-sighted and/or incompetent.

How US Unequivocal Support for Iraqi Nationalism Will Lead to Radicalization and Extremism

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/how-us-unequivocal-support-for-iraqi-nationalism-will-lead-to-radicalization-and-extremism/

Seth Frantzman, in a recent article, analyzes US position of neutrality on Baghdad takeover of Kirkuk, and further silence on the alleged human rights violations, and punitive actions such as the shut down of Kurdish press, Kurdistan24 and Rudaw. In sum, the thinking is that encouraging Iraqi nationalism, which is based in substantial part in anti-Kurdish sentiment, US will turn Iraq away from Iranian influence, and unify the country under the Saudi Arabia aegis against the spread of Iranian influence. The idea there is that if the Shi'a Iraqi government aligns with the Sunni KSA, together they can counter Iran. And indeed, Iraq has signed a corresponding defense treaty with KSA. However, that is not a meaningful agreement for two reasons: first, Iraq will do just about anything to play all sides, including the US, which has been arming its army. Second, KSA is far away, and Iran is close. Abadi and the Islamic Republic has been getting along quite nicely, and Abadi invited Iran to participate in takeover of Kirkuk. It clearly does not see Iran as a threat, though KSA does. And when forced to choose between its Shi'a neighbor, which has helped Iraq with the Kurdish issue and the Sunni Saudi Arabia, which is known to sympathize with Iraq's Sunni population, tribal and religious considerations will prevail over piece of paper.

The fact that the United States does not realize that shows the extent of ignorance of our foreign policy leaders of the cultures, which they are now trying to bring together through fictitious borders and imaginary alliances. The British, when they did the same, at least cynically imposed divisions to perpetuate their own power. The US leaders actually believe that this policy is going to work and that it's in the best interests of the Middle East and the United States. It is quite amazing.  This vision of a Baghdad-Riyadh alliance puts aside the dream of a free and democratic Kurdistan. The reason for this groupthink at top levels may be deeply rooted in the underlying psychological need to stay consistent. In other words, the US has already invested so heavily into Baghdad, that having realign its policy now would be equivalent to conceding defeat. In other words, the excuse that this is all about American interests is rational, but the reasoning behind is not. Otherwise, the weight that the US would be giving to other considerations would be at least equal to its own wishful thinking to see this implausible alliance of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to work for more than five minutes, until Iran decides that it should be otherwise.

Much has already been said and written about the potential boons of an independent Kurdistan for the United States - a trading partner with a vibrant economy, a buffer state against Iran's and Turkey's expansionist ambitions, a new model of indigenous evolutionary liberalization, a friendly state, open to Western values and partnership with Israel. All of these potential benefits, in the eyes of the generals, who are spearheading US foreign policy in the Fertile Crescent, is of less interest than having Iraq not be quite-so-pro-Iran.  There is no official analysis on how such calculations are figured, but there is also a darker side of this conversation that likewise does not appear to figure into the equation: the potential for the radicalization of the Kurdish region. Neither friends nor critics are particularly interested in touching on this sensitive topics. Those, who favor independent Kurdistan focus the bulk of their attention on the perceived betrayal by the US - in other words, a valid, but largely emotional talking point, whereas the critics cite the dubious benefits of yet another tribal Muslim state at the cost of weakening another ally - Iraq. The underlying working assumption, however, is that the US decisionmakers are correct in one way: Kurdish independence will bring greater instability than Kurdish "remain", at least in the short term.

Such position relies on the erroneous assumption that Iraq is open to various potential positions, and will pivot in the desirable direction if only the United States will do what Baghdad claims needs to be done to earn its favor - return the oil fields to Abadi's forces without a question, stay moot on the Kurds, encourage peace talks through gentle rhetoric, and ignore the Iran-backed militias and IRGC presence in the vicinity. If only the US does all these things, at some point, all will be well. IRGC will not do much damage beyond security the territory for Iraq and ensuring that the rebellious Kurds will not tempt its own Kurdish population; Turkey is all talk; ISIS has been taken care of, and US can reap the boons of its cynical wisdom. Such wishful thinking is no more practical than believing that Kurdish independence will come without a bloody fight against a variety of regional forces. That's not a commentary on the morality or benefits or likelihood of such a move; that's just a statement of logical observation based in the Middle Eastern dynamics. You get what you are willing to fight for, and only if you win with overwhelming force. In the meantime, US is so focused on its own line of reasoning that it ignores major red flags that undermine its position.

First, Iraq has already and openly pivoted to Iran. The actions of the last few weeks demonstrate it amply. US reasoning that by sacrificing Kurdistan it can stop Iraq from growing closer to Iran is not only mistaken; it is nothing short of appeasement.  Iran's interest is regional dominance. Abadi, if he wants to stay in power in the region, needs to abide by Iran's decisionmaking. It will, therefore, cooperate to whatever extent necessary that it is seen as a fully ally, reliable in supporting Iran's ambitions.  Iran will not stop at building IRGC military basis and headquarters in Kirkuk, nor does it make it any sense to stop when there is no resistance from anyone.

Second, Iran's presence in the Kurdistan area far exceeds what can be gauged from the coverage, especially after Kurdistan24 and Rudaw were shut down. According to one source, Iran has as many as 700 secret houses in Suleimanya alone. If that's accurate, it's quite plausible that Iran has extensive presence, both overt and clandestine, in every corner of Kurdistan. And it is there to stay, long-term.  From disputed territory between Baghdad and Erbil, Kirkuk province are becoming occupied territories, essentially colonized by Iran. If Iran continues to grow its military presence in the area, and there's every reason to believe that without a war, Iran is not going anywhere, the next step is indoctrination of the local population - ranging from forced conversions to political brainwashing.

It may already be building schools, whereas Western educational opportunities in the region are woefully missing. Furthermore, with Baghdad banning all commercial flights in and out of  Erbil, and potentially cutting off access to Syrian and Turkish overpasses, Kurds are not only economically isolated, but become wholly dependent on Baghdad and Tehran for humanitarian aid, educational maintenance, and even the news.And Iran is likely to radicalize the local Shi'a population through joint educational programming.  The religious element may prevail over tribal concerns, if Iran is seen as an economic benefactor, rather than an oppressor to the Iraqi majority. Meanwhile, it is taking every step to show who's the boss. Iran is opening up its border with Kurdistan - that is a sign that the regime has achieved a decisive military and psychological victory. It has nothing to fear from the Kurds.

At the same time, however, the support of nationalist sentiments among Iraqis is taking a turn less towards unity and more into anti-Kurdish xenophobia. Already, a Kurdish journalist was stabbed to death in Kirkuk. Iranian militias, not Iraqi forces, arrested dozens of young Kurds in a cafe in Kirkuk. Their fate is unenviable, as anyone, familiar with the brutality of the regime and its treatment of rebellious ethnic minorities will testify. And religious minorities all over the Kurdish region are threatened by the IRGC and the Iran=backed militias. Jewish and Christian sites near Al Qosh are in danger. Multiple Christian and Yazidi groups have expressed concern.  Militias are on full alert protecting civilians, yet they are outnumbered and outgunned by the well-equipped Iraqi forces, and the Iran=backed militias that are not answerable to Abadi's command.  This destabilization is precisely what US support for national unity was supposed to prevent. Instead, it is turning into the scapegoating and vendetta against the Kurds.

Third, these divisions are likely to be exploited by Sunni extremist groups, like Al Qaeda and remnants of ISIS and their ilk. Seemingly defeated, these groups await opportunity for strife in order to make a triumphant comeback, sow discord, and take advantage of other violent situations.  And ideological extremists will surely take the opportunity to appeal to the disenfranchised groups, proselytize among embittered and marginalized Kurdish peripheral regions, and go after every resentful person or group left hopeless after the takeover of Kirkuk.

Worse still, if Iraq continues to try to destroy Kurdish nationalism and sense of identity, as it's doing now, the resistance that will arise will become increasingly radical and violent, and the potential for militant action, all the way to terrorism against civilians is not to be ruled out. We have seen the way the Soviet Union had sown chaos among Turkish Kurds, eliminating all nationalist groups except for the PKK, and turning PKK into a Soviet terrorist group (which after several decades finally reformed, but not before costing many lives of innocent civilians in the process). Interestingly, Russia is moving back into Kurdistan, and is seeking a closer relationship with the Kurds. It's also looking to utilize them more in Syria.  That Russia will use this opportunity to play on the anti-American backlash through what is widely perceived as betrayal is quite obvious.

To make a long story short, the downside to the chimeric US strategy involving the one-sided coddling of Baghdad to the exclusion of all other interested parties, is that instead of building bulwarks against extremists, including Iran, which is the whole goal of this exercise, the US is actually making active enemies out of absolutely everyone in the region, strengthening the potential for extremism, and allowing radical actors to assume the vacuum of leadership, all in the name of unity and the US interests. But the region united by extremism is not in the US interests at all, and neither is giving up opportunities for economic investments and partnerships fall into the hands of Russia and Iran, which have not done anything positive with any place they have ever been involved in.

The administration should snap out of this dangerous delusion quickly, and start drawing and enforcing boundaries for its "ally" Baghdad, which include, first and foremost, getting Iran and out of the picture completely, and only then creating positive bilateral and equanimeous conditions for further negotiations. It should send a clear signal to Kurds that their identity is recognized and respected, and to all other actors, that US has a central role to play in the region, and that chaos and extremism of any sort is not an option and will not be tolerated - not after all the lives the US has sacrificed to get to where we are today. Most importantly, the US should remember that alliances among former enemies are temporary, and for that reason Iraqi-Saudi alliance cannot be relied upon to last.

But strong long-term relationship among groups of people who have a baseline of common interests, values, and a history of fighting together for common goals can endure and move in the most positive direction. We should not continue following the same failed policy of putting all our eggs in one basket (in this case, Abadi), only to be bitterly disappointed and face new crisis yet again.  We have the luxury of hindsight to make better, more informed decisions, and the richness of our experience to build a better, more secure future for ourselves, and the world that we want to live in.

Why Baghdad's Move on Kirkuk Is Not about The Independence Referendum

Cross-posted at:

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/11/22/why-baghdads-move-on-kirkuk-is-not-about-the-independence-referendum/

By now, it should be abundantly obvious that  Baghdad’s move to take over Kirkuk has been pre-planned and would have advanced with or without the independence referendum.

Iraqi forces and Peshmerga were allied against ISIS in the liberation of the territories, yet Iraq’s ultimate priority has always been in retaining the control over the oil fields and revenue from the Kurdish-held territories. And with Barzani’s resignation as KRG President, we now know that whatever criticisms could be made about the latter’s hold on power well beyond the constitutional provisions, his concerns about Kurdish security and move for independence were a great deal more than just power play. Further proof of Baghdad’s disingenuous bluster about territorial integrity and “unity” (carved out by the British under the Sykes-Picot agreement, that would intentionally keep different nations with disparate identities cobbled together, foster divisions, and allow the British Empire to maintain control) are Abadi’s actions with respect to the Kurdish citizens the moment the Baghdad-Iran alliance assumed control of much of the disputed territories and the oil fields, which were, in fact the central concern.

The legitimacy of Baghdad’s concern for its national sovereignty is undermined by the unnecessary assault on the Kurdish autonomy, which can only make the Kurds yearn for independence more, not less. Though Middle East is all about overpowering and crushing your enemy to make him respect you, the excessively vindictive actions by Baghdad, and its welcoming of a foreign regime (IRGC) into this punitive takeover is likely to have the opposite effect. Baghdad’s reimposition of power began with a crackown on Kurdish media – the banning of Kurdistan24 and Rudaw, two of the major local outlets, which have been providing detailed information about both the military action of the past few weeks and internal Kurdish matters of interest to their families in Syria, Turkey, and Europe, and enhancing the understanding of world leaders who would otherwise be uninformed about the alphabet soup of Kurdish parties and factions in the region.

This move signals illegitimacy of having a separate Kurdish identity, a bitter point for a nation of approximately 30 million people with distinct languages, culture, and indigenous roots in the region, but to this day without an independent state.  Second, it is an insurance policy that the international community will have no access to real-time information on the ground, and certainly not the English-language Kurdish take on it. There is a small coterie of Western journalists presence, but as the Israeli journalist Seth Frantzman has pointed out, they tend to rely on other Western journalists for information, and thus likely miss a great deal of internal dynamics and the full spectrum of regional narratives.  Lack of alternative information will go a long way towards creating an appearance of only one perspective: Baghdad’s position, made public through official channels and formal meetings.  Whatever public support the Kurds are currently getting is largely fueled by the unrestricted access to their voices. The legitimacy of Baghdad’s own actions are severely undermined by its move to squash down criticism from the significant portion of its population, and its ally in the war against ISIS.

Second, Baghdad has moved to pay salaries directly to the Kurdish civil servants, bypassing the KRG. This undermines the authority of the Kurdish leadership, and makes the Kurdish infrastructure heavily depended on, and thus potentially loyal to, Baghdad. For sure, even if the bulk of the Kurdish civilian forces grow resentful of this deprivation of a sense of autonomy, others will cling to security for their immediate situation, and Baghdad thus far successfully divides-and-conquers the already splintered Kurdish groups.  For the same reason, Abadi’s forces are seeking to cut off Peshmerga access to the pipeline that delivers oil to Turkey, and to provide all oil to Turkey, bypassing the KRG. It’s just another way of undermining Kurdistan, weakening its economy, undermining its business relationship with Turkey, and ensuring that Iraq is viewed as the central authority, whereas Kurdistan is merely a province with no independent power to make deals or provide anything of value to the region.

Third, Baghdad is seeking to undermine the use of Kurdish languages in the region, in order to weaken the sense of a national identity and common destiny among the Kurds in Iraq, as well as a sense of unity with the Kurds in other countries. The first sign of this cultural crackdown is the attack against a Kurdish official, who used his own language rather than Arabic, in a formal media setting. While Baghdad has not yet made this move an official policy, this disturbing incident is a sign of what it could do, and what it will likely do, following the example of Turkey, if Kurds continue to resist. Suppression of national culture is the best way to weaken a potentially rebellious or troublesome population. The Soviet Union has done that systematically to the Jews; Iran has persisted in its tactics against a whole host of national minorities; and Turkey before and during Erdogan has imposed fascist policies to ensure cultural conformity.

Fourth, Baghdad is looking to divide the minorities living in Kurdish area, and has already done so, in that various groups have associated themselves with Peshmerga, PMU (connected to Iran), or with Iraqi forces, that have been trained and armed by Americans.  At the same time, Iraqi forces claimed to have no control over the Iran-backed militias, that are retaking the territories, and have opened up civilians and minorities to potential exploitation and destruction by the militias.  Having gone as far as Al Qosh, these groups have threatened a Jewish historical site, and the Christian sites in the area.  And Christian groups have reached out to the international community to complain of threats directed at them by Hashd. Yet the forces have not stopped at the borders of areas that are of strategic and geopolitical importance to the Iraqi government. They have pushed out outwards, and have been repelled by Peshmerga in multiple places, and have made way in others. Although strictly speaking there has been a ceasefire, between Iraqis and Peshmerga, that has not affected non=Peshmerga Kurdish forces protecting civilians and minorities, and who are still under threat of Iran-backed militias and IRGC. At the same time, these moves are a clear indication that Baghdad is not seeking a truce. It is seeking domination and full control of the Kurdish population, a repressive and punitive one at that.

Thus far, the response from the international community, particularly from the United States, has consisted of calls for peace and agreement, support for Iraq’s unity, and proposals of mediation to the tune of “why can’t we just all get along”. None of that was aimed at curbing Iraq’s abusive behavior or at seriously reassuring our Kurdish allies as to the commitment of the US to their security, cultural preservation, and autonomy, even under our official position of preserving Iraq as a cohesive state – quite ironic, given that there is nothing indigenous about the Sykes-Picot treaty imposed on Iraq by the British. Furthermore, there is radio silence from the US administration as to the article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, assembled with the help of US State Department and top American lawyers, which provides for Kurdish independence. Certainly, such a provision would at the very least provide a level of recognition and provision for Kurdish rights.

And ironically, it is this potential suppression of Kurdish autonomy that provides the greatest justification to independence under international law. (The Katanga case). At the end of the day, however, any nation that feels oppressed or that is otherwise dedicated to independence and pursuit of its own destiny must come to terms of having to organize its forces into strong cohesive units, making at least temporary alliances with its factions abroad, procuring whatever is needed for strong offensive and defensive fronts, through subterfuge, if necessary, and being prepared for a military triumph and complete capitulation of its opponents. In other words, if Kurds want their own state, they are going to have to fight for it, and international support will emerge only once it becomes clear that they can actually win, and have the wherewithal to support their own state without anyone’s help. It’s not pretty, but this is how it worked out for Israel, which likewise was surrounded by overwhelming enemy forces, had very limited access to inferior weapons, and no international recognition – yet there she is, nearly 70 years later, small but independent.  I hope that the US administration will see that the Baghdad government is losing its own legitimacy with each oppressive step that it takes, that its direction comes from the Iranian ayatollahs and will do the only right and practical thing under the circumstances – change its policy to fully backing the Kurds and keeping the worst of Baghdad’s actions at bay. But I wouldn’t hold my breath or rely on that.  I would also not remain passive, waiting for miracles to happen or for these problems to resolve themselves. Time may very well be ripe for a Kurdish state – but are the Kurds themselves ready?

Irina Tsukerman, human rights and national security lawyer based in New York.

Who Is Lying About Kirkuk And Why It Matters

cross-posted in Times of Israel:

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/who-is-lying-about-kirkuk-and-why-it-matters/


Among the growing Baghdad-Barzani rift, various claims have been made about who knew what and when, and who said what and why.

The  three competing perspectives are as follows:

* US betrayed Kurds by failing to stop the invasion by Iraqi forces, Iran-backed Shi'a militias, and the IRGC. Kurds have been strong allies to the US during the fight against ISIS, and have peacefully voted to secede from a state, which is increasingly manipulated by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thus is not a good fit for the significant Kurdish population. The oil fields can and should be peacefully negotiated by the two governments, but the Iraqi forces have no business invading Kurdish-held territories, which the latter have liberated from the ISIS presence. Moreover, Iraqi Constitution, Article 140, provides for Kurdish independence, and given that the Constitution was comprised with the assistance from US lawyers and the State Department, US is well aware of that provision and should be respectful of it.

* Kurdish leadership new full well from CIA, State Department, and Pentagon statements before the referendum that US was strongly opposed to secession and would not be supportive if Baghdad decided to take back its territory in the aftermath. Barzani blatantly lied to its population, leading them to believe that the US was deceptive about its support for Kurds. There was no reason to believe that the independence referendum had international support. Barzani overstepped his authority in the attempt to distract from his own illegitimate hold on power despite the constitution.

* The well trained Iraqi forces, armed by the United States, had significantly more field experience in long-term operations than Peshmerga. Furthermore, Baghdad was planning to invade Kirkuk regardless of whether or not Kurds held the referendum, so it was only a matter of time before the region was overrun with Iraqi forces coupled with Iran-backed Shi'a militias. Barzani did not necessarily count on the Talabani faction to sell out to the IRGC, but had decided to call the referendum, knowing that they would be taken over regardless, to draw attention to the upcoming takeover, and also to start taking active steps towards the future, knowing that putting that off would likely make it less, not MORE likely to gain international support and recognition with time.  Furthermore, regardless of US statements, it was in the US interests to support Kurds and to avoid clashes between allies, so regardless of US statements about the referendum, it was reasonable to expect that they would mediate in a manner that would avoid violent takeover and could help negotiate oil. It's not in the US interests to have IRGC presence regardless of how the US administration feels about Baghdad's claims to Kirkuk, or or other issues complicating Kurdish path to independence.

These three narratives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. And the Kurdish people should have had realistic expectations of the US role in their own story, and had demanded better preparation and organization of troops, clear communications, and an actual plan from the Barzani government, not to mention dealing with the election issue instead of going for populist slogans. However, none of these considerations takes away from the legitimacy of the following concerns:

Whatever the concerns of the US in balancing various interests in the region and preventing further destabilization, failure to take a leadership role in preventing conflict, actually led to the very destabilization it was trying to prevent. Pentagon's denials about the role of IRGC in this avoidable situation are not helping the US credibility, and further, play into the hands of the very actors no one wants to see play a decisive role in the future of Iraq and Kurds. These lies and denials make US look treacherous, deceptive, anti-Kurdish and do nothing to dissuade the Kurds from moving forward with whatever faulty narrative Barzani may be peddling. In fact, it is pushing them into the embrace of the Russians, while IRGC and Baghdad government feel emboldened to disregard Kurdish claims, and act in a matter that is punitive and vindictive, rather than defensive of Baghdad's legitimate claims and interests.  As a direct consequence of US failure to intervene, several disturbing developments occurred:

IRGC, dressed as Shi'a militias, and in conjunction with actual Iran-backed militias,  have continued plundering and raiding their way through the territory, up to Al-Qosh, increasingly placing minority civilian populations and Jewish and Christian historical sites in danger.  Minorities, such as Christians and Yazidis, have been forced to choose among three factions - Kurdish Peshmerga, the PMU units, now linked to Iran, and Iraqi forces,  in order to protect their civilians and interests. That does nothing to simplify the situation, as the continuous clashes may force these groups to pick up weapons against each other.  Christian militias that run their own defense in Nineveh are paid by PMU, which is troubling to US interests in preventing Iranian financial transactions that benefit the IRGC, recently designated as a terrorist organization. Qasem Soleimani, despite being recognized as a terrorist by the State Department in a recent statement, continues to play an active organizing role in the planning and implementation of the regional takeover.

Second, Turkey and Iraq are moving to cut off Kurdish access to Syrian and Turkish overpasses, which will ease the likelihood of future Turkish entry into the area. Turkey views Kirkuk as its own sphere of interests, and considers the prevention of contiguous Kurdish territories between Iraq, a likely Syrian Kurdish federation,and Kurdish territories in Turkey as central to its interests.  There is also a growing possibility that Turkey may target the oil pipelines remaining under Kurdish control, which will deprive the Kurds of their essential livelihood and further empower and embolden Erdogan's expansionist neo-Ottoman ambitions in the region. Turkey is becoming an increasing threat to US interests in the region and elsewhere, and this additional step will make that much harder for the US to defend its foothold, access to energy, defense of minorities, or relationships with more stable and less aggressive allies.

For now, however, Iraq is more likely to gain control of that pipeline and has already taken steps to bypass the Kurdish region in providing oil to Turkey. Iraq and Turkey are on the same page with regards to Baghdad's regaining control and dominating Kurdistan, and Turkey has already made a similar security agreement with Iran. This triumvirate will ultimately prove hostile to US interests in the region, and should be broken up by the US, regardless of Barzani's flaws. US needs to prioritize what is at stake. Iran-oriented Iraq is no great ally and will likely prove a hindrance in the US's future battles against Iranian aggression. And Turkey is proving increasingly less of a friend and more of a menace as it opposes US presence in the region, detains US citizens, interferes with US strategy in Syria, and threatens US allies. The more time the US wastes maintaining supposed neutrality that only strengthens our enemies, the more likely we are to find ourselves friendless when our neutrality inevitably backfires.

Trump, Don't Be Obama

My article was published in Israel HaYom, and republished on Instapundit.org

http://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/trump-dont-be-obama/

Irina Tsukerman

Trump, don't be Obama
Eight months into the Trump administration, it is time to stop making excuses. The Obama administration holdovers are not exclusively responsible for everything going wrong with U.S. foreign policy. Multiple agencies doubling down on foreign policy are a clear indication that the policy in question comes from the top, not from some rogue employee in one agency.

These actions by the U.S. are doing nothing but damaging its credibility and relationships.

First, the United States contributes free weapons to the Lebanese Air Force, which are then shared with Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization. Hezbollah is a fearsome Iranian proxy that has now grown to the size of a standing army and plays a distinctive and influential role in Lebanese politics. It has also attacked Americans, Israelis, and other targets over the course of the last several decades in a number of locations, and has played a destructive role in Syria. That has not worked out so well with the branch of the Afghani mujahedeen that has grown into the Taliban, and arming Hezbollah is likewise not likely to contribute to peace and stability in the world.

Second, U.S. policy in Syria, which has focused only on ISIS, has essentially allowed Iran to step in uninhibited.

Admittedly, this policy started under former U.S. President Barack Obama; however, no clear explanation has ever been provided as to why the Trump administration should go along with the terrible policies of its predecessor. The White House let Iran build a land corridor to Lebanon, which will facilitate arms and drug trafficking and offer passage for terrorists. All the while, Iran is looking to build bases in Syria and gaining control of the Strait of Hormuz, which has essentially sidelined the U.S.

Third, Trump's capitulation to Iraqi and Turkish demands on opposing Kurdistan independence emboldened Iran in its interventionism policy in Kurdistan. And it's no excuse to say that the U.S. clarified well in advance that it won't support Kurdish aspirations. The Republican-led Congress has failed to repeal the law against directly arming Kurds. As a direct result of the heavy-handed U.S. pressure on the Kurds to postpone their referendum, Iraq's government openly invited the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps to plan the takeover of Kirkuk, which, by use of some force, displaced over 170,000 people, murdered over 400 civilians and injured hundreds more. And it did not stop at Kirkuk. Faced with the administration's "neutrality" policy, Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Ghasem Soleimani entered Kirkuk freely on numerous occasions, and opened headquarters and military bases, solidifying Iran's presence in the area.

Iranians and Iraqis continue their punitive march past Kirkuk, placing minorities, such as the Yazidis, in harm's way. The Iraqi army refuses to take control or responsibility for these militias, which are wreaking havoc, and, coupled with Baghdad's harsh, isolationist policies, are ruining the region's economy. Further, Iraq, armed with U.S. weapons, ignored U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's gentle admonition that Iranian militias should go home. Iraq has now found a new, stronger ally, and the U.S. is being pushed out.

Fourth, Tillerson and Trump both said that there was no plan to try to stop America's European partners from doing business in Iran. And despite the positive indication that Trump will not allow a major Boeing deal with Iran to go through, such statements send, at best, a mixed signal. It was the complete isolation of Iran that forced it to seek relief from sanctions by way of the nuclear deal in the first place. Now, not only is Iran flush with money and investments, but continued business with other countries will make U.S. sanctions a mere drop in the bucket. U.S. sanctions alone will not affect Iran's economy, it won't diminish the strength of the Revolutionary Guards, nor will it hamper Iran's geopolitical ambition. Instead, the U.S. will be at a distinct business and economic disadvantage vis-à-vis European states. Disunity among allies is sure to be exploited by the Iranian regime, which thrives on the divide-and-conquer approach to dealing with its adversaries.

Fifth, the U.S. is allowing Hamas to do business with Iran, even as it is facilitating Palestinian unity between Fatah and Hamas and trying to work out a peace deal with Israel. Iran is encouraging the worst possible behavior in Hamas and praises the return to the destructive rhetoric that makes any sort of coexistence with Israel, much less normalization, impossible. Funding from Iran will also serve to nullify any effect from the Taylor Force Act, which would curb U.S. taxpayer funding of the Palestinian Authority in response to its continuous incitement to terrorism.

Separately, each of these policies, continuing under Trump, not Obama, is destructive enough. Together, they create a pattern of paying lip service to decertification and opposing Iran's military expansion across the Middle East and beyond, while tacitly allowing Iran and its proxies to profit from the U.S. defense industry and sacrificing American allies – a familiar pattern from the preceding administration. It is time for the Trump administration to stop finger-wagging while de facto perpetuating Obama's outdated and failed policies and refocus its energy on finding solutions.

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security lawyer based in New York.

Congress All Talk, No Action On Iran's Growing Strength In the Middle East

Sen. Cotton correctly highlighted the dangers of Iran's growing presence in the Shi'a Crescent.

You know what would have been even better?

Calling on the President to take action in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. I'm not entirely sure why Congress is sitting pretty and watching calmly while the enemy forces are spreading everywhere.

US is grasping defeat from the jaws of victory in Iraq

Two disturbing developments: Hashd, an Iran-backed militia, basically told US forces in Iraq to get lost. So if the US has been supporting Abadi vis-a-vis Kurds in hopes that Abadi is going to be better than someone more pro-Iranian leader, they are in for a disappointment. Iraq now has much more powerful buddies - Iran and Russia, which is seeking to widen its business operations in Iraq, and particularly, Iraqi Kurdistan, and increasingly doesn't need the US. US is losing out not only with Kurds but with Iraq as well entirely due to its show of weakness. That's an important cultural point that the administration simply doesn't get, because it thinks only in terms of short-term military tactics, without understanding the tribal nature of the societies it's dealing with. Furthermore, US is endangering the local minorities. Iraqi military has made it clear that it doesn't have control over Iranian militias and what they choose to do to Yazidis, Christians, and others. Second, Iraq is seeking to not only control 100% of oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, but to block important passages to Syria and Turkey. That will prevent freedom of movements for Kurds who have passed back and forth unrestricted since the beginning of life in that area. It's actually very, very dangerous and will enable Turkey to potentially enter the area in the future. It will also prevent Peshmerga from assisting with fight against ISIS or other terrorists in Syria.

We're Living An Old Joke About the Nazis

Rex Tillerson: It's time for Iranian militias to go home.

IRGC + Iranian militias immediately picked up their marbles and went home.

Or not. No, they actually didn't even blink.

No Friends But the Mountains

Couldn't agree more with this statement on Kurdistan by Bernard-Henry Levy:
"As for the others, it is an unmitigated disaster. For the United States, in particular, it is one more step in the discrediting of an administration that has become incapable of the elementary political act of distinguishing friends from enemies".

Time for the President to Stop Hiding Behind the Obama Holdovers and to Own His Policies

OK, here's something I don't understand.

An Obama holdover has not only not been replaced, but been allowed to remain the same position, undermining the new Iranian strategy and lying to his boss, to the agency he serves, to the President, and to the entire country.

After he is duly outed, nothing is done, and in fact other agencies, double down on his lies and terrilble advice and pursue the same course of action.

You know how that's possible, that Rex Tillerson, the Pentagon, and the CIA are all going along with the adversarial ideology of one State Department employee?

Because a) they agree with it and b) that's in effect, an order that comes directly from the PResident. That's the only way how all these agencies could continue with their course of action.

Time for the President to stop hiding behind the Obama holdovers and to own his policies.

Dangerous Words Lead to Dangerous Actions

In an earlier post, I surmised that dehumanization of Kurds and other minorities in Turkey can eventually lead to the justification of mass atrocities against them, just as in 1915, the Ottomans used political enmity to justify the massacre of over a million Armenian men, women, and children.

However, the US ally Erdogan is not the only one capable of riling up the masses into an extreme nationalistic (and also religious) fervor. Our other ally, supported, supplied, and strengthened by the United States, Iraqi VP Nouri Al-Maliki, recently stated that ISIS was created in Erbil in order to lead to the partition of Iraq.  This level of political propaganda, and there is no doubt that's what this is, is aimed to manipulate tribal, deeply divided, and in many cases, largely uninformed public to shift the blame for lack of unity inside the country from the people who drew the maps with the purpose of creating internal divisions and thus minimizing the possibility of rebellion against the British Empire to the Kurds, who are seeking a peaceful separation.

There is no question that in an unstable region fraught with tensions, such comments are inherently incendiary and can be interpreted as an incitement to hatred, if not to outright violence. The people of Iraq who have suffered greatly in the hands of ISIS are now being pointed in the directions of the Kurdish region, which played a significant part in the fight against the common enemy, as a perpetrator. The idea that Kurds created ISIS is as preposterous as comparing right-wing Jews to Nazis, and yet, this comment was made by the Vice President of the country.  This is the government the United States supports and considers a legitimate democratic representation of all of the people of Iraq. Despite President Trump's comments that the United States is not taking sides in any tensions between Baghdad and Erbil, the State Department stated otherwise, specifically calling for joint administration of all regions, and claiming that separation might be exploited by ISIS, and likewise referring to all parties involved as Iraqi partners, despite the fact that the recent independence referendum established that at the very least, the Kurds no longer think of themselves as such, nor wish to stay in this dubious union.

However, even such commitment to the chimeric idea of Iraqi national unity does not justify excusing and ignoring blatantly provocative comments from top level officials, who are maliciously and deliberately encouraging strife and violence against a particular group of people. US should pressure Al-Maliki into disavowing his comments, issuing an official apology to the Kurds, and explaining that Kurds were equal partners in the fight against ISIS and can in no way be blamed for its creation. What makes these comments particularly dangerous is that they complemented by action. Specifically, despite earlier claims from the Pentagon that the invasion of Kirkuk was due to a misunderstanding of the official instructions, the Iraqi forces, backed by IRGC and Iran-supported militias, are on the march for the second day and have now entered Sinjar.

Sinjar is an area that is home to a large  number of Yazidis, who have also formed their own forces. IRGC is not known for being particularly welcoming to minorities, and Iran and Shi'a militias have threatened Yazidis in the past. Despite tensions with the Barzani government, Yazidis are better off under Kurdish control of the area than should the likes of Soleimani and Al-Maliki be left in charge.  Barzani, meanwhile, issued a non-commital statement expressing an unspecified hope for the creation of an independent Kurdistan one day in the future. With PUK reportedly having abandoned Barzani's coalition due to an agreement with or perhaps pressure from the IRGC forces, Kurdish unity is likewise in question. As they quarrel and point fingers, Baghdad's agents continue to gain control of essential oil fields, leaving the Kurds with not much to go on at this juncture. The visuals of the Iraqi forces on the march with their Iranian partners while the Vice President is making comments blaming the Kurds for the creation of ISIS are striking and horrific. Kirkuk was largely empty and for now the troops are under control, focusing on their military targets, but it takes but a match to light the fires of enmity, fear, and nationalist fervor that could lead to bloody attacks against the locals. Such reprisals may indeed be planned by the Iraqi government in order to ensure complete control and kill off the Kurdish dream altogether. The Pentagon threatened the cessation of armament and supply of the Iraqi troops in the event they attack and cause harm to the Kurds, but it's unclear that this will either actually happen or, even if it does, will in any way undermine the Iraqi determination to subdue the Kurds, in thought as well as in deed.

What should Barzani do now?  Regrouping... and planning a more strategic response that will not, in the future, rely on untrustworthy groups. Including leaders of other tribes and factions into the decisionmaking process regarding further plans may ensure the groups remaining on the same page and being less likely to be divided by IRGC or anyone else. Kurdish democracy is imperfect, and an adversary can easily pick off different parties one by one by promising them future leadership, threatening that particular group, or bad-mouthing Barzani's leadership. There's nothing new to exploitation of internal divisions. In fact, to provide a historical comparison, Israel went through much the same in the early stages of the formation of the state. However, at the end of the day, the leadership managed to summon just enough unity and agreement to do what was needed to be done to achieve independence (and then happily continued to fight and backstab each other from the day Israel was created until now).

Disunity is not an impediment to creation of the state, just so long as there is enough commitment among the core group to make a strategic victory possible. Barzani should take lesson from this experience, and not leave major cities or other sites in the hands of small groups of people. Additionally, this is the time to come to an agreement with Kurds in Syria and Turkey, and start forming and organizing a real army, strong, numerous, and committed enough to stand up to Iraq and its militias, with or without support from the United States, Israel, or anyone else. There will be help, but in the beginning it will be clandestine, limited, and highly dependent on circumstances. Once the Kurds show their commitment to victory through strengths, even the United States will start coming around. But for now, hard times lie ahead, and the Kurds should look inwards for solution, while receiving consultation and limited supported from a few early enthusiasts until such time as they start showing signs of clear success and military superiority.