Trump and the Grid

Trump and the grid:

As excited as I was about the concept of the grid actually being protected and prioritized in our NSS, I'm not sure that it will actually happen. Because, based on reports from Bloomberg and other sources, the career officials at the Department of Energy, and elsewhere, are still doing everything possible to derail this administration's agenda, and Trump still has not appointed people who would kick the bureaus inside those agencies in gear. Rick Perry may give orders, but enforcement of implementation ends up falling to the career people, who, so far, have shown little gusto for doing the work, and on some things, downright put up obstacles or lied about doing it.

That is why I do not have high hopes for anything infrastructure-related. This would have been the case to some extent with any Republican president, but will be particularly bad with Trump.

Oh well. At least, just like with the embassy, he set an example of what should be a national security priority, and perhaps in the future, someone else will actually get it done.

NIAC Is The Propaganda Arm of Iran, Not a Human Rights Organization’

https://en.dailymail24.com/2017/12/06/niac-is-the-propaganda-arm-of/

They wine and dine members of Congress at monthly dinners. Their members serve on the boards of successful, well-respected organizations run by Iranian-Americans. They claim to be the voice of moderation and friendship.

In reality, NIAC is the propaganda arm of Iran, strengthening its position inside the United States through outreach, propaganda, disinformation articles, character assassination attacks against critics, and intimidation of dissenters through lawsuits.

The Department of Justice should investigation this lobby group for its failure to register under Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), expose their frauds and destructive role in the US, and inform Congress and the administration about their destructive roles as agents of influence for Iran's intelligence.

Challenge

NIAC claims to be dedicated to strengthening the voice of the Iranian Americans and promoting greater understanding between Americans and Iranian people. In fact, NIAC has been acting as a de facto lobbyist for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act ((22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq.)  This law requires agents representing interests of foreign powers in a political or semi-political capacity to disclose their relationship with the foreign government, as well as related activities and finances. NIAC, led by the Swedish-born activist Trita Parsi, is likely in violation of the relevant provision. As a key and overtly pro-Iranian voice advising the Obama administration on the nuclear deal  with the Islamic Republic, NIAC consistently voiced the interests and point of view of the "Reformist" faction of the regime, represented, in part, by the current president Hassan Rouhani.   

While in Lausanne during the JCPOA negotiations, Trita Parsi put himself forward as a member of the Iranian negotiating team, and repeatedly boasts of his access to Iranian regime leaders. He has dined with Iran's former hardliner president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, met with the brother of the current president Hassan Rouhani, corresponded and maintained close ties with  Foreign Minister Zarif, dating from Zarif's previous position as Iran's Permanent Representative to the United States in New York. That level of access suggests trust on the part of the normally suspicious regime. Furthermore, a shady family that had financed NIAC,  started by Parsi in 2002, stood to gain financially from the sanctions relief, as they openly backed the deal.  The Namazis, who peddled influence between the White House and Teheran, ultimately overstepped the boundaries and have been arrested by the regime.  Parsi continued pro-regime fabrications through the years since NIAC's inception.  Most recently, Trita Parsi fabricated (in allegation) that green card holders from the seven countries designated by the most recent immigration suspension were being asked about their views on President Trump upon entering the airport.  He then doubled down on this mendacious claim.  

Contrary to the popular view, the Reformists are no more moderate than the hard-liners such as the previous president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and are yet another group of people played by the ayatollah-led regime. NIAC was consistently deceptive in advocating the potential consequences of the nuclear deal, and attacked critics of the deal, such as the well-known dissident and journalist Ahmad Batebi, for their public concern. NIAC-affiliated public figures, such as Muhammad Sahimi, had attacked critics of the deal as right-wing pawns and pillars of the Israel lobby in the U.S., an argument that directly reflected the rhetoric of the regime itself and furthered its interests through a character assassination campaign. Trita Parsi himself had visited President Obama at least 33 times, and remained his leading adviser.

There is evidence to believe than rather than being an organization and an individual sympathetic to the Regime, NIAC and Parsi actively aided Iranian intelligence. For instance, a report from Iranian American Forum, based in London, claims that a secret message delivered by Trita Parsi to their office in September 2011 was identical to a secret message delivered to Washington in 2007 by the regime's envoy Salman Savafi. Both messages warned against designating the IRGC (The Iranian Revolutionary Guards) as a terrorist organization because it would wreak havoc in Iraq, and also jeopardize the possibility of improving relations with Iran.  Separately, an unclassified Pentagon report described NIAC's collaboration with two Iranian intelligence agents, who were invited to give a Congressional briefing (links to report included). Meanwhile, most recently, a number of senior defense and intelligence officials have come forward  against designating IRGC as a terrorist organization, in a language similar to the two messages cited above, particularly warning that such designation could endanger US troops in Iraq and endanger the fight against ISIS. Given the close connection between NIAC and the previous administration, one can easily surmise NIAC's role in making that impression and continuing to play the role of the regime's lobbyist in preventing unfavorable policies.

Above-mentioned Trita Parsi unsuccessfully sued a noted Iranian American journalist Hassan Daioleslam for defamation, where Mr. Daioleslam argued in his articles that NIAC is an unregistered lobby group. A treasure trove of documents on Mr. Daioleslam's website unveil the intricate web of deeply rooted and personal relationships between NIAC members and regime families. More recently, they demonstrate how NIAC is deceitfully trying to divorce the West's view of Iran from its obvious connections with North Korea.  Furthermore, NIAC appears to be the only widely known group representing interests of Iranian-Americans, and has gained renowned in the US educational and cultural institutions. For that reason, perhaps, only Reformists in Iranian prisons are promoted in the NIAC-sponsored English language press, and for the same reason the voices of the NIAC-sponsored “dissidents” drown out and shut down the voices of legitimate anti-regime critics throughout the United States.  

. Prior to the lawsuit, NIAC was registered as a (501) ( c) (3). Despite the fact that NIAC spent only about 5% of their activity on human rights advocacy and the remainder on lobbying activities in violation of their status, the State Department did not require them to register as foreign agency and did not refer them to the Department of Justice.  In court, NIAC and Trita Parsi were both sanctioned for systematic abuse of discovery process and repeated false and misleading declarations to court. Interestingly, this abuse of process included the altering of 1400 emails referencing the word "lobby".  In fact, Parsi himself used the word "lobby" to describe NIAC in documents obtained by Eli Lake. Additionally, NIAC and Parsi withheld vital documents on numerous occasions and made false comments before the court.

The sanctions were upheld on appeal.  Many Iranian Americans, as well as the governmental press in Iran, consider NIAC to be the"Iran lobby".  This organization, and its director Trita Parsi, pretend to be the leading voice of the Iranian Americans in the United States, in reality representing the interests of a state that promotes terrorism, ignores sanctions, engages in systematic and widespread human rights abuses, and has utilized the money released by the Obama administration towards developing its illegal ballistic missile program.  NIAC-affiliated entities have engaged in a pattern of shutting down the dissent by Iranian dissidents and other critics who have come out against the regime and who have criticized the Reformists.  NIAC and its individual members release deceptive missives, which paint a distorted portrait of the Islamic Republic's regime and excuse away its anti-Western, anti-Israel rhetoric.

Suggested Response

NIAC, rather than representing the interests of Iranian Americans, promotes the interests of an openly adversarial and threatening regime, all tax-free. Its duplicity and intentions should be unmasked and exposed.

In fact, after the oral argument in the above-cited case,  Judge Wilkins states:

“I got to tell you that your client is lucky that I was not the District Judge, because you will be here appealing much more severe and higher sanctions, because I think he (the District Court judge) had extreme patience in dealing with lots of misleading and false representations and countless times when your client was trying to slice the baloney very thin, as far as trying to parse what their obligations were.”

Given the strong signal from the judiciary, the Department of Justice and Congress should launch an investigation into NIAC's and Trita Parsi's deceptive and insidious activities in violation of the United States law, and contrary to U.S. interests.  A hearing examining its pattern of duplicity, character assassination attacks on critics, and self-serving agendas that in no way help the interests of the Iranian American community will bring to light its many instances of violations, and likely, tax evasion. It may reveal the illicit funding of its pro-Iran agendas by figures within the regime itself. Finally, it may give grounds for a recommendation that the State Department should require NIAC be designated as a foreign agent, and that the Department of Justice should investigate NIAC, Trita Parsi, and other relevant subsidiary groups and individuals for fraudulent activities, tax evasion, and other violations.

The Department of Justice should investigate NIAC's and Tria Parsi's failure to register under FARA and require them to do so immediately, while strictly enforcing the periodic reporting requirement in the interests of national security. Likewise both NIAC and Trita Parsi should be charged with perjury and obstruction of justice and investigated for their lies under oath and tempering with evidence during the course of the trial.  

Anticipated Outcome

The Islamic Republic's aggression against the Western, and particularly U.S. interests, takes many forms, but not the least of them is "lawfare" against critics, information warfare, the shutdown of popular dissent at home and abroad, institutionalized espionage, and high-positioned agents of influence. Not-for-profit cultural organizations purporting to represent intercultural understanding and the interests of particular communities are an excellent vehicle to promote these active measures of swaying public opinion, influencing decisionmakers, and dictating pro-Iran policy to the U.S. government and institutions. Exposing these instruments of the Islamic Republic for what they are will shred their credibility, and give opportunity to pro-freedom, pro-Western institutions to arise among Iranian-Americans, and will give voice to the Iranians that are looking to defend the interests of the United States, rather than its adversary.

A Further Perspective Visa Reexamination: A Wide-Ranging Overhaul Is Needed

My article published in the American Spectator:

https://spectator.org/visa-reexamination-a-wide-ranging-overhaul-is-needed/

November 3, 2017, 12:05 am

But is the State Department even up to it?
The recent terrorist attack in New York City, which took the lives of eight people, and was perpetrated by an Uzbek Uber driver, in the United States on diversity visa, has led to the latest heated reexamination of our immigration system. President Trump accused Democratic minority leader and New York Senator Chuck Schumer of masterminding the diversity visa, which helps bring in random people, and he asked Congress to drop this type of green card lottery admission, in favor of a merit-based system. Others take issue with the family reunification visas that allow family members of citizens and permanent residents to apply for visas, under the premise that families should be kept intact, because families build stronger communities and support each other through difficult times in their new home. What’s missing from the evaluation of various types of visas on security grounds is the most obvious point: any type of visa can be exploited by frauds, criminals, terrorists, or spies if there are no proper vetting procedures in place.

Clifford Smith of the Middle East Forum, writing last summer, suggested that screening for ideology, particularly Islamism, which presents as much of a threat to today’s Western societies as Communism once did, would help prevent the exploitation of these visa structures by clever actors with ulterior motives. The Middle East Forum’s analysis of more effective screening procedures have made their way into a proposed immigration bill. I would suggest that such commissions should stay away from theological discussions on what constitutes “radical” or moderate Islam, and focus instead on three objective security criteria: the actor’s past activities and associations, ideology (i.e. proclivity for violence, attitude towards women and minorities), and goals.

Such an objective scheme would do away with any chance for personal bias, and could also apply in a wide variety of circumstances, not just with respect to any particular ideology, religion, or worldview. As we know, threats shift, ideologies evolve, and religious fervor rises and falls as other movements replace it — and our immigration system and national security apparatus should be flexible enough to accommodate whatever is the most troublesome at the moment. The good news is, such a screening approach would work well with any type of visa, so that in the future consideration of various types of visa, security could be taken out of the equation as a distinct consideration, and other goals of the immigration systems could be reexamined and addressed dispassionately.

Others argue that no amount of background research can work without behavioral screening, which has been particularly successful in Israel. Specially trained airport agents examine people of all backgrounds for consistency in response to a variety of questions, developed by experts. Notice that terrorist attacks in Israel come from the domestic context rather than from terrorists flying in from outside. Knowing what to look for and situational awareness as to suspicious behavior or lying has managed to screen out many a bad apple. I would argue that whichever system or combination of systems one prefers, the central concern is as much about who is doing the screening as who is being screened. Unfortunately, the discussion not currently on the table is that the State Department is not necessarily sending well trained and aware professionals to stamp passports and grant visas.

This dilettantish approach to security results in many “good people” getting stuck in places they really don’t want to be, whereas clever manipulators familiar with the systems know just what to show and to say to get by — and sometimes don’t even have to go so far. Overwhelmed, low level consulate and embassy workers are frequently unfamiliar with the languages, culture, or unique security issues of many of the countries they work in and simply lack the skills for high level “extreme vetting.” There should be nothing extreme about taking common sense factors into consideration. Fair screening ideally involves a high degree of professionalism, education, familiarity with the issues, as well as skills for dealing with all types of people, rather than the minimal general briefing these consulate workers frequently get. That means, however, a long overhaul of the entire State Department system and culture, for which there is a need of a devoted high level administrator, situational awareness of all the factors involved, and how they appear, and most importantly, political will.

And political will is the factor that is currently lacking. A prime example of that is the death by inaction of the effort to reform the controversial EB-5 investor visa. The requirements for the visa are as follows:

To qualify as an immigrant investor, a foreign national must invest, without borrowing, the following minimum qualifying capital dollar amounts in a qualifying commercial enterprise: $1,000,000 (U.S.); or. $500,000 (U.S.) in a high-unemployment or rural area, considered a targeted employment area.
Moreover,

EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program. USCIS administers the EB-5 Program. Under this program, entrepreneurs (and their spouses and unmarried children under 21) are eligible to apply for a green card (permanent residence) if they:

• Make the necessary investment in a commercial enterprise in the United States; and

• Plan to create or preserve 10 permanent full-time jobs for qualified U.S. workers.

This program is known as EB-5 for the name of the employment-based fifth preference visa that participants receive.

Congress created the EB-5 Program in 1990 to stimulate the U.S. economy through job creation and capital investment by foreign investors. In 1992, Congress created the Immigrant Investor Program, also known as the Regional Center Program. This sets aside EB-5 visas for participants who invest in commercial enterprises associated with regional centers approved by USCIS based on proposals for promoting economic growth.
To put it very simply, the idea is that if you invest a substantial amount of money into the U.S. economy, you get an automatic path to citizenship. This concept was developed in the 1990s as a way to boost the flailing economy, gained a great deal of backing in the 2000s, and fell into disfavor in the last few years, as a host of economic downsides and security problems came to the surface. Some of the factors that brought forth skepticism about this visa on efficacy and security grounds from such people as Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, included:

• A tendency for uneven investment, with some of the poorer areas of the country getting no attention, whereas big urban centers getting the bulk of the profit.

• Exploitation by frauds thanks to malleable and amorphous language in the body of the screening forms.

• The fact that up to 84% percent of these visas in recent years went to Chinese nationals.

• The discovery by the Department of Homeland Security of a number of Chinese and Iranian individuals with links to intelligence in their countries utilizing these visas for the purpose of espionage, active measures, and other activities undermining U.S. national security.

The State Department’s tendency to favor investment considerations over other factors led to what may be a widespread mismanagement of the system. To date, this is the only type of visa for which there is no accounting of how many people and from which countries are granted the green card annually. We simply have no idea who and how many of such people are in the U.S. thanks to EB-5. Perhaps the State Department keeps track of everyone who is granted this visa, but this information is not available to the public, and makes any sort of study of individuals taking advantage of this opportunity nearly impossible.

As a result of heated discussions between more critical lawmakers like Grassley, and strong supporters, such as the Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, there was some limited consensus towards reform of the system, which would include more effective screening procedures, a higher security threshold, a quota restriction by country, and other such measures. However, with the uncertainty of a heated presidential election, it was decided to wait for cues from the next administration, which, as we now know, shifted the focus of the discussion towards other immigration reform issues, such as the crackdown on illegal immigration, the renewal of DACA, refugee admission policy, temporary immigration restriction on a country basis, and restrictions on the work visas.

In light of the recent renewal in discussing the placement of a better screening system for immigrants, it is time to return to this EB-5 question. Danger to our country’s security may come just as much from educated engineers, such as highly ideological 9/11 terrorists, as from poor Uber drivers. And the danger can be as immediate and violent as a terrorist attack and as imperceptible as the building of IRGC-linked Shi’a “cultural centers” and mosques by wealthy Iranian investors in California, where individuals are brainwashed into supporting positions counter to U.S. interests. Let’s face it, a country in which all the wealth is distributed by the government, like North Korea, and the yearly salary of an average government employee does not exceed $15,000 per year, who can afford to pay $500,000 to $1,000,000 for a visa? The answer is, someone very powerful, who, without a doubt, is connected to the regime and pursuing goals that further that regime’s agenda. It is our job to push for reexamination of such irresponsible policies, which let in hundreds, if not thousands, of wealthy promoters of the regime’s policies who “invest” in our country’s economy by sponsoring anti-American education or building gathering centers for extremists, and to go back and scrutinize anyone who came into the country under such a visa, provided the State Department has not already “expunged” these records.

Extreme Vetting? Not If You Don't Have Specialists

After today's terrorist attack in New York (which President Trump called an act of a sick and deranged person), perpetrated by an Uzbeki here on a diversity visa, the president stated that he instructed the Department of Homeland Security to step up extreme vetting.

Uzbekistan has portions of the country that are hotbeds of terrorist activity.

No offense, Mr. President, but our DHS knows zilch, zip, nada about Uzbekistan or other Central Asian countries.

We couldn't find enough Russian language specialists in the State Department to translate one button correctly.

Who are we kidding here?

No Secrets Left Worth Keeping

First we find out that a Russian cybersecurity firm got to examine the source code for central Pentagon software under Obama.

Then we learned that Russian hackers stole NSA data, which may allow for easier penetration.

Now it turns out that Chief of Staff Kelly's phone was compromised since last December, and he didn't learn of the breach until this summer, all the while being the head of the Department of Homeland Security!

If the head of DHS doesn't check for bugs, hacks, and other technical compromises of his devices, what can be said of everyone else in the government?

Aren't there common sense protocols for compromise awareness that our officials are briefed on when taking office?

And that's not even counting the obvious and inexcusable negligence of Javanka keeping officials on private servers after all the brouhaha with Hillary Clinton doing the same thing.

Jeez.