Wednesday, October 18, 2017

New Strategy in Afghanistan Already a Bust

With Taliban continuing to gain ground in Afghanistan, not without assistance from Russia, and taking over 3 districts in the past 2 days, our "new" strategy in Afghanistan seems to be flawed.
First of all, we cannot really achieve victory without cutting off the source of fuel and other resources (i.e. Russia) from the enemy. However, that does not appear to be the goal. Our "surge" of several thousand people is aimed at providing additional training and counsel to the local police. However, this tactic seems little to do with the stated goal, which is to back the Taliban into a corner and force them to the negotiating table. Without a significant realignment of strategy, human resources, and capabilities, actions by the Afghan forces are not likely to change, and all of that will take significant time, during which period, the Taliban will continue gaining ground, making the consequent push back that much harder.
So basically, Taliban right now has the momentum. We added more troops for counseling, but did not otherwise significantly shift the situation on the ground. And we have no specific stated measurement of success, but without any military education whatsoever, I can tell you want one such measurement logically should be: How much ground our allies have regained from the enemy. I sure hope that there is some secret plan that will emerge like deus ex machina at the last minute, and we will see an immediate reversal of fortunes for everyone involved. Right now, however, we are off to an inauspicious start.

Lame Excuses from the Pentagon

The Pentagon is claiming ignorance about the blitz takeover of Kirkuk by IRGC and Iraqi forces.

If so, one of the three things is true:

1. Our own "allies" just stabbed us in the back by failing to inform us about an attack on another ally - and we are perfectly ok with that.

2. Our intelligence capabilities are at an all-time low.

3. Someone's lying, and we actually knew all along, but didn't want to get involved, and now, after international criticism for inaction, are trying to make ourselves look somewhat better by claiming incompetence and victimhood over malice.

Either way, shame on DoD.

The futility of the War on ISIS

The US forces are attacking ISIS in Yemen.

While that in itself is not a bad thing, I get the sense that the Pentagon, as with Syria, is missing the big picture. Much of the ruin in Yemen is the result of a proxy war between Iranian-backed Houthis and other groups backed by the Saudis. Radicalization which is leading people straight to ISIS is certainly not helpful, but overall, the conflict between state actors is a much more significant reflection of the geopolitical reality in the region.

And the fact that we are, once again, focusing our efforts on eradicating a terrorist group, that will come back in some other form in a matter of time, ignoring the factors that lead to proliferation of extremists, shows clearly that after all this time, after 16 years of fighting the War on Terrorism, we still don't get it.

Shooting at ISIS without trying to get bigger conflicts in the area resolved will not do anything to stabilize the reason. Syria will soon fall prey to terrorist attacks by other groups who have made their homes in the ground, and Iranian presence and the inflow of Shi'a militias into the area will create additional hostilities. We have not fixed a damn thing. We put a band aid, patted ourselves on the back, and moved on to the next sideshow.

Tuesday, October 17, 2017

On the Harvey Weinstein Kerfuffle and Victimhood

Teaching would-be victims how to defend themselves and not be victims is not victim-shaming or victim-blaming. It's a way to prevent dangerous situations and potentially save people from traumatic experiences. No one is taking moral culpability off the offender. But would you rather have to survive sexual assault or exploitation and then get to talk how evil the attacker was or prevent sexual assault or exploitation was and talk about how evil the attempted attacker was? And frankly, if stopping the attacker first time around is going to deter him/her from future assaults, it's well worth it.

Refighting the Cold War in Afghanistan

The current US Afghanistan strategy is to destroy ISIS and to force Taliban to the negotiating table.

Russia's strategy is to arm Taliban and to give it free stuff, like fuel, in order to strengthen it vis-a-vis ISIS (at least, that's what it says).

By arming the very terrorist organization, NATO forces are fighting, Russia is engaging in a proxy war with the US.

Wait a second, haven't we done this before? And haven't we learned anything?

Only now we have American boots on the ground. Why is the new strategy not addressing this macro issue of having to contend with Russia?

Dangerous Words Lead to Dangerous Actions

In an earlier post, I surmised that dehumanization of Kurds and other minorities in Turkey can eventually lead to the justification of mass atrocities against them, just as in 1915, the Ottomans used political enmity to justify the massacre of over a million Armenian men, women, and children.

However, the US ally Erdogan is not the only one capable of riling up the masses into an extreme nationalistic (and also religious) fervor. Our other ally, supported, supplied, and strengthened by the United States, Iraqi VP Nouri Al-Maliki, recently stated that ISIS was created in Erbil in order to lead to the partition of Iraq.  This level of political propaganda, and there is no doubt that's what this is, is aimed to manipulate tribal, deeply divided, and in many cases, largely uninformed public to shift the blame for lack of unity inside the country from the people who drew the maps with the purpose of creating internal divisions and thus minimizing the possibility of rebellion against the British Empire to the Kurds, who are seeking a peaceful separation.

There is no question that in an unstable region fraught with tensions, such comments are inherently incendiary and can be interpreted as an incitement to hatred, if not to outright violence. The people of Iraq who have suffered greatly in the hands of ISIS are now being pointed in the directions of the Kurdish region, which played a significant part in the fight against the common enemy, as a perpetrator. The idea that Kurds created ISIS is as preposterous as comparing right-wing Jews to Nazis, and yet, this comment was made by the Vice President of the country.  This is the government the United States supports and considers a legitimate democratic representation of all of the people of Iraq. Despite President Trump's comments that the United States is not taking sides in any tensions between Baghdad and Erbil, the State Department stated otherwise, specifically calling for joint administration of all regions, and claiming that separation might be exploited by ISIS, and likewise referring to all parties involved as Iraqi partners, despite the fact that the recent independence referendum established that at the very least, the Kurds no longer think of themselves as such, nor wish to stay in this dubious union.

However, even such commitment to the chimeric idea of Iraqi national unity does not justify excusing and ignoring blatantly provocative comments from top level officials, who are maliciously and deliberately encouraging strife and violence against a particular group of people. US should pressure Al-Maliki into disavowing his comments, issuing an official apology to the Kurds, and explaining that Kurds were equal partners in the fight against ISIS and can in no way be blamed for its creation. What makes these comments particularly dangerous is that they complemented by action. Specifically, despite earlier claims from the Pentagon that the invasion of Kirkuk was due to a misunderstanding of the official instructions, the Iraqi forces, backed by IRGC and Iran-supported militias, are on the march for the second day and have now entered Sinjar.

Sinjar is an area that is home to a large  number of Yazidis, who have also formed their own forces. IRGC is not known for being particularly welcoming to minorities, and Iran and Shi'a militias have threatened Yazidis in the past. Despite tensions with the Barzani government, Yazidis are better off under Kurdish control of the area than should the likes of Soleimani and Al-Maliki be left in charge.  Barzani, meanwhile, issued a non-commital statement expressing an unspecified hope for the creation of an independent Kurdistan one day in the future. With PUK reportedly having abandoned Barzani's coalition due to an agreement with or perhaps pressure from the IRGC forces, Kurdish unity is likewise in question. As they quarrel and point fingers, Baghdad's agents continue to gain control of essential oil fields, leaving the Kurds with not much to go on at this juncture. The visuals of the Iraqi forces on the march with their Iranian partners while the Vice President is making comments blaming the Kurds for the creation of ISIS are striking and horrific. Kirkuk was largely empty and for now the troops are under control, focusing on their military targets, but it takes but a match to light the fires of enmity, fear, and nationalist fervor that could lead to bloody attacks against the locals. Such reprisals may indeed be planned by the Iraqi government in order to ensure complete control and kill off the Kurdish dream altogether. The Pentagon threatened the cessation of armament and supply of the Iraqi troops in the event they attack and cause harm to the Kurds, but it's unclear that this will either actually happen or, even if it does, will in any way undermine the Iraqi determination to subdue the Kurds, in thought as well as in deed.

What should Barzani do now?  Regrouping... and planning a more strategic response that will not, in the future, rely on untrustworthy groups. Including leaders of other tribes and factions into the decisionmaking process regarding further plans may ensure the groups remaining on the same page and being less likely to be divided by IRGC or anyone else. Kurdish democracy is imperfect, and an adversary can easily pick off different parties one by one by promising them future leadership, threatening that particular group, or bad-mouthing Barzani's leadership. There's nothing new to exploitation of internal divisions. In fact, to provide a historical comparison, Israel went through much the same in the early stages of the formation of the state. However, at the end of the day, the leadership managed to summon just enough unity and agreement to do what was needed to be done to achieve independence (and then happily continued to fight and backstab each other from the day Israel was created until now).

Disunity is not an impediment to creation of the state, just so long as there is enough commitment among the core group to make a strategic victory possible. Barzani should take lesson from this experience, and not leave major cities or other sites in the hands of small groups of people. Additionally, this is the time to come to an agreement with Kurds in Syria and Turkey, and start forming and organizing a real army, strong, numerous, and committed enough to stand up to Iraq and its militias, with or without support from the United States, Israel, or anyone else. There will be help, but in the beginning it will be clandestine, limited, and highly dependent on circumstances. Once the Kurds show their commitment to victory through strengths, even the United States will start coming around. But for now, hard times lie ahead, and the Kurds should look inwards for solution, while receiving consultation and limited supported from a few early enthusiasts until such time as they start showing signs of clear success and military superiority.

What US Neutrality on Iraq's Invasion of Kirkuk Means for Our Interests in the Region

Cross-Posted:

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/what-us-neutrality-on-iraqs-invasion-of-kirkuk-means-for-our-interests-in-the-region/

President Trump responded to the entrance of the Iraqi forces and Iran-based militias into Kirkuk this morning by stating that US is not taking sides between Kurds and the Iraqi government and is engaged in encouraging all sides to avoid clashes and continue dialogue.

However, in the context of the current tensions, US neutrality and commitment to non-intervention is taken as betrayal by the Kurds and as tacit approval by Iraq, Iran, and even Turkey. Qassem Soleimani's role in the fall of Kirkuk was the first test of the White House's  new policy on Iran, which includes designating IRGC as a terrorist organization and opposing Iranian expansionism in the Middle east.  Nevertheless, thus far, the administration has failed to show commitment to upholding US law and going after the terrorist leader, despite an opportunity to do so in the course of this operation.

From the perspective of tribal Middle Eastern societies, no matter what President Trump's actual intentions are, he has chosen sides by failing to stop the Iraqi forces from entering Kirkuk, raising the Iraqi flag, lowering the Kurdish flag, seizing the oil field in the area, and in every respect asserting dominion and control over the area. That is a sign of not only a political betrayal, but of a strategic choice that will have long-term repercussion for the region.  Despite the lofty rhetoric about stopping Iran, the United States cannot overlook the alliance about the Abadi forces, trained and supplied by the United States, and Iran-backed Shi'a militias, that in the past, have pressured the Kurds, threatened religious minorities in the area, including Yazidis and Christians, and despite some limited cooperation with the United States on the issues of fighting ISIS (mainly out of self-interest), have otherwise acted as agents of the ayatollah-led Iranian regime.  Both indecisiveness and conscious choice to allow Baghdad and Iranian agents to do as they wish with the Kurdish areas, send the same signals to all involve, and make the United States both unwelcome with the allies, and irrelevant with the adversaries in the region.

Strategic withdrawal from an active role in the region may have its place, but only if it's done on our terms, to our advantage, and in a way that signals a well-thought out foreign policy and defense of interests, rather than weakness, inability to make decisive move, or a choice of undemocratic regimes and bad allies over dependable allies whose help will be needed many times over in the future. Indeed, however, many are not convinced that the position of the administration on this issue is sincere. For instance, Turkey's position on the matter of Kurdish independence may have been the lodestar in this decisionmaking process. Turkey has recently come to an agreement with Iran on a variety of matters, which included increased military cooperation and the issue of Kurdistan's independence referendum. After the fall of Kirkuk, Ankara issued its approval of the invasion.

The administration has been careful in maintaining good relations with Turkey. It had previously pressured Barzani to postpone the referendum, after both Abadi and Erdogan expressed strong opposition. President Trump, despite major policy differences, recently called Erdogan a friend, and Turkey and the US recently concluded a deal over Boeing airplanes. Turkish lobby has been strong in the US. Michael Flynn, President Trump's former national security adviser, had worked for Turkish interests. In fact, shortly before being removed from his position, Flynn had reportedly blocked a military move in Syria that Turkey had opposed. Moreover, as we now know, Turkey had paid off a number of major think tanks that had advised President Trump shortly prior to Erdogan's visit to the White House in May of this year.  President Trump is likely getting very bad advise from the Secretary of State, who views the independence referendum as illegitimate, and from an assortment of sources, who are taken in by the extensive Turkish lobby in the United States.

None of it changes matters. The current calculus throws the Kurds into the arms of Russia, which has already ascended to power along with Iran in Syria, pushing the United States out of a position of significant influence altogether due to our short-sighted focus on only dealing with ISIS. Furthermore, Russia has stayed away from publicly condemning the referendum, and in fact, acted as the biggest financial backer of KRG. Although the Kurdish leadership is generally distrustful of Russia, Russia has proven itself to be a stalwart ally to Assad, and has deftly advocated for the Kurds in Turkey when it suited her interests. Putin's backing of the Kurds in Iraq is not sentimental; rather, he is shrewdly taking advantage of the US inaction to establish Kurdistan as Russia's sphere of influence and rise to power in the Middle East, all without having to expend significant power or resources.

As our influence diminishes and our presence becomes marginal, the US is likely to miss significant opportunities for business and educational investment in Kurdistan; infrastructure projects with potential for job growth for American workers; creation of a stable buffer state in the Middle East that would likely protect our security interests vis-a-vis Iran and Turkey, and spread elements of democracy and liberalization naturally through the people indigineous to the region rather than through conquest, occupation, or or other policies likely to be viewed as colonialist.  What we are losing, however, Russia, Turkey, and Iran are gaining. Sooner or later, the imperial ambitions of these three aggressive states will come to a head in the oil-rich region; however, either one of the three belligerent actors prevails, which will not benefit the region, or the three countries come to a power-sharing agreement, in which case minorities, Israel, and the US will all lose out, or the situation deteriorates to the point of chaos, with civil war, strife, and new waves of refugees repeating the tragic events in Syria. In all cases excepting the instance where US rises to the occasion, shows moral and strategic leadership, and backs Kurdish aspiration to independence, we are looking at some very dismal scenarios that will place America dead last not only in the Middle East, but in the international arena as well.